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PREFACE
This book originates in a research project conducted by the Human Rights Centre 
of Ghent University (UG) in partnership with the University of Cape Town 
(UCT). The project ‘Addressing Traditional Law in Post-Conflict Judicial and 
Legal Development Aid in Sub-Sahara Africa’ (AFTRALAW) was funded by the 
Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) from April 2008 to March 2011, and was 
carried out under the supervision of Professor Eva Brems (UG) and Professors 
Thomas Bennett and Christina Murray (UCT), with Martien Schotsmans as a 
researcher for the component on transitional justice (UG) and Giselle Corradi 
(UG) and Lia Nijzink (UCT) as researchers for the component on justice sector 
aid. An initial version of the results of this three-year policy-supportive research 
was published in Dutch in Bennett, Brems, Corradi, Nijzink and Schotsmans’ 
Internationale Actoren en Traditioneel Recht in Sub-Sahara Afrika: Beleid en 
Interventies op het Vlak van Transitional Justice en Ontwikkelingshulp aan de 
Justitie sector (Academia Press).
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CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA
Giselle Corradi and Martien Schotsmans
1. INTRODUCTION
International actors, such as multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental 
donors and organisations, play an important role in the legal landscapes of Sub-
Saharan Africa. On the one hand, they support transitional justice initiatives in 
the framework of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. On the other hand, they 
provide assistance for interventions in the context of justice sector aid. While 
international support for transitional justice and justice sector aid is not unique 
to the African continent, in this region, international actors’ involvement in these 
domains is noteworthy. This can be explained by a range of factors, such as the 
prevalence of armed conflict and the emergency of democratic regimes in the 
aftermath of the Cold War (Piron, 2005: 1, 2). Concerned with the promotion of 
peace- and statebuilding, the rule of law and human rights, these interventions are 
not neutral. They have significant political consequences in as much as they can 
‘directly or indirectly influence existing legal relations and change the conditions 
under which people are able to use their rights’ (Weilenmann, 2009: 156). Not 
surprisingly, in the past, academics and practitioners have produced a number 
of critical studies of international actors’ legal and judicial interventions in this 
region (Piron, 2006; Barnett et al., 2007; ICTJ, 2007; Samset, Peterson and Wang, 
2007; Uvin, 2009; Lekha Sriram et al., 2011). One of the topics that has recently 
gained momentum within studies of the role of international actors in the field of 
transitional justice and justice sector aid in Africa – and beyond – is the interest 
these actors have started to show in legal pluralism and local normative orders, 
which in this book we refer to by the umbrella term ‘traditional justice’.1 In both 
1 The terms ‘traditional law’ and ‘traditional justice’ are used as umbrella terms throughout 
this book in order to denote a range of local normative orders, legal processes and actors, 
the authority and legitimacy of which does not stem from the state. See Chapters 2 and 8 
respectively regarding the terminological choices specific to Part II of this book dealing with 
transitional justice and Part III dealing with justice sector aid.
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areas, international actors are confronted with the fact that ‘the law’ in Africa 
differs from Western concepts and ideals. African legal orders are composed of a 
combination of formal legislation rooted in legal transplants from former colonial 
powers, co-opted and transformed structures of customary authority with judicial 
functions, and a multi-layered range of local dispute resolution mechanisms, 
the legitimacy of which derives from local socio-historical processes (Obarrio, 
2011). All these normative orders are constantly interacting with each other, 
constituting a highly challenging backdrop for any intervention. Independently 
from the particular stance that international actors take towards this complex 
reality, the interventions they finance and support are inevitably impacted by and 
have an impact on these legal configurations.
Nevertheless, international actors have rarely taken ‘the whole picture’ into 
account. Despite their partial relevance, international actors have traditionally 
focused almost exclusively on formal justice institutions and legal processes, 
while neglecting the rest (Sriram et al., 2011: 7). There are a number of reasons for 
this. On the one hand, international actors have long regarded traditional justice 
institutions as backward.2 On the other hand, international actors tend to over-rely 
on technical and legalistic approaches, including a narrow view on international 
law standards and human rights, which are not always easily compatible with 
traditional justice (McEvoy, 2008; Isser, 2011). International actors’ concern that 
engaging in traditional justice would amount to institutionalising poor justice for 
poor people (Harper, 2011), and that those living in post-conflict countries are 
entitled to ‘the same kind of conventional legal mechanisms as everyone else living 
in modern states’ (Allen, 2006), can be read against these two issues. In addition, 
‘statebuilding’ is approached from a centralistic and Westphalian perspective so 
that engagement with other sources of power is regarded as posing a threat to 
political stability and sovereignty (Chopra, 2009; Clarcke, 2011; Isser, 2011; Kyed, 
2011). In the case of post-conflict and so-called fragile states (i.e. states that are no 
longer capable of providing their core functions – OECD, 2010), the reasoning is 
that they present a greater risk of new conflict, and therefore, that peacebuilding 
needs to focus on statebuilding, i.e. the reinforcement of state structures and 
institutions. This also applies to justice, considering the monopoly of the central 
state on the use of coercion and thus its primary role in the provision of security 
and justice (Albrecht and Buur, 2009; Baker and Scheye, 2007). Hence, there is 
no place for traditional justice in this view. This position became increasingly 
questioned by a second school of thought that points out that the Western-style 
Weberian state ‘hardly exists in reality outside the OECD’ (Boege et al., 2009; 
Scheye, 2009). Indeed, in many developing countries, alongside or even in the 
absence of functioning centralist state institutions, authority has always been 
situated among various actors. In such ‘hybrid political orders’ the state shares 
2 For an overview of international actors’ perceptions of traditional justice in the context of 
evolving development paradigms see Corradi and Schotsmans, 2012.
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its authority and legitimacy, including its capacity to provide security and justice, 
with other structures, and thus differs fundamentally from our Western state 
model (Boege et al., 2009). This is also called the ‘rule of the intermediaries’ or ‘the 
second state’, i.e. ‘a series of networks and politics that substitute and compensate 
for the lack of authority of the central state and its inability to deliver essential 
public goods and services’ (Scheye, 2009). These networks – customary courts, 
secret societies, traditional structures such as tribal headmen, traditional leaders, 
village communities, clan elders, religious brotherhoods – provide public goods 
and services such as justice to those who adhere to them (Scheye, 2009). Though 
the particular rationales provided by the literature on transitional justice and 
justice sector aid for explaining the need to move beyond state centric approaches 
to justice in Africa may differ in some regards, it is possible to identify a common 
denominator: working with non-state actors starts from the reality on the ground, 
i.e. the plurality of actors providing justice and security (Albrecht and Buur, 2009; 
Baines, 2010), not from an ideal that was never a reality in most African countries 
(e.g. Englebert and Tull, 2008). In addition, some authors emphasise the link 
between legal institutional arrangements and the paradigms of order that lay at 
the basis of different world views. According to this line of argument, in many 
African countries, it is necessary to engage in a plurality of justice institutions 
since a diversity of world views coexist at different scales (Kuyu and Le Roy, 1997). 
In addition, some authors highlight the fact that it is necessary to look at how 
different law institutions are suitable to handle issues emerging from different 
kinds of social relations (Penal Reform International, 2000). This resulted in the 
compelling argument that focusing on the state while leaving out traditional 
justice from the equation is exclusionary (Chirayath et al., 2005). Consequently, 
international actors started to react to these arguments by showing an increased 
concern with ‘the local’, including local forms of justice such as traditional justice.3
In transitional justice, the idea grew around the millennium that each 
transitional justice strategy needs to identify the most appropriate combination 
of complementary approaches and mechanisms considering the specific context 
of the post-conflict country, as a reaction to the one-size-fits-all solutions and 
externally imposed models used until the early nineties, and to the fact that more 
transitions occurred after internal conflicts that involved large groups of citizens 
as perpetrators, victims or both (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010; McEvoy and McGregor, 
2008; Huyse and Salter, 2008; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena, 2006; among 
others). It is now generally accepted that, in order to be effective transitional 
justice strategies must be ‘localised’, i.e. contextually and culturally appropriate 
(Lutz, 2006: 333), ‘place-based’ (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010: 5), coming ‘from below’ 
(McEvoy and McGregor, 2008: 3) or be ‘home-grown’ (Lundy, 2009: 323). The 
call for the ‘localisation’ of transitional justice implied a call to increase ‘local 
3 See for example, DANIDA, 2010; UNDP, 2005, 2004; UN Secretary-General, 2004; OECD-
DAC, 2007; World Bank, 2006, 2003; DFID, 2004; GMECD, 2002.
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ownership’, a concept borrowed from development and peacebuilding (Accra 
Agenda, 2008; Paris Declaration, 2005; OECD, 2001). It has meanwhile been 
integrated in various official documents on transitional justice (United Nations, 
2011; United Nations, 2010; United Nations, 2004; Peace Building Commission, 
2009). The United Nations acknowledge the value of traditional mechanisms in 
the framework of post-conflict justice: ‘For the United Nations, justice is an ideal 
of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and 
the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights 
of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at 
large. It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its 
administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms are equally relevant’ (United Nations, 2004). In the field 
of justice sector aid, the emphasis on poverty reduction that characterises the 
current development paradigm is often translated into interventions that aim at 
improving ‘access to justice for the poor’.4 As the argument goes, poverty is not just 
a matter of material deprivation, but it also entails powerlessness, vulnerability, 
lawlessness and fear for crime (Narayan, 2000). In the African context, this has 
led to the acknowledgement that most people have very limited access to formal 
justice, while an estimated 80 percent of disputes are handled by traditional 
justice institutions (Piron, 2005: 9). Hence, the need to include these institutions 
within access to justice interventions.
This seems to be leading to a progressive shift in the position of international 
actors towards traditional justice in Africa and other parts of the world, 
which can potentially provide some room for looking beyond formal justice – 
although for now this is more the case in the field of justice sector aid than in 
transitional justice, where international actors take a more reluctant approach.5 
It is unclear whether international actors start to give positive value to different 
justice institutions or whether they merely accept legal pluralism as a matter of 
pragmatism and simply attempt to ‘manage’ it (Kyed, 2011). In any case, we seem 
to witness the emergency of a new paradigm where international actors start to 
perceive traditional justice as a Janus-faced phenomenon. On the one hand, it 
can potentially contribute to the relevance of their interventions, but on the other 
hand, engaging traditional justice goes hand in hand with numerous challenges.6 
First of all, there seems to be a lack of clear theory guiding international actors’ 
interventions (Chirayath et al., 2005). Secondly, working with these institutions 
remains problematic from the point of view of the various kinds of management 
systems that international actors apply (Harper, 2011). Third, these legal orders 
are often problematic from a human rights perspective (ICHRP, 2009; UNDP, UN 
Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Last but not least, there are serious political 
4 See for example the ‘Justice for the Poor’ initiative of the World Bank and the ‘Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor Initiative’ of the United Nations Development Programme.
5 With an exception for donor support to Rwanda’s Gacaca justice (Schotsmans, 2011).
6 This perception of traditional justice is visible in all the documents mentioned in supra note 3.
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issues to be considered, both at the local and at the national levels (Clarcke, 
2011). Against this backdrop, studies of international actors’ involvement with 
traditional justice and legal pluralism have increased considerably. Though their 
regional focus is not always Africa in particular, the sheer relevance of traditional 
justice in this part of the world entails that in practice, a considerable share of 
these studies draw on examples from this region. Varied in nature and scope, these 
studies range from scholarly publications to guidelines prepared for international 
agencies.7 As this body of knowledge grows some recurrent threads become 
evident, such as the need to understand the socio-historic-political and cultural 
context and devise tailored interventions that respond to it, the importance of 
taking the political dimensions of legal pluralism into account and enhancing the 
downwards accountability of local actors, the necessity to ‘base’ interventions on 
the experiences of justice users, the idea that international actors need to look at 
justice in a holistic way and engage all stakeholders, and the recognition that all 
these processes take time and require a long term commitment.
While also concerned with the work of international actors, this book links 
theory and practice moving back and forth between the empirical and the 
normative. In other words, this book studies the role of international actors in the 
areas of transitional justice and justice sector aid with respect to traditional justice 
in Africa with the aim of identifying current trends in policies and interventions 
and analysing this empirical material from the perspective of existing normative 
insights. On the one hand, the different chapters interrogate how international 
actors deal with traditional justice in a number of case study countries. They 
describe the kinds of policies and interventions that are actually supported and 
financed with special attention for the kinds of strategies that are deployed in 
order to address areas of tension between traditional justice and human rights. On 
the other hand, the book explores the relationship between international actors’ 
interventions and the body of knowledge that exists in these domains, as well as 
a general socio legal theory. The different chapters are guided by the following 
questions: do the international actors that are active in transitional justice and 
justice sector aid in Africa have any policy or view regarding traditional justice? 
If so, what are the main features of these policies? What kinds of interventions do 
international actors support regarding traditional justice? Are there identifiable 
trends and/or gaps? What are the strategies that international actors follow in 
relation to possible areas of tension between traditional justice and human rights? 
How can these trends feed into the debate about the role of international actors in 
7 For transitional justice related publications see Huyse and Salter, 2008, among others. For 
further publications see Chapter 2. For justice sector aid related publications see Le Roy 
and Kuyu, 1997; Penal Reform International, 2000; Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; DFID, 2004; 
Odinkalu, 2005; Kimati, 2005; Chirayath et al., 2005; Wojkowska, 2006; Weilenmann, 2007; 
ICHRP, 2009; DANIDA, 2009; Toomey, 2010; Wojkowska and Cunningham, 2010; Albrecht 
et al., 2011; Obarrio, 2011; HAKI, 2011; Kyed, 2011; Isser, 2011; Harper, 2011a, 2011b; Clarcke, 
2011; Ubink and Van Rooij, 2011.
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transitional justice and justice sector aid in Africa? The volume does not attempt 
to provide an evaluation of international actors’ interventions nor an exhaustive 
inventory covering all countries of the region. Rather, it offers empirical data 
drawn from examples of who is doing what in a series of case studies. Thereby, this 
contribution identifies regional trends and links them to the existing literature 
by examining the extent to which the insights generated so far by scholars and 
practitioners is reflected in the work of international actors. Based on this, the 
book formulates a number of hypotheses that may explain current trends and 
proposes additional issues that need to be considered in future research agendas. 
Finally, the volume links two fields of intervention that have so far evolved in 
rather parallel ways and explores the commonalities and differences that can be 
found in the areas of transitional justice and justice sector aid.
2. METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES
The material presented in this book is based on a combination of research methods 
that in some regards overlap and in others differ for the sections on transitional 
justice and justice sector aid. This section presents the methodological choices that 
were made in general, while the introductory chapters in Part II on transitional 
justice and Part III on justice sector aid outline the methodological choices that 
differ.
Due to the nature of the research questions, this book relies heavily on 
the case study method. This entails an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
(Yin, 2009). The case study is the preferred method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ are the 
core questions of the research, the investigator has little control over events and 
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2009). It relies on multiple 
sources of evidence and the triangulation of data while benefiting from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis 
(Yin, 2009).
Both for the sections on transitional justice and justice sector aid, a first 
exploratory phase consisted in a systematic review of grey literature produced by 
international actors. During this exercise, the focus was on identifying which actors 
had produced documents discussing their views on traditional justice and legal 
pluralism. At the same time, this phase was dedicated to mapping interventions 
related to traditional justice in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though this mapping was 
not exhaustive, it provided the basis for the identification of interesting case 
studies. The latter were selected on the basis that in those countries a number 
of international actors were found to be active in the field of traditional justice 
and legal pluralism. In addition, they were selected because different actors were 
involved in each case, so that a broader range of actors could be studied. Based on 
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this, three countries were selected for research in the area of transitional justice 
and another four in the area of justice sector aid. The former included Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and Uganda, whereas the latter researched the cases of Malawi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia. At the same time, this phase included 
an extensive review of academic sources, on the basis of which a status question 
was drafted and which provided the foundations for the development of a first 
analytical framework against which the empirical data would be analysed.
The second phase of the research consisted in fieldwork in the above-
mentioned case studies.8 The methods of data collection included semi-structured 
interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, such as government representatives, 
representatives of international actors’ country offices, representatives of civil 
society, formal and traditional justice providers and justice users. One of the main 
objectives of the fieldwork was to be able to deepen on the information that was 
available in the grey literature. Particular attention was paid to discussions with 
international donors that were active in this area so that their specific country 
discourses on traditional justice became clear. In addition, the fieldwork provided 
an excellent opportunity to discuss the topic with international actors that were 
not active in the area of traditional justice and explore their reasons for dismissing 
it. Interviews at governmental and civil society level revealed yet another series 
of issues in relation to local strategies of implementation. Based on this, it was 
possible to produce country mappings of interventions directly or indirectly 
related to traditional justice. In most cases, a number of upcountry projects were 
visited in situ.9 Finally, interviews with formal and traditional justice providers 
and users were geared towards uncovering local perspectives on the relevance of 
interventions.
Once the empirical data had been collected, the findings from the different 
case studies were analysed in a systematic way in order to assess whether similar 
trends were identifiable, both within the fields of transitional justice and justice 
sector aid and across them. At this point, the research moved into a third phase 
where preliminary findings were presented and discussed with stakeholders from 
the case study countries. An International Forum was organised in Cape Town 
from 23 to 25 March 2010, which brought together representatives of stakeholders 
identified during the field research. The Forum served as a platform to discuss the 
8 For the case studies on transitional justice, the fieldwork in Sierra Leone took place from 
05/04/09 to 17/04/09, including 52 interviews, in Rwanda from 10/07/09 to 03/08/09 (including 
a few interviews in Burundi) and from 10/07/10 to 24/07/10, including a total of 115 interviews, 
and in Uganda from 04/08/09 to 22/08/09, including 46 interviews. For the case studies on 
justice sector aid, the fieldwork in Malawi took place from 27/08/09 to 10/09/09, including 
25 interviews; in Mozambique from 11/08/09 to 25/09/09 and from 13/09/10 to 10/10/10, 
including 102 interviews; in Sierra Leone from 05/04/09 to 17/04/09, including 52 interviews 
and in Zambia from 26/11/09 to 05/12/09, including 13 interviews. 
9 In Sierra Leone the researchers conducted interviews with local stakeholders in Makeni, Bo 
and Moyamba. In Mozambique, the researchers conducted interviews with local stakeholders 
in Morrumbene, Massinga, Maxixe and Pemba. 
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findings and explore further questions with these actors. Invited representatives 
from the selected countries were asked to present their views and reflect on their 
experiences with regard to international actor’s engagement with traditional law. 
For this purpose, a series of structured focus group discussions were organised 
during the forum, which aimed at collectively exploring a range of relevant topics 
so that the analytical framework could be refined. In the area of transitional 
justice, considering the important differences between the transitional justice 
landscape in the countries under study, the emphasis of the discussions was 
on the need for localisation, hence for consideration of traditional values and 
mechanisms – which are constantly evolving – and the dilemmas donors are 
confronted with when invited to support such mechanisms, especially when these 
are not part of the state’s transitional framework or when they do not respect 
international human rights or when traditional actors have lost their legitimacy. 
In the domain of justice sector aid, the focus group discussions explored the role 
of institutional frameworks for legal pluralism and reform proposals dealing with 
state recognition and regulation of customary law and traditional justice, the role 
of international actors active in justice sector aid and their current approaches to 
traditional justice in general and the perspectives of traditional justice users and 
providers and the way processes of change unfold at the grassroots level. Finally, 
a more refined version of the results was presented at an international seminar, 
which took place in Brussels on 2 February 2011. The seminar was attended by a 
mixed public of academics and practitioners and it was divided into two parts, 
one focusing on justice sector aid and the other on transitional justice. In both 
cases, the presentation of the research results was preceded by a keynote address 
and followed by a discussion with a panel of experts. Consequently, this book 
results from a process of systematic involvement and consultation of relevant 
stakeholders.
The usual ethical principles guiding qualitative social science research applied 
during the research, namely informed consent, respect regarding confidentiality 
requested by interviewees and access to research results for all actors involved in 
the process.
3. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This book is divided into four parts. In addition to this general introduction, 
which constitutes Part I, Part II is dedicated to transitional justice and Part III to 
justice sector aid. Finally, Part IV deals with a number of common conclusions 
and recommendations.
In Part II, Chapter 2 introduces the research regarding transitional justice 
and develops the conceptual difference between traditional justice mechanisms 
and tradition-based justice mechanisms in transitional justice. Chapter 3 frames 
the policies and interventions of international actors in the historical evolutions 
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on development thinking, international criminal justice, peacebuilding and the 
concepts of ownership and localisation. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical 
data from the case studies in Rwanda, Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone 
respectively. Chapter 7 analyses the data and presents a number of conclusions 
and recommendations for transitional justice.
In Part III, Chapter 8 introduces the aim and scope of the section dealing 
with justice sector aid. The chapter clarifies a number of specific terminological 
and methodological choices that apply only to this section and situates the 
study within the existing literature on the topic. Chapter 9 provides the general 
background to the empirical data presented in the case studies by outlining a series 
of common features running across the legal landscapes of Africa as well as the 
way in which justice sector aid has so far engaged with them. Chapter 10 explores 
how socio-legal theory on legal pluralism relates to the practice of development 
actors and discusses its implications. Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14 present and 
discuss the empirical data from the case studies in Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia respectively, while Chapter 15 analyses how the latter relates 
to the insights presented in Chapters 9 and 10.
Finally, Chapter 16 explores the differences and commonalities between 
international actors’ engagement with traditional law in the context of transitional 
justice and justice sector aid and proposes some recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF TRADITION 
IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Martien Schotsmans
1. AIM AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
Over the past two decades, more than 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
put an end to armed conflict or an authoritarian regime.1 Most of these were 
intra-state conflicts, i.e. conflicts within a single state, between the government 
and one or more armed groups, or between two or more armed groups.2 These 
conflicts caused large numbers of casualties (over 1 million in Sudan, DRC and 
Mozambique, and between 99,000 to 1 million in Rwanda, Angola, Ethiopia, 
Burundi and Liberia).3 During many of these conflicts massive human rights 
violations were committed against civilians and often by civilians.
As a consequence, donors developed strategies to deal with post-conflict 
reconstruction in these countries, with a view to enhance sustainable peace as 
a precondition to the further development of the countries involved. Dealing 
with crimes committed during the conflict, in other words transitional justice, 
was added to the agenda. In this regard, donors have supported internationally 
created tribunals and truth commissions. Given the strong involvement of 
civilians in these conflicts, there was a need for mechanisms to pursue justice and 
reconciliation at a local level, including mechanisms based on traditional values.
In the framework of this evolution, this book looks into to the following 
research questions. First, have international actors involved in transitional justice 
developed a policy in relation to traditional justice and what are the main features? 
Second, what projects, programmes and interventions in the field of traditional 
1 Angola, Burundi, CAR, Congo Brazzaville, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Chad, Togo and South Africa. 
Source: Uppsala University, UPCD-PRIO dataset, www.pcr.uu.se.
2 www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm.
3 Source: Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, www.peri.umass.
edu.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   19 21-4-2015   12:29:10
20 Intersentia
Martien Schotsmans
2n
d  p
ro
of
justice are supported by international actors? And third, how do international 
actors deal with possible tensions between traditional justice and human rights?
2. METHODOLOGY
As mentioned in the introduction to this book, the research methodology 
comprised three steps: a literature review, a series of case studies and the 
submission and discussion of the findings with stakeholders and academics 
during two international seminars. Specifically for the transitional justice 
part of this research, three types of literature were analysed: the literature on 
transitional justice, on peacebuilding and on development. Additionally, some 
literature on legal anthropology, legal pluralism and international criminal law 
was consulted. As to ‘grey’ literature, policy documents of donors, international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and other international actors were 
studied.
Subsequently, three case studies were selected for this part of the research, 
instead of two as planned in the research project, thus allowing further comparison. 
The selection criteria are explained below (section 2.3.1). For each of the three 
cases a literature study was conducted on the country and conflict background, 
in order to map the transitional justice landscape and provide an overview of 
traditional views and mechanisms in the country. Based on this research, 
hypotheses, and questionnaires were developed to conduct semi-structured 
interviews during the field research. The field research in Sierra Leone took place 
in April 2009, in Rwanda (and Burundi) in July 2009 and July 2010 and in Uganda 
in August 2009. The research was not limited to the capital of the country, but 
always included one or more regions in which tradition-based activities had 
taken place (for Sierra Leone: the Makeni, Bo and Moyamba district; for Rwanda: 
various locations in the Huye district, in Rwamagana and around Kigali; in 
Uganda: various locations in and around Gulu). In each country a wide range 
of stakeholders was interviewed: from government to donors, international and 
local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), traditional and religious leaders, 
academics, people involved in policy making and persons who had participated 
in the respective tradition-based mechanisms, either as judge or mediator, as 
perpetrators or victims, or as members of the public. Furthermore, some donors 
were interviewed by telephone or in Belgium and various information exchanges 
took place via e-mail. A total of 212 persons were interviewed (including eight 
persons who were interviewed twice). Focus group discussions were organised 
when considered useful. Furthermore, some tradition-based activities were 
observed (gacaca hearings and an itorero session in Rwanda, and a wang oo 
meeting in Uganda).
After an initial mapping of post-conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
selection was narrowed down to those countries where traditional mechanisms 
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were in one way or another used to deal with past crimes or violations (thus 
excluding Burundi, among others), then again narrowed down to those countries 
where such mechanisms had been supported by international actors (thus 
excluding Mozambique, among others). This led to the selection of Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda and Northern Uganda as case studies, leaving aside some other countries 
where the peace process was still more recent at the time the research started and 
where no lessons were to be learned yet (such as Liberia and Kenya).
The selection of these countries has several advantages.
First, comparison is possible since all three countries have known a 
proximity conflict, i.e. a conflict where civilians were the main targets of the 
crimes committed and where civilians were also among the perpetrators: they 
joined the armed forces or an armed opposition movement in committing these 
crimes, after forceful or voluntary conscription or as a result of hate campaigns. 
This means that victims and perpetrators, even if they did not know each other 
directly, were often from the same village or region and have to live together again 
after the conflict. It is therefore interesting to compare how in the three countries 
tradition-based mechanisms are being used to address problems of post-conflict 
coexistence at an individual and community-level, or even at a national level.
Second, the three countries have ended their respective conflicts in a 
chronological order (Rwanda in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1999 and Northern Uganda 
in 2007, at least according to the dates of the peace agreements for the latter two). 
This timeframe coincides with important shifts in both transitional justice and 
peacebuilding strategies. The study of the three countries and donors’ agency 
therein will illustrate these developments.
Third, a body of literature and research on the use of tradition is available 
on the three countries (although to a lesser extent for Sierra Leone). Since this 
research project did not comprise empirical sociological field studies it will not 
present a final analysis of the use of tradition-based mechanisms dealing with 
past crimes, nor an assessment of their impact. Where appropriate, relevant 
literature will be referred to.
After analysing the obtained data, the preliminary findings were then 
reviewed during the already mentioned Forum in Cape Town, to which five 
key stakeholders from each country were invited (government, donors, NGOs 
and academics). During this Forum, three academics, one from Sierra Leone, 
one from Rwanda and one from Uganda, gave a presentation on an aspect of 
tradition-based mechanisms in their countries. This was followed by three 
focus group discussions. The first concerned the donor perspective and dealt 
with motives, challenges and the responsibility of donors in making the choice 
whether or not to support activities based on tradition. The second looked at the 
official government policy on the use of traditional mechanisms and explored 
the contradiction between the posted and the underlying motives thereof, as 
well as the problem of the lack of political will and how this can be tackled. The 
third discussion examined the issue from the local perspective and looked into 
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the legitimacy of tradition-based mechanisms, and questioned the importance of 
knowing whether they are (re)invented or based on local values. Each participant 
was asked to make a presentation depending on his personal view, followed by a 
debate. The Forum concluded with the presentation and adoption of the findings 
of the participants.
During the final seminar in Brussels, the researchers presented and 
discussed the main difficulties donors face when deciding whether or not to 
support tradition-based mechanisms, as well as lessons, to an audience of donors, 
international NGOs and academics.
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice is about how to deal with legacies of abuses committed in the 
past by previous regimes or during an armed conflict. Transitional justice as a 
concept first occurred in the early 1990s. However, some mechanisms, which are 
today labelled as transitional justice mechanisms, were already used much earlier. 
The war crime tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II, the truth 
commissions or commissions of inquiry established in several Latin American 
countries in the eighties and the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission established in 1995 are all transitional justice mechanisms.
But it is only since some 25 years that transitional justice emerged as a specific 
field of research and practice. Interestingly, transitional justice is being studied by 
various disciplines: law (mainly human rights and criminal law), political science, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and peace and conflict studies (Kritz, 2002). 
Criminology is only recently starting to gain interest in the topic, through 
studies on political crimes and restorative justice (Parmentier, Vanspauwen and 
Weitekamp, 2008). This multidisciplinary approach is linked to the fact that 
transitional justice is a rather policy-oriented field of research. For these reasons, 
definitions can be found in policy papers, ‘grey’ literature as well as in academic 
publications.
With former secretary-general Kofi Annan, the United Nations have fully 
integrated the concept of transitional justice as part of the UN policy, and defined 
it as follows (United Nations, 2004):
‘The notion of “transitional justice” discussed in the present report comprises the 
full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come 
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at 
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all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, 
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof ’.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006) developed its own 
position on transitional justice that it sees as a growing realm within the field of 
human rights. UNDP adopts the following definition:
‘Transitional justice covers the ways in which societies in transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy, or from armed conflict to peace, address legacies 
of gross and systematic human rights abuses and other violations such as large-
scale corruption’.
The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a leading NGO in this 
field, defines the concept as follows:4
‘Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that societies undertake to 
reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse as they 
move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights. In making such 
a transition, societies must confront the painful legacy, or burden, of the past in 
order to achieve a holistic sense of justice for all citizens, to establish or renew civic 
trust, to reconcile people and communities, and to prevent future abuses.’
Whereas there is a common understanding of what transitional justice is about, 
opinions differ slightly on what kind of abuses should be looked into: Kofi Annan 
uses a broad concept of ‘abuses’, whereas ICTJ clearly limits this to widespread 
or systematic human rights abuses, while UNDP mentions gross and systematic 
human rights abuses, meanwhile adding ‘corruption’ as a separate category of 
abuses to be addressed. It is clear that transitional justice does not just refer to 
any kind of abuse, nor to individual or ad hoc abuses. There needs to be a legacy 
of widespread violence or repression, of mass abuses (Freeman, 2006). For the 
purposes of this research, the focus is on international crimes and gross and 
massive human rights violations, as explained further.
Generally, scholars and practitioners agree on accountability, truth telling, 
reparations and non-repetition of violence as objectives of transitional justice. 
Another objective added by many, although not unanimously, is reconciliation 
(Huyse and Salter, 2008). The objective of institutional reform seems to cover 
a broad, not clearly defined area of activities, going from vetting programmes 
(ICTJ) to anything needed to prevent the conflict from reoccurring (UNDP). 
One can wonder if such institutional reform is not too broad a category to be 
considered as a transitional justice mechanism (Roth-Arriaza, 2006). Others, 
4 International Centre for Transitional Justice, www.ictj.org, 16/05/08.
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however, see institutional reform as the correspondent of the state’s obligation to 
prevent serious human rights violations in the future (Freeman, 2006).
This research examines where traditional justice mechanisms fit into these 
objectives. Whereas the first idea probably is that traditional justice mechanisms 
are essentially focused on social healing and reconciliation, the challenge will 
be to verify to which extent they also meet the objectives of accountability, truth 
telling and reparations, and what implications that has. The research will not 
focus on institutional reform in the part of the research regarding transitional 
justice, since this is the object of the chapter on justice sector aid (Chapter 3).5
In conclusion, the research uses the following definition of transitional justice: 
‘that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period 
of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting 
and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law’ (Roht-
Arriaza, 2006).
3.2 . TR ADITIONAL AND TR ADITION-BASED 
MECHANISMS IN TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
During the 1990s, transitional justice was perceived as a kind of ‘tool box’, 
with criminal prosecution, truth finding, reconciliation processes, vetting and 
institutional reform as its main instruments, from which countries emerging 
from conflict could select the most appropriate ones for as far as the international 
community had not already made a choice for them.
Around the year 2000, the limitations of such one-size-fits-all solutions 
began to become clear, and the importance of context-specific solutions was 
slowly being recognised, both by local actors (see for example the criticism 
regarding the distant character of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda) and by international organisations. In 2004, 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: ‘We must learn as well to eschew one-
size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base 
our support on national assessments, national participation and national needs 
and aspirations’ (UN, 2004).
A consequence of the move away from the one-size-fits-all solutions and 
the models imposed from the outside was the flaring up of a debate within 
transitional justice about the need for localisation (Huyse and Salter, 2008; 
Orentlicher, 2007; Roth-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena, 2006; Gready, 2005; Kritz, 
2002). In this debate, transitional justice is understood to be the search for the 
best combination from the wide array of available mechanisms and instruments 
to serve the situation in the country involved. In this spectrum, local mechanisms 
5 Although the possibility to implement transitional justice measures often depends on the prior 
existence of functioning state institutions (Bossire, 2006). 
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to deal with crimes from the past are increasingly emphasised during the past 
few years. These vary from informal to formal, and some are completely new or 
modern. In this context, ‘local’ does not necessarily refer to their applicability in 
a limited geographical area, but more acutely to the source of the mechanisms, 
that emerge from a bottom-up approach, instead of being imposed from above. 
It comprises more traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution, meaning ‘non-
state justice systems which have existed, although not without change, since pre-
colonial times and are generally found in rural areas’ (Penal Reform International, 
2000). Tradition is not a static whole of frozen norms and practices, but is, on 
the contrary, flexible, continually in development and constantly adapting to the 
changed reality.
With the already-quoted report by Kofi Annan, the UN consider the concept 
of justice as being rooted in all national cultures and traditions, recognising the 
specific value of traditional mechanisms: ‘For the United Nations, justice is an 
ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights 
and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the 
rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society 
at large. It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its 
administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms are equally relevant’ (UN, 2004).
Colonial rule gradually replaced informal justice systems by more or less 
formalised native or customary courts, composed of laypersons, who were 
often appointed by the colonial authorities. They would deal with civil matters 
and minor crimes among natives, applying customary law, while more serious 
crimes had to be dealt with by formal courts applying colonial legislation. 
In many African countries, such semi-formalised customary courts continue to 
co-exist with formal justice, leading to a variety of challenges, further analysed 
in Chapter 3 of this book. Under the surface of formal justice, informal justice 
mechanisms continue to play an important role in the settlement of day-to-
day conflicts. Today, the coexistence and simultaneous operation of a variety of 
formal and informal justice mechanisms in the debate on justice sector aid, is 
acknowledged as the inevitable reality of legal pluralism. However, it is also a 
reality in transitional justice, though it is rarely acknowledged as such (Nagy, 
2009; Berman, 2007; see further in section 2.4.3).
In addition to these day-to-day conflicts, some traditional mechanisms 
informally deal with serious crimes that would normally fall under the 
jurisdiction of the formal courts, thus replacing or complementing formal justice. 
In Northern Uganda for instance, a person who has been convicted for murder 
and served a prison sentence, may still be subjected to mato oput – a process 
comprising confessions, mediation, reparations and ritual reconciliation among 
Acholi clans – in order to be fully accepted again in his community (see case 
study on Uganda, section 2.3.4). In Sierra Leone, some acts of wilful revenge 
killing of returning ex-combatants took place after the war, following decisions 
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of the secret societies and implemented by these societies. In Rwanda, a kind of 
informal gacaca – a way of dispute settlement among relatives or neighbours 
at grassroot level – re-emerged in some communities soon after the genocide, 
mainly to settle property disputes related to the genocide without entering into 
the crimes committed.
The transitional justice part of the research distinguishes between two levels 
– the official and the unofficial. Local lay courts applying customary law will not 
be considered, since they usually only have jurisdiction over minor conflicts and 
do not deal with crimes of the past.
It is clear however, as many scholars have pointed out, that these old practices 
have not been conceived to deal with the consequences of serious crimes committed 
at a large scale, across ethnic boundaries, by large numbers of perpetrators against 
large numbers of victims, sometimes even with interchanging roles (Huyse and 
Salter, 2008). In addition, the social context may have been disrupted: people 
have been displaced or lived in camps for many years (as in Northern Uganda), 
traditional leaders have not always been neutral in the conflict (as in Sierra Leone), 
many generation conflicts occur between the elders and the youth and poverty 
is overwhelming, thus making compensation by the perpetrators an illusion in 
all three countries. Finally, even people in rural areas in Africa are not living 
disconnected from the outside world anymore: sensitisation campaigns, primary 
school education, radio and mobile phones and mobility in general have made 
them aware of human rights standards.
Not surprisingly, as tradition is not static but flexible and dynamic, post-
conflict societies adjust traditional mechanisms to this reality: they create new, 
tradition-based mechanisms, inspired both by the underlying traditional justice 
and reconciliation values of old mechanisms and by modern standards such 
as gender and children’s rights, while being considerate of the enormous post-
conflict constraints, such as the high numbers of perpetrators, the trauma of both 
victims and perpetrators and the need for peaceful coexistence of victims and 
perpetrators belonging to the same communities.
This leads to a great variety of mechanisms, situated on a spectrum from 
traditional over tradition-based mechanisms, to real hybrids of traditional and 
modern justice, having in common that each of them is based on the living values 
of a community regarding justice and reconciliation.
3.3. TR ADITIONAL VALUES
This research has tried to look beyond both the romanticised, idealised promotion 
of tradition and the legal centralist rejection of tradition, and to adopt a more 
pragmatic position based on what happens on the ground and on how donors 
and other external actors deal with that. Indeed, the polarisation of the debate 
around the intrinsic value of tradition versus its invented character, compared 
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to the universal nature versus externally imposed human rights standards, is not 
helpful to the debate and does not facilitate the choices donors inevitably have to 
make.
Whether such mechanisms are traditional as such, and therefore legitimate, 
or invented and therefore illegitimate, is in fact a false debate (that one could 
also apply to formal court-based justice mechanisms in these countries, which are 
equally alien to a large apart of the population). The basic point is that they are 
deeply rooted in a people’s culture and based on existing local values regarding 
appropriate responses to serious crime.
Even where traditional practices have fallen into oblivion or where traditional 
leaders have lost legitimacy, people’s concepts on how best to respond to serious 
crime are deeply rooted in their cosmovision or world view, of which traditional 
values are an undeniable part. In the three countries studied in this research the 
underlying traditional justice and reconciliation values of response to serious 
crimes are: the need for acknowledgment of wrong-doing by the perpetrator, but 
also of the context in which the crime occurred, the offering of apologies and the 
possibility to accept these (to be distinguished from forgiveness), a commitment 
not to repeat the past, compensation, reconciliation, full reintegration and the 
restoration of social harmony. The community is an active participant, being an 
important stakeholder considering the need for social harmony.
Unsurprisingly, there are differences as well: whereas ritual reconciliation 
with the ancestors is very important in Sierra Leone, this is not the case in Rwanda, 
where traditional rituals seem to have disappeared. On the contrary, finding the 
bodies of one’s relatives and honouring them with a Christian funeral is crucial in 
Rwanda, while people in Sierra Leone do not really bother about bones and rather 
emphasise the spiritual dimension. In contrast, in Northern Uganda, a parcel of 
land on which people have been killed or skeletons have been found can only be 
cultivated again after purification. Also, whereas the need for the perpetrator to 
acknowledge his responsibility seems crucial in the three countries, the extent 
to which public truth telling is a requirement, or something that may just be 
useful or in contrast, entirely inappropriate is the object of controversy (among 
anthropological scholars).
However, none of these common values sound awkward to a Western public, 
nor do they seem to be in contradiction with human rights. Indeed, they resonate 
to restorative justice values, as practiced in Western countries too, be it not for 
such grave crimes. The way some of the values are materialised in traditional 
justice practices may seem repugnant – such as animal sacrifices – or unusual – 
such as the direct participation of the population in the debates, without being 
unacceptable.
This recent tendency to create hybrid mechanisms, trying to marry 
international standards and local practices, will become more important in the 
future and presents important challenges to donors (see section 2.4.3).
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Such hybridisation – puzzling different pieces together – is not an easy task 
and does not provide a perfect picture from either perspective. In fact, when we 
call such hybrid, tradition-based mechanisms ‘traditional’, traditional leaders in 
these countries may very well call them ‘human-rights based’ or ‘Western-based’. 
Thus, each emphasises the alien aspect of the new mechanism and criticises it, 
depending on his or her perspective.
Looking for inspiration in a society’s (former) traditional practices can have 
the advantage of calling upon an existing normative framework. Their tradition-
based character enhances the chances for local ownership and therefore their 
effectiveness and sustainability. As we will see, the argument of local ownership 
has been one of main motives for donors to support these unfamiliar tradition-
based mechanisms. Problems occur, however, where the existing local values are 
in conflict with international standards. In such instances, donors hesitate to 
support such mechanisms, since they are in contradiction with the principles of 
the donors’ own policy, and supporting them is opposed by international human 
rights organisations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ACTORS ON TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Martien Schotsmans
1. THE CONTEXT OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
The fact that this research project started in 2008 is not a coincidence at all, as 
it finds itself at the crossroads of the trend towards globalisation that started in 
the nineties and the gradually increasing attention for localisation that came up 
around the millennium. Where these two trends intersect, we found the challenge 
of providing substance to localisation without throwing global standards over 
board. This led to the creation of hybrid solutions – and their criticism, as we will 
see. These are obviously complex developments, which this book can only sketch 
in broad lines, with the risk of lack of nuance that any simplification entails.
1.1. GLOBALISATION IN INTER NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, PEACEBUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In the nineties, the importance of international criminal law gradually increased: 
first with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in 1994 and following the adoption 
of the Rome Statute in 1998 and the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in 2002. In addition, the obligation to prosecute and the prohibition 
of amnesty for international crimes developed to become an emerging rule of 
international customary law, some aspects of which were already implied in 
various international conventions (like the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 
Convention for the Prevention of Genocide of 1952, the Convention against 
Torture in 1987). These standards were reflected in various UN instruments 
such as the (Updated) Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through the Fight against Impunity of 2005. This is illustrated by the 
fact that ruling authoritarian elites were able to proclaim self-amnesties during 
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the 1980s, which became increasingly excluded in the last two decades, due to 
pressure by local and international human rights organisations, drawing ‘the net 
of transitional justice tighter’ (Call, 2007).
With regard to our research, illustrations of this evolution can be found in 
the UN disclaimer in the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 relating to Sierra Leone 
– which excluded amnesty for international crimes – and the increasing number 
of trials based on universal jurisdiction (including the prosecution of Rwandan 
suspects, among others, in Lausanne in 1999 and in Belgium since 2001), and of 
course the debate about whether the Ugandan traditional mechanisms meet the 
international obligation to prosecute.
With the end of the Cold War and of a number of armed conflicts and 
authoritarian regimes in Africa, donors started to gain interest for peacebuilding 
in post-conflict countries as a separate policy area between emergency relief and 
development. Considering the high risk of a renewed outbreak of violence within 
five years after the end of an armed conflict (between 20 and 50%, see: Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004) programmes for peacebuilding tried to find ways to create positive 
peace (Galtung, 1985) as a condition for sustainable development. This means 
that post-conflict countries require a transitional period of peace before they can 
be incorporated into development programmes. Over the years, the initial linear 
distinction between preventive diplomacy, peace negotiations, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding (see: United Nations, 1992) was replaced by the view that 
peacebuilding is a complex process for which a more integrated and coordinated 
strategy of the various actors and a wide range of measures are needed (see: United 
Nations, 2000). The conviction grew that such strategies are only successful if 
they focus on the root causes of the conflict. Hence the importance attached to 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, combating corruption and finally 
the need for justice for past crimes increased. (Chetail, 2009; OECD, 1997; UN 
Secretary-General, 1998).
This coincided with the fact that in the nineties respect for human rights 
also became an important principle in development (Carey, 2007; UN Secretary-
General, 2005; Uvin, 2002; UN Millennium Declaration, 2000; OECD-DAC, 
1993; European Community, 1991), and peacebuilding (Uvin, 2009; OECD-
DAC, 2001). This comprised the ‘do no harm’ principle, which means that all 
aid has an impact beyond its intended goal and that any unintended negative 
impacts should be avoided wherever possible (OECD-DAC, 2007a). Donors 
should therefore ensure that their intervention is not perceived as a complicity to 
human rights abuses (OECD-DAC, 2007b). Even Kofi Annan stressed in his 2004 
report the importance of respecting human rights and international standards in 
developing a transitional justice strategy (UN Secretary-General, 2004).
This recognition of the need to address past crimes as part of peacebuilding 
and the increasing importance attached to the criminal prosecution of 
international crimes brought transitional justice automatically on the agenda 
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of peace negotiators (as in Sierra Leone, Northern Uganda, the DRC, Burundi, 
Liberia, among many others).
1.2 . LOCALISATION IN TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
As explained above, around the same time an evolution took place in transitional 
justice, from the use of standard solutions to more attention for the specific context 
and for local solutions, including tradition-based mechanisms. This coincided 
with the shift in the nature of armed conflicts (more intra-state then interstate), 
which implied that – either voluntarily or under coercion – more civilians were 
involved in the conflict, as perpetrators and as victims, often with interchanging 
roles. Inevitably perpetrators and victims had to learn to live together again after 
the conflict, creating a need for mechanisms to establish sustainable peace at a 
local level, in addition to mechanisms operating at a national or international 
level. Moreover, experience (in Rwanda) had learned that the retributive justice 
system could not provide this solution because of the massive scale of the crimes.
1.3. LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND HAR MONISATION 
IN DEVELOPMENT COOPER ATION
This development went parallel with a shift within the development paradigm, 
which caused an increased attention for traditional law in justice sector aid as 
well. As explained in Chapter 9, development aid only gained interest in the justice 
sector in the 1990s and in traditional law only since the late twentieth century. 
Justice sector aid was initially focused on the state and on institution-building 
based on the international model, but evolved into more interest in an accessible, 
local justice in the context of the fight against poverty. This shift was reflected in 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) which contains the principles for 
reform of international aid, and indicators to monitor progress. The Declaration 
stresses the importance of ownership by the partner country and requires donors 
to align their interventions to the policies and development strategies of partner 
countries and provide mutual accountability. The principle of local ownership 
was later retained by the UN Peacebuilding Commission.1 In addition, the Paris 
Declaration found that there was a need for greater harmonisation on the donor 
side. In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action adopted, aiming at accelerating and 
deepening the implementation of the Paris Principles – including an emphasis 
1 Peacebuilding Commission, Emerging lessons and practices in Peacebuilding 2007–2009, 
Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission, May 2010.
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on national ownership – effective and inclusive partnerships and a results-based 
approach.2
Not only were donors under the Paris Declaration encouraged to harmonise 
their policies and interventions with other donors and to align them to the 
development policy of the partner country, they also had to harmonise the policies 
and practices of various ministries or departments within their own country in 
dealing with partner countries.
Where donors initially left the conduct of peace negotiations with their 
diplomatic services, while the defence department participated in peacekeeping 
efforts, followed by the development agencies which then started the long term 
work, the development of peacebuilding as a separate phase, and as a complex 
of various political, military and humanitarian measures, lead to a need for 
internal donor harmonisation. This meant that the different departments within 
a donor country could no longer implement their own policies in the post-
conflict countries, sometimes with contradictory agendas and interests, with only 
some attempts for coordination. The whole-of-government concept was born, 
also known as the ‘3 Ds policy’, i.e. diplomacy, defence and development as an 
integrated strategy. In light of this development and especially for post conflict 
countries, some multilateral and bilateral donors created inter-departmental 
units, while some others established entirely new departments or organisations 
for peacebuilding.3 Such agencies have the advantage that their procedures are 
often smoother and faster, require no long term planning and allow funds from 
different donors to be grouped and managed through for example UNDP (Uvin, 
2009). An analysis of such agencies from 24 countries has, however, indicated that 
they use very different definitions of peacebuilding and that the mandate of these 
agencies, their priorities and activities vary considerably (Barnett et al., 2007). 
Hence, the authors of this analysis state that interventions are often based on the 
supply of these agencies, rather than on a demand by the post-conflict country. 
In addition, this complicates an effective coordination between donors that goes 
beyond agreements on the division of labour. Finally, the establishment of these 
agencies as such does not fulfil the need for more substantive harmonisation 
2 Accra Agenda for Action (2008) Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra.
3 Some examples: The Office of Transition Initiatives in the United States; the Africa Conflict 
Prevention Pool and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool in the UK established in 2002, the 
Postconflict Reconstruction Unit in the UK established in 2004 and transformed into the 
Stabilization Unit in 2007; the Inter-ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention 
in Germany. The UN have created the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding 
Fund, while UNDP established the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery. In the 
field, integrated UN offices have been established in various countries, in which temporary 
UN missions (DPKO) cooperate with UNDP, UNOHCR, etc. The European Commission 
created a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. The Netherlands have a Section 
for Peacebuilding and Fragility within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Belgium did the same 
with the Service for Peacebuilding.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   34 21-4-2015   12:29:11
Intersentia 35
Chapter 3.  The Policy of International Actors on Traditional Justice 
in  Transitional Justice
2n
d  p
ro
of
between the various aspects of peacebuilding programmes, such as between 
demobilisation programmes and transitional justice.4
2. POLICIES REGARDING TRADITIONAL 
MECHANISMS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
To see to what degree the context described above influences donor policy 
regarding traditional justice as transitional justice mechanism, the policy of 
donors on transitional justice has to be dissected first.
2 .1. POLICIES R EGAR DING TR ANSITIONAL JUSTICE
With exception of the United Nations (UN Secretary-General, 2004), it would 
appear that not a single donor (multilateral or bilateral) has formulated a 
comprehensive approach specifically regarding transitional justice. The already 
cited report by Kofi Annan premises a number of definitions (see Chapter 3, 
point 3.1), sketches the role of the UN in this context and recommends certain 
guidelines and methods. Additional guidelines were proposed in 2010 (UN 
Secretary-General, 2010). The point of departure of this policy is the notion that 
sustainable peace is only feasible if there are legitimate mechanisms for conflict 
resolution. This requires the establishment of the Rule of Law on the one hand and 
transitional justice on the other, which must include dealing with the causes of the 
conflict. The guidelines refer to the importance of including transitional justice 
in peace agreements, excluding amnesty and capital punishment, respecting 
international norms and human rights, and paying special attention to women, 
children, minorities, refugees and prisoners. Additional attention is drawn to the 
importance of adjusting every transitional justice strategy to the specific context 
and local needs, involving all stakeholders in the process, among others through 
consultations, capacity building, defining the most appropriate combination 
of mechanisms and the necessary coordination between UN agencies among 
themselves and with other actors.
Other donors mention the importance of democratisation, good governance, 
(re)establishing the Rule of Law, respect for human rights and the fight 
against impunity as their general goals, both in their foreign policy (including 
peacebuilding) and in their development policy. Furthermore, one often 
finds an enumeration of currently supported and future activities, without a 
comprehensive policy. Support for the various mechanisms used in transitional 
justice – criminal prosecution by international, mixed or national tribunals and 
4 For example: DDR and Transitional Justice, Issue paper, Second International conference on 
DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, DRC, 12–14 June 2007. 
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courts, truth mechanisms, rehabilitation programmes, reconciliation activities 
and institutional reform – is spread out over several policy domains, strategies and 
budget lines. For example, the aforementioned agencies for peacebuilding often 
state that they support transitional justice, referring in concreto mostly to support 
for the International Criminal Court, ad hoc tribunals and sometimes a truth 
commission in the context of their goal to fight against impunity. Supporting 
national criminal justice reform often holds a prominent place on the post-
conflict reconstruction agenda, since it is a necessary requirement to prosecute 
past crimes and prevent new violence, but it can also be found in development 
aid. Support for reparations is quite rare, unless it involves rehabilitation, which 
can be found either in post-conflict reconstruction programmes, or as part of 
the development aid to the respective sectors. Examples can be found in the 
health sector (e.g. trauma counselling, prosthetics, retroviral medication, 
removal of scars) and in the education sector (e.g. programmes for the education 
of former child soldiers). Bilateral support by donors for programmes aimed 
at direct financial compensation of victims is uncommon, unless it occurs 
through multilateral organisations such as the Peacebuilding Fund. Support for 
reconciliation activities usually falls under programmes for peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention. In fact, reconciliation turns out to be an umbrella term under 
which all kinds of local activities are grouped, ranging from training on conflict 
mediation, counselling programmes, support for the reintegration of persons in 
their community, to microcredit, infrastructure projects and support for farming 
projects, of which the link with reconciliation is not always clear. As Daly and 
Sarkin state, there are ‘literally thousands of groups that at any given moment 
work on reconciliation all around the world.’ The authors claim that it is impossible 
to ascertain exactly how many groups are involved, partly because new groups are 
created and old groups disappear or merge into collective organisations (Daly 
and Sarkin, 2007). Institutional reform as part of a transitional justice strategy 
to deal with the causes of the conflict can comprise a wide range of activities 
that are usually labelled as Security Sector Reform (SSR), which includes justice 
reform and vetting programmes. In reality, SSR, in the context of peacebuilding, 
often concerns reform of police and the military. Justice sector reform other than 
criminal justice reform usually follows later and is then part of development 
cooperation.
This overview shows that most donors not only lack a comprehensive policy 
on transitional justice, but that interventions that can be seen as transitional 
justice support are spread out over several programmes and budget lines, and 
often even over several services or agencies of the same donor. Moreover, many 
bilateral donors support peacebuilding through multilateral organisations, such 
as the diverse UN agencies,5 that support transitional justice mechanisms. This 
5 Regarding transitional justice these are mainly: UNOHCHR, UNDP, UN Peacebuilding Fund, 
and, to a certain degree, Unicef, Unifem (now UN Women).
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lack of policies on transitional justice does not prevent donors from becoming 
more and more interested in the development of such policy (International Centre 
for Transitional Justice, 2007). Several donors have recently supported policy-
preparing research on transitional justice.6 It furthermore turns out that in their 
interventions these donors de facto apply most guidelines formulated by the UN.
2.2 . POLICIES R EGAR DING TR ADITIONAL 
MECHANISMS
Donors who in one way or the other support transitional justice also support 
traditional mechanisms in that context. Since few donors have a policy on 
transitional justice, they a priori lack such policy regarding the use of traditional 
mechanisms in the framework of transitional justice. As the case studies and 
their analyses will show, donor support for such mechanisms is largely prompted 
by the requirement of local ownership, as expressed in the Paris Declaration of 
2005 and further elaborated upon in the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008. This 
development also had an impact on the debate surrounding the localisation of 
transitional justice, as already referred to above.
The application of the concept of local ownership in transitional justice led 
to the following developments. First came an acknowledgment of the need to 
adjust strategies and mechanisms to the local context: the toolbox mechanisms 
were maintained, but more or less adjusted to the context, while the most 
appropriate combination of mechanisms was identified considering the specific 
situation of the post-conflict country. This remained a top-down approach from 
the international to the national level. At the level of international justice, this 
is when mixed mechanisms emerged, such as the Special Court in Sierra Leone 
(2000), the Serious Crimes Panels in Timor (2000), the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (2001) and the War Crimes Chambers in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2005).
This was later followed by an increasing acknowledgment of the value and even 
prime responsibility of national mechanisms in addition to international ones, 
if consistent with international standards: e.g. the prosecution of international 
crimes by domestic courts and donors’ investment therein (e.g. Rwanda and 
Burundi). The ICC itself, established in 2002, is an illustration of this evolution 
since it emphasises that the prime responsibility for prosecution rests with the 
6 Some examples: for the European Union, the report ‘the European Union and Transitional 
justice’ by Laura Davis for the Initiative for Peacebuilding Mediation Cluster, June 2010; for 
the Netherlands the report ‘Transitional justice. Justice and peace in transitional situations’ of 
the Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public 
International Law, Advise no. 65, AIV/n°19 CAVV, April 2009; for Germany: ‘Transitional 
justice & Dealing with the past’ by Natascha Zupan and Sylvia Servaes for FriEnt (Working 
Group on Development and Peace), June 2007.
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country where the crimes occurred, while the ICC serves as a complement in case 
the country is unable or unwilling to prosecute.7
The Paris Declaration emphasised the need for country ownership, which 
initially was understood as mainly government ownership (the fact that gacaca 
justice was in the first place a ‘Rwandan’ solution was very attractive to donors 
around the millennium) – while the legitimacy in the eyes of the population was 
not verified. At the level of international criminal justice, this is when discussion 
on the legacy (transfer of capacity and cases) of international and mixed courts 
towards domestic courts occurred.
The concept of country ownership gradually expanded to national ownership, 
hence the involvement of non-state actors as stakeholders in the peacebuilding 
process (Accra Agenda for Action 2008). This was not an obvious evolution since 
peacebuilding strategies initially focused on statebuilding and the fear was that 
working with local structures would undermine this process (Chopra, 2009).
Thus, non-state actors – civil society organisations, religious and traditional 
leaders – became important participants in both peace processes (conferences, 
negotiations) and in transitional justice mechanisms (monitoring, participation). 
Hence, donor support that allowed these organisations to participate in 
preliminary conferences (as in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 1999) and even in 
peace negotiations (in Lomé for Sierra Leone and in Juba for Northern Uganda) 
primarily aimed at creating local ownership.
At the same time, international guidelines for peacebuilding emphasised 
the importance of supporting civil society as watchdogs of government policy, 
protectors of human rights, advisors and peace negotiators (OECD-DAC, 
2001). That is why donors supported capacity building of local NGOs (through 
international organisations such as the International Center for Transitional 
Justice) and activities of transitional justice coalitions of civil society stakeholder 
organisations of a particular country. The restoration of traditional leaders 
in Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda was also inspired by the importance of 
local involvement in peace negotiations and transitional justice mechanisms. 
Regarding criminal justice, the importance of outreach by international, hybrid 
or mixed courts started to be emphasised. One step further was the involvement 
of the population as such. Hence, the importance of consultations was added. 
Apart from asking the input of civil society organisations, popular consultations 
(by NGOs and INGOs, the UNOHCHR, the government) became a current 
practice. Most of them were conducted post-decision, i.e. when the transitional 
justice strategy had already been established (as in Rwanda, where people’s 
opinion was asked when the decision to establish gacaca courts had already 
been taken at a political level). In Burundi, the government supported by the UN 
has held real national consultations, but only years after the framework of the 
transitional justice strategy had been adopted in the Arusha Peace Agreement of 
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, preamble and art. 17.
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2000. The Guidance note of the Secretary General of the United Nations of March 
2010 promotes national ownership either ‘to shape the design of an overarching 
transitional justice strategy’ or ‘within the context of a specific mechanism’. 
However, real popular involvement in the decision process ab initio is rare (UN 
Secretary-General, 2010).
The fact that top-down planning in transitional justice has been replaced by 
a process in which the national governments and later civil society stakeholders 
are included has opened the door to traditional and other local views on justice 
and reconciliation, which led the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
acknowledge the value of traditional justice within a rule of law and transitional 
justice framework in his 2004 report.8
Because donors attach great importance to local ownership, aiming for 
this is an important motive in decisions concerning specific interventions. 
While in the past donors decided to support or refrain from supporting certain 
mechanisms once these were established, we now observe a move to additional 
donor interventions during preparation processes. These aim to identify the local 
needs and to create ownership. The increased attention for human rights and the 
‘do no harm’ principle subsequently gave rise to more donor interventions related 
to monitoring and supervision of the mechanisms.
Hence, donor interventions regarding the use of traditional mechanisms in 
the framework of transitional justice can be classified into four categories. First, 
support for preliminary processes. These include, among others: (i) facilitating 
the participation of traditional leaders in negotiations, conferences and 
consultations (including the preceding restoration of traditional leadership or 
traditional bodies and training on transitional justice and human rights); (ii) the 
promotion of traditional values, directly by traditional leaders or by other civil 
society actors; and (iii) support for processes that create hybrid, tradition-based 
mechanisms through policy-oriented research and consultations. Second, support 
for tradition-based mechanisms as an element of peacebuilding and the official 
transitional justice policy. Third, support for tradition-based mechanisms outside 
of the official transitional justice policy. And fourth, support for monitoring/
supervising tradition-based mechanisms, especially in view of respect for human 
rights.
3. CONCLUSION
The above shows that traditional mechanisms for justice and reconciliation have 
not come to the attention of donors because of their intrinsic values, but mainly 
because the concept of local ownership generated attention for local, tradition-
8 See also the Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, 2007. Peacebuilding Commission 
Lessons Learned Working Group, 2008.
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based solutions. These were proposed as part of transitional justice either by the 
government of the partner country (such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda), or by 
civil society actors consulted and supported by donors (such as in Uganda). The 
fact that traditional mechanisms were not integrated in the official transitional 
justice policy in Sierra Leone is also a result of this evolution, since state ownership 
was decisive at that moment (1999).
It subsequently shows that the increased importance of peacebuilding and 
the search for mechanisms to create sustainable justice on a local level also play 
a role, while donors engage themselves to respect international standards with 
regards to the duty to prosecute international crimes and to ensure respect for 
human rights.
The convergence of these different developments and the dilemmas that 
emanate from them show that the support for tradition-based mechanisms is not 
obvious for donors and implies quite some challenges. This will be illustrated by 
the case studies presented in Chapters 4 to 6.
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CHAPTER 4
NON-OFFICIAL USE OF TRADITION: 
A CASE STUDY ON SIERRA LEONE
Martien Schotsmans
1. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
Sierra Leone gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. Before 
then, the country was divided into two parts: the Freetown peninsula, i.e. the 
current Western area, which was a British colony. It was considered a part of the 
British Empire and was directly ruled by the British administration. It was mainly 
populated by freed slaves who spoke Krio. Here common law was applied. The 
rest of the country was a protectorate, inhabited by ‘natives’, ruled indirectly and 
under a mixed system of common and customary law. The British divided the 
protectorate into 400 chiefdoms that were indirectly ruled by traditional chiefs 
who now became the representatives of the British and were called ‘Paramount 
Chiefs’. This undermined their legitimacy and abolished their downward 
accountability.
The 1947 Constitution united the country to prepare it for independence. 
After independence, any government in power relied on the traditional chiefs 
as their local representatives, as did the colonial power before. Bad governance, 
the submission of all state institutions (army, police, parliament, judiciary, civil 
service, chieftaincies, etc.) and non-state oversight bodies (media, civil society, 
etc.) to party control, the imposition of a one-party system in 1978, corruption, 
nepotism, the plundering of state assets and the lack of respect for any human 
rights of the citizens, led to a strong feeling of alienation: the central government 
became almost irrelevant to people’s everyday lives and they rather turned to 
local, traditional leaders and secret societies instead (traditional organisations 
of persons who have been initiated together and who share a number of 
secrets).1 However, even at this level, the bad governance practices of the central 
government had trickled down to the chiefs, leaving people with no outlet to vent 
1 The most important ones being Poro and Wonde for men, Sande and Bondo for women, but 
others exist as well.
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their grievances. Violence became the only alternative. Poor, disgruntled youth 
of the rural areas could easily be mobilised by armed groups who opposed the 
government (TRC report, 2004, Vol. 2 and 3A). Since 1991, Sierra Leone has a 
constitutional presidential regime based on a multiparty system and periodic 
elections, which took place even during the conflict.
Sierra Leone experienced a violent conflict from 1991 to 2002. This opposed, 
on the one hand, the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) supported by 
Liberia, later joined by the military of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) who overthrew the government in 1997 – and on the other hand the 
government army (SLA) and local Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Many war crimes 
and crimes against humanity were committed by all armed factions, be it not to 
the same extent. During the conflict, over 2 million persons were displaced, an 
estimated 50,000 to 75,000 people were killed, 50,000 to 64,000 women and girls 
were victims of sexual violence, approximately 10,000 children participated in the 
fighting and about 4,000 persons were victim of amputation (Suma and Correa, 
2009; Dougherty, 2004; Physicians for Human Rights, 2002; International Crisis 
Group, 2001).
After the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999 and international armed 
intervention, the Lomé peace agreement was signed on 7 July 1999, providing 
a blanket amnesty, disarmament, power sharing and new elections. However, 
in May 2000 the violence resumed and the war was not declared over until 18 
January 2002. Bad governance, large-scale corruption, regional discrimination 
and political polarisation were identified as the causes of the conflict, and 
not diamonds and other natural resources as often portrayed (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 2004, Vol. 2 and 3A). Sierra Leone has since known 
various democratic elections, as well as a peaceful regime change.
2. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN SOCIETY
In its colonial period, Sierra Leone – like many other African countries (Penal 
Reform International, 2000) – had a system of traditional justice administered by 
traditional leaders, sometimes called kings. Sierra Leone knew several systems, 
varying for all of the 17 ethnic groups, but in most cases the king was not an 
autocratic ruler, since he ruled together with a council and the secret societies, 
and partly delegated his power to the traditional chiefs and sub-chiefs. The 
secret societies still play an important part in settling disputes and in decisions 
regarding the community, and also act as sources of informal education and 
social control and cohesion (Manifesto ’99, 2001: 8–12; Alie, 1990). The traditional 
leaders of Sierra Leone have always remained officially recognised (unlike in 
other countries, such as Uganda and Rwanda, where they were dismissed), but the 
institution is heavily politicised, and was always manipulated by the government 
in power (Keen, 2003: 71).
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Since many traditional chiefs were killed or died during the conflict, after 
the war the government, supported by the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), launched a programme to appoint new chiefs and restore 
the institution (Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme; Fanthorpe, 2005; 
Archibald and Richards, 2002). Furthermore, a Council of Paramount Chiefs 
was established, which advises the government (cf. Statement on Paramount 
Chiefs by President Kabbah). This was preceded by extensive consultations which 
showed that, despite their role before and during the conflict, traditional chiefs 
are still accepted by the people of Sierra Leone, who turn to the chiefs for many 
of their daily problems (Fanthorpe, 2005; Alterman et al., 2002). The chiefs are 
regarded as the guardians of traditional heritage, traditional values, the secret 
societies and local interests (Fanthorpe, 2007). They can, however, no longer act 
as autocrats, as possible abuse is no longer accepted by the people, who are now, 
after displacement during the war and after being introduced to human rights 
through modern media and awareness raising, informed about their rights. 
The government’s decentralisation policy has furthermore placed elected local 
authorities on level with and above the chiefs (Boersch-Supan, 2009; Keen, 2003; 
Fanthorpe, 2005). The establishment of the Paramount Chiefs was acknowledged 
by the Constitution. They have permanent representatives in Parliament.2 The 
role and election of the Paramount Chiefs are regulated by law and their tasks are 
limited to collecting taxes, law enforcement, preservation of cultural heritage and 
community development.3 In case of misbehaviour, they can be relieved of their 
power by the president. In the north of the country, all chiefs are male, while in 
the southern and eastern regions women are also eligible for the position.
3. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
The Lomé Peace Agreement4 granted a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed 
prior to 6 June 1999 and provided for the establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). After a new outbreak of violence in 2000, the 
United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone established the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone since 
30  November 1996.5 It has effectively prosecuted nine persons, eight of whom 
are now serving their sentences in Rwanda, while Charles Taylor is serving his 
2 Constitution 1991, art. 72 and art. 74.
3 Chieftaincy Act 2009, 10 September 2009.
4 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front 
of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999, transmitted to the Security Council on 12 July 1999 (S/1999/777).
5 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002. Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, art. 1.1.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   45 21-4-2015   12:29:12
46 Intersentia
Martien Schotsmans
2n
d  p
ro
of
sentence in the UK.6 Both at the Special Court and at national courts, victims can 
only intervene as witnesses and are not entitled to reparations. At the national 
level, two trials have taken place convicting 17 low level perpetrators for relatively 
minor crimes committed after the Lomé Peace agreement (Horovitz, 2009).
The TRC operated from 2002 to 2004 and issued a report, providing a historical 
record of the conflict, identifying the causes of the conflict and recommending 
institutional reform, more reconciliation activities and reparations, among 
others. The TRC heard witnesses in each district during only one week and did 
not have the opportunity to organise hearings at the lowest administrative levels. 
Following the TRC’s recommendations, the reparations programme has started 
to be implemented since September 2008, with funding from the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Fund (Suma and Correa, 2009).
4. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE
The use of tradition-based mechanisms was not part of the official transitional 
justice policy in Sierra Leone. In the debates on transitional justice, using 
traditional justice as an alternative to the formal retributive justice system has 
never been suggested (unlike Rwanda and Uganda) by either donors, authorities, 
civil society or the population involved (Hayner, 2007). Most respondents refer 
to the amnesty provisions in the Lomé peace agreement and consider the Special 
Court as the only institution with jurisdiction over the international crimes that 
had been excluded from amnesty in the peace agreement.
The importance of traditional culture was nonetheless recognised within the 
framework of the transitional justice process, more precisely in the mandate of the 
TRC. The TRC law determines that the Commission can call on both religious and 
traditional leaders in the implementation of its activities.7 The law was co-written 
by the UNOHCHR after extensive consultations with several organisations from 
civil society, which included NGOs, the organisation of Paramount Chiefs and 
the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL). The TRC was a mechanism 
that would not just operate at the national level, but would also support local 
reconciliation initiatives. That is why these organisations insisted that both the 
traditional chiefs and the religious leaders – the latter also played an important 
role in the peace negotiations – would be involved in the activities of the TRC. The 
traditional leaders had been consulted earlier as stakeholders during a preparatory 
conference for the Lomé peace negotiations. Nevertheless, the conference’s 
recommendation not to grant amnesty for serious crimes, but to allow the TRC 
6 For more details see the website of the Special Court, www.sc-sl.org.
7 Art. 7(2) of the TRC Act: ‘The Commission may seek assistance from traditional and religious 
leaders to facilitate its public sessions and in resolving local conflicts arising from past 
violations or abuses or in support of healing and reconciliation.’
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to establish accountability, was not taken into account in the peace agreement 
(Hayner, 2007).
The fact that an official transitional justice body such as the TRC regularly 
called upon traditional leaders for assistance confirms this recognition, albeit this 
was not done with the goal of truth finding, as recommended by preliminary 
research of a local NGO, funded by UNOHCHR (Manifesto ’99, 2002), but only 
for reconciliation purposes, and only to a limited extent. There were several 
reasons for this: the variety of traditional practices, as identified by Manifesto ’99, 
in addition to the fact that some traditional practices would violate international 
human rights (such as certain practices of swearing and oath-taking) and the fact 
that abuse by traditional leaders in the past was identified as one of the causes of 
the conflict.
Nevertheless, the TRC did call upon the traditional leaders on various 
occasions: they were involved during the sensitisation campaign and the 
statement-taking phase, during the district hearings to participate in the opening 
ceremonies, attend the hearings and play an active role in the reconciliation 
ceremonies at the end of each week of hearings, and as participants in the 
reconciliation workshops, organised by the TRC jointly with the Inter-Religious 
Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL).
In certain instances the traditional leaders also testified about their own 
experiences and played an important exemplary role; this was particularly relevant 
in the case of a chief testifying that his wife had been raped, and declaring that he 
did not reject her, which goes against the usual response in Sierra Leone.
However, this remained limited and unilateral: the Commission only called 
upon the traditional leaders as gatekeepers to the communities to increase the 
efficiency and legitimacy of its own work as well as its impact (Alie, 2008).
In the same way, traditional leaders, as one of many categories of stakeholders, 
are being involved in the reparations process of the National Commission for 
Social Action (NaCSA)8 and in consultations on some of the institutional reform 
(such as the restatement of customary law in Moyamba district, see Chapter 3). 
The reasons for this are generally the same: their role as gatekeepers to the local 
community on the one hand, and their role as guardians of traditional values and 
of the relationship with the ancestors on the other hand.
But traditional justice is not only about the involvement of its institutions, i.e. 
the traditional leaders, it is also about people’s belief in traditional values and in 
the importance of appeasing the ancestors after the commission of a crime. These 
beliefs are still very much alive in rural Sierra Leone, which is why any transitional 
justice mechanism should take them into consideration (also: Alie, 2008). More in 
particular, our findings show that acknowledgment of wrongdoing, apologies and 
reconciliation have to take place at three levels: at the individual level between 
the perpetrator and the victim, at the community level between the perpetrator 
8 The TRC had recommended that NacCSA implement its proposed reparations programme. 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   47 21-4-2015   12:29:12
48 Intersentia
Martien Schotsmans
2n
d  p
ro
of
and his community, and at the spiritual level between the community of the 
perpetrator and the ancestors. After the perpetrator’s presentation of apologies 
and their acceptance by the victim and/or his community, the traditional leaders 
will offer apologies to the ancestors (and through them to God) on behalf of the 
community for the bad behaviour of one of their children. Sacrifices will be made 
and rituals performed to appease the ancestors. Reconciliation is not considered 
to be complete without such rituals. In contrast, detailed truth revealing does not 
seem to be so important. While reparations, according to tradition, need to be an 
integral part of reconciliation, reality makes people at community level accept 
that these will not be provided for the moment.
To a certain extent, these values have been considered by the TRC during its 
reconciliation ceremonies, although there was more emphasis on inter-individual 
and community reconciliation.
Further initiatives were largely left to religious and other civil society 
organisations. These unofficial activities are often to an even more important 
extent inspired by traditional values and views. Hence, tradition-based 
mechanisms were not used for retributive prosecutions at the official level, but 
as restorative justice mechanisms according to local notions and values at the 
unofficial, informal level. The Fambul Tok project (see below) has taken this 
approach the furthest, but there are other organisations that base their activities 
to a greater or lesser degree on traditional values as well.
As mentioned, the TRC jointly with the IRCSL organised a series of 
reconciliation workshops at district level and set up District Support Committees 
for reconciliation, with religious and traditional leaders, women and youth 
representatives, as well as victims and ex-combatants. After the closure of the 
TRC, the IRCSL conducted activities at chiefdom and section level, based on 
people’s wishes as expressed during the reconciliation workshops. These often 
comprised traditional as well as religious and communal aspects. One example is 
the renaming and cleansing ceremonies for abducted and raped girls (previously 
named after their abductor), through which they became suitable for marriage.9
Even before the TRC-IRCSL programme, there had been quite a number 
of programmes aimed at the reintegration of ex-combatants that used both 
traditional and religious elements, especially programmes for children. In this 
context, UNICEF supported several Child Protection Agencies and supplied 
a complete package, which could include education, skills training, micro-
projects and traditional cleansing. The actual rituals differed per community 
and consistently included elements of purification from negative spirits, and of 
reconciliation with the community and ancestors (Alie, 2008; Zack-Williams, 
2006; Stark, 2006). These are supposed to have had a significant positive impact 
9 These were supported by the BCPR of UNDP.
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on further co-existence (Ginifer, 2003).10 They were not linked to the actual 
role during the conflict of the individual involved and thus did not provide 
accountability, although general apologies were sometimes expressed. Even 
though the cleansing rituals provided a first step in that direction, they did not 
entail an actual initiation into the secret societies – still a requirement for one to 
be considered a full member of a local community in Sierra Leone (Fanthorpe, 
2007) (for a more detailed account: see section 2.4.2).
Other NGO initiatives were taken regarding peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention, such as the Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement (BPRM) 
(Hanson-Ap, 2007; Baker, 2005). This organisation started working in 1996 
with a coalition of local NGOs and worked with both professionally trained and 
voluntary peace monitors, the latter selected by the communities and working in 
Chiefdom Peace and Reconciliation Committees. The methodology for conflict 
resolution applied by the peace monitors is a mixture of traditional and modern 
methods, focusing on the restoration of the broken relationship behind the 
conflict and using traditional ceremonies such as the pouring of libation and 
sacrifices to pacify the ancestors, as well as religious prayers, social activities and 
‘modern’ conflict mediation techniques, respecting human rights. They deal with 
contemporary conflicts, as well as conflicts that existed before the war, which are 
often related. These reconciliation sessions are followed up by the peace monitors. 
Many other projects for peacebuilding and conflict prevention exist, some of 
which also involve traditional elements (e.g. Park, 2007).
Fambul Tok11 is a tradition-based mechanism, which uses traditional 
methods and values, although adjusting them to some extent. The methodology 
involves several steps, starting with consultations and training (on traditional 
reconciliation values, mediation, PTSD and human rights), preliminary 
mediation of cases presented by either victim or perpetrator to a Reconciliation 
Committee, concluded by a reconciliation ceremony. The latter comprises a 
bonfire in the evening where victims and perpetrators share their experiences, 
perpetrators apologise and ask for forgiveness and are embraced by victims and 
community leaders. In this regard, forgiving was described as accepting apologies, 
while ‘forgiveness of the heart’ could come later. The following day, traditional 
ceremonies are performed to achieve reconciliation between perpetrator and 
victim, between perpetrator and community and between community and 
ancestors. Rituals to appease the ancestors may include prayers, sacrifices, the 
pouring of libation or purification and cleansing (Manifesto ’99, 2002). Although 
many respondents viewed reparations as a condition for reconciliation – reality 
forces victims to accept apologies anyhow since most perpetrators lack the 
10 According to UNAMSIL 75,490 combatants were demobilised after the conflict, 6,845 of 
whom were children. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Fact Sheet 1: Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil, December 
2005.
11 Krio for Family Talk, referring to the traditional way of conflict resolution through palaver. 
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necessary means. Afterwards, a peace tree is identified under which benches 
are constructed for people to gather at regular times to solve more disputes. 
In addition, community farming projects are set up and support groups are 
established for women (peace mothers), mainly to provide support to victims of 
sexual violence. Being a civil society initiative, Fambul Tok has conducted over 
60 reconciliation ceremonies and established 30 projects of community farming 
since it started in 2008 (Fambul Tok, 2010), and thus remains a small-scale civil 
society project.
The Fambul Tok project uses traditional conflict resolution – the African 
palaver – the traditional values of mediation and the restoration of relationships 
and concludes with a traditional ritual of reconciliation with the community and 
the ancestors. Meanwhile, it integrates modern values: victims, ex-combatants, 
women and youths participate in the decision and implementation phase, the 
traditional practices of swearing and oath-taking are replaced by mediation 
and voluntary confessions and discrimination against women and children is 
countered by human rights training provided by Forum of Conscience.
Thus, by creating a tradition-based mechanism, Fambul Tok manages to 
create a space for dialogue that goes beyond traditional practices, e.g. the fact that 
a woman can talk publicly about being raped and ask a man to apologise, or the 
fact that a small man can ask a big man to apologise.
Nevertheless, not all formal aspects of a traditional mechanism can be 
changed: regarding reconciliation with the ancestors, for instance, the role of 
traditional leaders is indispensable, since they are the only ones, through their 
initiation and position in the secret societies, who can communicate with the 
ancestors. Thus, where adjustments of tradition-based justice might be possible 
at the level of inter-personal and community reconciliation, this might not be 
the case for spiritual reconciliation. In this same regard, where victims and 
the community can (temporarily) accept that the perpetrator does not pay any 
reparations, asking the ancestors for forgiveness without offering sacrifices and 
performing certain ceremonies does not seem to be an option either, which is why 
external support to conduct such ceremonies will often be required.
Our research has shown that although it is easily said in Sierra Leone that 
there is no longer a need to talk about the past, people nonetheless have a need 
to call mid-level commanders and those who committed many atrocities in the 
communities to account. There is furthermore a need for minimal recognition 
of guilt and for apologies by low-level executors who wish to reintegrate into 
their communities (Boersch-Supan, 2008). Hence, the blanket amnesty and the 
fact that there is no urge to prosecute more perpetrators do not mean that there 
is no need to establish accountability for what happened. This would allow the 
perpetrator to relieve his conscience (to blow his mind) and to reintegrate into his 
community (to be one), while offering the victim closure (to have a cool heart). 
Several respondents thought that the social climate had become more favourable 
to such a process, because people felt safer.
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This leads us to the conclusion that more interventions regarding transitional 
justice based on traditional justice values and involving traditional leaders are 
possible and necessary in Sierra Leone, even with adjustments to a certain extent. 
Although it is early days to assess the impact of these ongoing initiatives of civil 
society, transitional justice interventions both at the national and the local level 
may not be successful in the long run, unless they consider traditional justice and 
reconciliation values.
5. POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
In Sierra Leone, the government’s transitional justice policy was supported by 
multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental donors. There seemed to be a kind 
of division of labour: multilateral and bilateral donors principally supported 
interventions that fit in with the official policy, such as the Special Court and the 
TRC, while NGOs and foundations seemed more inclined to support informal 
initiatives, such as the NGO projects mentioned above, aimed at reconciliation.
Since traditional mechanisms as such were not part of the official transitional 
justice policy, one can only examine the motives of donors to support mechanisms 
in which traditional elements play a role in one way or another. Interviews with 
multilateral or bilateral donors have shown that the involvement of traditional 
leaders in activities, or the use of traditional values or practices in the context 
of transitional justice interventions, are hardly a sufficient reason to support 
or decline support for a specific activity. Every donor stated that the role of 
traditional leaders and the presence of tradition in Sierra Leone are established 
facts that should be taken into account for an intervention to be successful. With 
regards to the mention in the TRC mandate of a possible appeal to traditional 
leaders, the respondents stated that this was an unequivocal request of civil 
society, i.e. not just of the Paramount Chiefs, but of the NGOs as well. The 
donors’ choice to support activities that contain traditional elements, such as 
the TRC,12 seems rather determined by the fact that a mechanism is included in 
the official government policy. This was also the case in their support for other 
official programmes in which traditional elements were included, such as their 
support for the Paramount Chief Restoration Programme and the preceding 
consultations13 and the reintegration programmes for children14 – including 
ritual cleansing ceremonies. The same applies to the restoration programmes of 
12 Supported by the United Kingdom, the European Commission, the USA, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The 
funds were collected by the UNOHCHR and managed locally by the UNDP. UNIFEM and 
UNICEF offered the Commission technical assistance.
13 Supported by the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool of the United Kingdom.
14 Supported by UNICEF.
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the NaCSA15 – in which traditional reconciliation activities were also performed 
as a kind of symbolic reparations, and traditional leaders were called upon to 
help implement reparation payments – as well as to the TRC-IRCSL programme 
regarding reconciliation workshops and activities,16 which was more of an 
offshoot of the UNDP support to the TRC, despite the fact that the second part, 
the local (including traditional) reconciliation activities, was executed solely by 
the IRCSL. In other words, none of these donors had a specific policy regarding 
the importance of traditional justice in the framework of transitional justice, or 
supported certain activities specifically because they were based on tradition. 
The fact that their interventions were largely inspired by government policy 
has led to a lack of interventions based on traditional values concerning justice 
and reconciliation, especially at the local level. Despite what donors sometimes 
think, it is not sufficient to involve traditional leaders or to add some traditional 
elements to an activity developed on a national scale to make it successful at the 
community level. To achieve this goal, the activities themselves must be anchored 
in the population’s cosmovision.
At an unofficial level there were some smaller projects, not part of the official 
traditional justice policy, which were supported by non-governmental donors, 
such as international NGOs or foundations. These projects are specifically 
designed to promote the local, traditional values of reconciliation and to 
acknowledge the important role traditional leaders play in this respect. This goes 
for projects such as Fambul Tok17 and the – slightly less specifically tradition-
oriented – Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement.18 The policy of these non-
governmental donors to support these projects was inspired by their search for 
local reconciliation methods which are aligned with the local population’s views 
and which can be used with the assistance of locally anchored structures that can 
ensure sustainability. In Sierra Leone, this search automatically led to the potential 
of tradition-based mechanisms, i.e. to the importance of traditional values and 
the role of traditional leaders in society, besides other local stakeholders. The 
support for these projects is therefore inspired by the conviction that mechanisms 
in which traditional values are mixed with modern methods, such as mediation, 
and respect for human rights, have a better chance of bringing about sustainable 
justice and reconciliation at the local level.
In general, donors seem to ignore the fact that the recognition of traditional 
leaders as important actors at the local level will also confirm their authority 
and legitimacy in the eyes of the population. This means that to prevent novel 
abuse of power, there is a need for checks and balances. The role of local NGOs 
in the unofficial tradition-based projects, as initiators and supervisors, and the 
15 Supported by the Peacebuilding Fund of the UN.
16 Supported by the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of UNDP.
17 Financed by Catalysts for Peace, an American foundation, and substantively supported by the 
Center for Justice and Peacebuilding of the American Eastern Mennonite University.
18 Supported by the British INGO Conciliation Resources.
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integration of respect for human rights in the projects will (hopefully) be sufficient 
to supply counter-pressure to the power of traditional leaders,19 although it is still 
too early to assess their impact.
Finally, the donors’ interventions are too restricted in time, meaning that 
they occur primarily in the first years after the end of a conflict, while people 
often need longer periods of stability and safety before they feel secure enough 
to address the past, thereby creating room for reconciliation. The decision of the 
Peacebuilding Commission to make Sierra Leone one of its first intervention 
countries runs counter to this trend, but it does not include activities regarding 
local reconciliation or justice with regard to past crimes.20
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CHAPTER 5
OFFICIAL HYBRIDISATION 
OF TRADITION: A CASE STUDY 
ON RWANDA
Martien Schotsmans
1. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
A former German colony, Rwanda, together with Burundi, became a Belgian 
mandate after the Second World War, until its independence in 1962. While 
Belgium applied a system of indirect rule through the mwami or king and his 
chiefs, who were mainly Tutsi (see below), Rwanda’s three population groups, the 
Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa, have been dominated by a Hutu majority from 1959 
until the end of the civil war in 1994.
While crimes of genocide against the Tutsi have been committed and 
remained unpunished in Rwanda since 1959, the civil war from 1 October 1990 
to 4 July 1994, initiated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) mainly composed 
of Tutsi refugees from neighbouring countries, exacerbated the number and 
intensity of such crimes, culminating in the 100 days of genocide of the Tutsi from 
6 April to 4 July 1994. The killings were committed according to a plan developed 
and implemented by Hutu extremists within the government, who did not 
agree with the power sharing deals that were being negotiated in Arusha under 
international pressure. It involved trained militias called Interahamwe as well as 
large numbers of ordinary citizens, incited by hate campaigns broadcasted over 
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). The genocide allegedly caused 
the death of 800,000 to 1,000,000 victims, in addition to victims of crimes against 
humanity committed against moderate Hutu, and war crimes and other crimes 
committed by members of the RPF (Des Forges, 1999). Hundreds of thousands of 
women were allegedly raped (Wells, 2005). In a survey conducted in 2000, 36% 
of respondents claimed to have lost family members due to the genocide and 23% 
due to massacres (Gasibirige, 2002).1 The war ended in a victory of the RPF, which 
1 The survey does not mention whether those crimes were committed in 1994 or before (or after), 
nor whether there is a possible overlap between both categories. 
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transformed into a political party that still dominates the political landscape 
today, following several elections.
2. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN SOCIETY
In contrast to many African societies, traditional aspects are quite absent from 
daily life in Rwanda.
Although they were not all Tutsi before colonial times, the Belgian rulers 
gradually replaced non-Tutsi chiefs by allegedly more loyal Tutsi chiefs. The 
Second World War and the strife for independence from colonial powers which 
followed all over in Africa, caused another shift in Belgium’s policy, which then 
started to support the ‘oppressed’ Hutu against the more independence-minded 
Tutsi elite. With the so-called ‘social revolution’ in 1959, over 50% of all Tutsi chiefs 
were replaced by Hutu chiefs, against the will of the mwami, who had the right 
to nominate chiefs. Later reforms gradually replaced the traditional institutions 
and chiefs with administrative structures and elected counsellors (Reyntjens, 
1985). Rwanda became a republic in 1961. Today, there are no traditional power 
structures present in Rwanda.
During colonial times, indigenous courts presided over by the chiefs were 
established by the colonial authorities to replace the traditional gacaca system 
(UNOHCHR, 1996). They had the right to settle disputes according to customary 
law, with the exception of more important criminal cases, which were handled 
by established criminal tribunals. Later, the possibility to appeal decisions of 
indigenous courts at the level of the formal courts was established, while the 
appointment of judges in the indigenous courts (all Tutsi) had to be approved by 
the colonial administrator for approval. Thus, indigenous judges gradually lost 
their legitimacy and moral authority in the eyes of the population (Reyntjens, 
1985), while gacaca continued to operate as a local mechanism for conflict 
resolution at the informal level.
3. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
Immediately after the end of the genocide, Rwanda opted for criminal prosecutions 
of all those suspected of having committed the crime of genocide and related 
crimes against humanity. The idea of a blanket amnesty was outright rejected 
(Republic of Rwanda, 1995). Criminal prosecutions took place at several levels. 
The United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) that has tried 75 cases so far.2
2 UN Resolution S/RES/955, www.ictr.org.
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In addition to the ICTR and some trials in third countries using universal 
jurisdiction powers (Redress, 2008), Rwanda prosecuted about 10,000 accused 
at the domestic level (Schabas, 2008; Des Forges and Longman, 2004). The 1996 
Organic Law3 provided for reduced sentences in exchange for confessions, which 
led to almost 30% of accused confessing and offering apologies (Avocats Sans 
Frontières, 1999). The law also provided for reparations by both the perpetrator 
and the Rwandan state, but these judgments have never been implemented 
(Rombouts and Vandeginste, 2005). Meanwhile, a fund4 provides assistance 
(housing, medical care, school fees) to survivors. Furthermore, 35 cases of crimes 
‘of revenge’ committed by RPF soldiers have been prosecuted by the military 
courts at the domestic level,5 which is generally felt to be disproportionate6 
(Haskell and Waldorf, 2011).
Considering the huge numbers of detainees7 and the limited capacity of the 
formal justice system, a new hybrid gacaca justice system was created in 2001,8 
involving a mixture of traditional gacaca and modern retributive trials. By the 
end of April 2009 1,138,860 cases had been tried by gacaca justice.9 In July 2010, 
the process had largely ended, with the exception of some appeal and revision 
cases.
4. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE
Despite the fact that most traditional elements from Rwandan society disappeared 
during the colonial and postcolonial periods, two official transitional justice 
mechanisms systematically refer to these elements: on the one hand the gacaca 
courts and, on the other hand, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(NURC). This concerns mechanisms and activities that to a certain degree are 
based on traditional values and practices, but are in fact true hybrids, amalgams 
that adjust traditional elements to contemporary needs and (partly) to modern 
standards. Both instances are government initiatives that nevertheless relate to 
3 Organic Law no. 8/96 of 30/08/1996, J.O. no. 17 of 01/09/1996. 
4 Fond d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide.
5 Ministry of Defence, Military Prosecution, RPA soldiers who committed crimes of revenge 
during and after 1994 genocide and were prosecuted before Rwandan military courts, April 
2007.
6 Ministry of Defence, Military Prosecution, RPA soldiers who committed crimes of revenge 
during and after 1994 genocide and were prosecuted before Rwandan military courts, April 
2007.
7 112,000 in 2000 according to Avocats Sans Frontières (2000).
8 Organic Law no. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, J.O. no. 6 of 15/03/2001. Modified by Organic Law 
no. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004, J.O. special no. of 19/06/2004, adding the need to try the accused 
with promptitude. Modified by Organic Law no. 28/2006 of 26/06/2006, Organic Law 
no. 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 and Organic law no. 13/2008 of 19/05/2008.
9 Information from the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, received in July 2009.
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the population’s collective memory. This is especially the case with gacaca that 
many people remember from their youth as an informal mechanism to settle 
minor disputes.
4 .1. GACACA COURTS (INKIKO GACACA)
Traditional gacaca was the lowest informal level of dispute resolution, starting 
at the household level (uruko), going to the level of the extended family (inzu) 
and the level of the lineage or clan (umuryango). Women could not participate 
directly in the process and had to be represented by a man (Wells, 2005). If a 
dispute could not be settled at this level, the mwami could be called upon. He 
could intervene himself or delegate the case to a lower chief. The primary goal of 
gacaca would be the restoration of social harmony. For capital crimes, however, 
the restoration of harmony required the killing of a person of equal value of the 
killer’s family, although settlement by gifts or giving a girl for marriage would 
sometimes, and with time more easily, be possible (Ingelaere, 2008; UNOHCHR, 
1996). As mentioned above, colonial authorities withdrew the jurisdiction of 
capital crimes form traditional authorities. However, gacaca as a means of low-
level dispute settlement continued to exist. Gacaca gradually evolved towards 
a semi-administrative body, supervised by and composed of local authorities, 
which tried to settle disputes as a filter to the formal justice system (Reyntjens, 
1990). This type of gacaca continued to exist even after the genocide (UNOHCHR, 
1996).
After the genocide, gacaca soon started to revive in a very informal way 
in some communities at the local level: one type was used mainly to settle 
property disputes related to the genocide without entering into the crimes 
committed (Ingelaere, 2008; Vandeginste, 1998). It was acknowledged and 
sometimes supported by local authorities, and in this regard resembled the semi-
administrative gacaca mentioned above. Another type of post-genocide gacaca 
focused on reconciliation and was initiated by the Catholic Church (the so-called 
Christian gacaca).10
During a conference in Kigali in 1995, the idea to use the traditional gacaca 
as an alternative solution to deal with genocide related property crimes was 
mentioned (Republic of Rwanda, 1995). In 1996, the outcome of a research, initiated 
by UNOHCHR, on the potential use of gacaca to deal with crimes of genocide 
was published. The researchers, all Rwandan, found that gacaca would be a useful 
tool for investigation and truth finding, as a kind of truth commission, while the 
actual trying of crimes should best be left with the formal justice system. In 1998, 
a series of gatherings and discussions on national unity was initiated by President 
10 Interview Evèc de Kabga, who mentions that it was practiced in all dioceses in Rwanda during 
1999–2000, with a focus on confessions, apologies and reconciliation.
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Bizimungu, the so-called Urugwire village meetings (Republic of Rwanda, 1999). 
During these discussions, it was decided to establish modernised gacaca courts, 
not only for truth finding, but also to try crimes. The active participation of the 
population in this process was deemed indispensable.
Gacaca justice has been extensively described, analysed and assessed (Clark, 
2010; Ingelaere, 2008; Haveman, 2008; Clark, 2007; Waldorf, 2006; Schabas, 2005; 
Stover and Weinstein, 2004), which allows us to mention only those features 
relevant to the subject of this research.
In contrast to traditional gacaca, gacaca justice or inkiko gacaca is a 
formalised, state-organised justice mechanism, officially part of the country’s 
transitional justice policy. Gacaca courts – following several modifications – deal 
with almost all crimes of genocide and related crimes against humanity, except 
for the crime of organising or planning the genocide at a national or prefecture 
level, which are tried by ordinary courts.
War crimes, such as those committed by RPF military, do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of gacaca justice, nor do revenge crimes committed by either the 
military or survivors. Gacaca jurisdictions were composed of elected honourable 
persons (inyangamugayo) at the lowest administrative levels, each of which had to 
deal with a specific category of accused: the lowest level conducted investigations, 
oriented the cases and tried property crimes (3rd category), while the second level 
dealt with cases of homicide and physical injury (2nd category) and with appeals. 
Women can participate as judges, witnesses, suspects or in the general public. 
After a pilot phase in 2002, the legislation was reviewed and gacaca trials started 
all over the country. A number of important adjustments of the system took place 
during the process.11
The discussion surrounding the question whether gacaca courts are 
tradition-based or are in fact a complete new mechanism or a hybrid model 
(Clark, 2007) is still ongoing. Most donors and INGOs in the field perceive 
gacaca as a modern, newly founded institution that is only vaguely inspired by 
tradition. Representatives of Rwandan organisations and local NGOs mainly 
consider popular participation, the lay judges and the objective of reintegration 
as traditional components, but nevertheless take the view that the traditional 
character of the gacaca courts was primarily used to convince the people to accept 
the mechanism and actively participate in it.
Gacaca justice has been severely criticised for not respecting fair trial 
standards and leading to many abuses. Even though all agreed that there had 
been false accusations (rather made by non-survivors than by survivors in recent 
11 Modified by Organic Law no. 16/2004 of 19/06/2004, J.O. special no. of 19/06/2004, Organic 
Law no. 28/2006 of 26/06/2006, Organic Law no. 10/2007 of 01/03/2007, Organic Law no. 
13/2008 of 19/05/2008. The 2004 laws add the need to try the accused with promptitude. 
For a detailed description of the system and the various modifications, see: Ingelaere, 2008; 
Waldorf, 2006; reports by Avocats Sans Frontières, www.asf.be. Penal Reform International, 
www.pri.org.
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years), complots of silence (ceceka), ‘buying of the hill’ (kugura agasozi: someone 
takes the blame on him, in exchange for support to the family) and corruption of 
both judges and witnesses, many of our respondents felt gacaca justice had to a 
large extent achieved its goal of accountability and allowed the establishment of 
individual guilt (also: Penal Reform International, 2010; Institut de Recherche 
et de Dialogue pour la Paix, 2008). Respondents were also positive about the 
revelation of the factual truth about crimes and the location of bodies of victims, 
even if the precise role of the perpetrators was not always established (in contrast 
to: Shaw and Waldorf, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008).
The transfer of authority to try sexual offences from the formal to the gacaca 
courts is more problematic: this led to rape victims having to lay their case 
before the local gacaca court, often comprised of neighbours and acquaintances. 
Although they could select a confidant(e) from the judges to state their case, and 
although the gacaca hearings took place behind closed doors, dates and locations 
of these hearings were public knowledge. The gacaca courts are said to have 
handled approximately 8,000 cases, a disproportionally small number, which 
observers blame on the social stigma regarding rape.
While gacaca legislation abolished the possibility to claim compensation 
from the State, the long promised Victims’ Fund was finally established on paper 
in 2008, but never became operational.12 Only gacaca jurisdictions dealing with 
property crimes can decide on restitution or compensation for the victims. 
However, the implementation of these compensation orders was an important 
concern.
The actual popular participation, i.e. beyond mere physical presence, has 
been one of the most criticised aspects of gacaca justice (Shaw and Waldorf, 2010; 
Clark, 2010; PRI, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008; Clark, 2008; Avocats Sans Frontières, 
2006). Much would depend on the proportion of survivors in the community 
and in the gacaca process, as the presence of only a few victims would allow the 
community to disregard them more easily (Ingelaere, 2009).
Although in a country where about 15,000 jurisdictions have been operating 
simultaneously, one can certainly not generalise, what seems to have been lacking 
in many gacaca trials is exactly the feature of traditional justice often promoted 
for its restorative value: encounter or dialogue (Penal Reform International, 2010; 
Institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix, 2008). As one of the respondents 
stated: ‘Dans gacaca on parle, mais on ne se parle pas’, meaning ‘in gacaca we talk, 
but we do not talk with each other’.
As gacaca proceedings are not concluded by popular consensus, but by a 
decision taken by the inyangamugayo, the ritual celebration of the agreement to 
leave the past behind is equally lacking. Even in a country where traditional rites 
have disappeared from the public landscape, simple rituals such as sharing a beer 
or a meal are often mentioned as signs of reconciliation. But after a gacaca hearing 
12 Law no. 69/2008 of 30/12/2008, J.O. special no. of 15/04/2009.
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everyone just returns home. In other words, there is no closure of the process, 
and therefore no new beginning. For this reason, many observers I interviewed in 
2009 were looking forward to what would come after gacaca – the post-gacaca – 
hoping it would bring healing and start a process of reconciliation through 
sincere dialogue (Penal Reform International, 2010; Republic of Rwanda, 2009; 
Ingelaere, 2008).
The question is whether encounter13 as an objective of restorative justice is a 
realistic expectation for a hybrid mechanism like gacaca justice, being a formal 
procedure guided by the law and by political guidelines of conduct for participants. 
Perhaps truth finding and accountability through gacaca justice – partial as they 
may be – were preliminary conditions in a long process towards genuine dialogue, 
of which one can catch a cautious glimpse in Rwanda nowadays. According to a 
report of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) based on 
a survey conducted in 2008, the lack of reparations, absence of apologies after 
gacaca, testimonies during gacaca and the pressure of government to reconcile 
are among the main reasons for persisting distrust between survivors and their 
neighbours14 (Republic of Rwanda, NURC, 2009).
4.2 . NURC: TR ADITIONAL VALUES OF UNITY 
AND R ECONCILIATION
During the Urugwire village meetings, the need to establish unity and 
reconciliation among Rwandans was also discussed. Culture was considered to 
be the needed ‘cement for unity’ (Republic of Rwanda, 1999). The NURC actively 
promotes a revival of traditional values for unity and reconciliation purposes and 
uses them as a justification for certain activities.
The most prominent activities in this regard are the solidarity camps, i.e. 
residential camps where specific groups are taught civic education for three 
weeks, and cover topics such as the analysis of Rwanda’s problems; history of 
Rwanda; political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda and Africa, rights and 
obligations of citizens and good leadership.15 Participation is mandatory for both 
men and women. There are two types of such solidarity camps. Ingando camps 
have been used for the reinsertion of ex-combatants, of released prisoners and 
for the education of university students of government universities. The cultural 
origin of these camps is explained as follows: ‘In old times, when the country 
13 Encounter in the framework of restorative justice refers to a meeting of offender and victim in a 
safe and supportive environment where both can play an active role in the discussion, can talk 
openly and express their emotions and participate in the decision on the problem. (Johnstone 
and Van Ness, 2007).
14 77.6% of survivors distrust their neighbours, compared to 37% of released prisoners and 53.3% 
of the general population.
15 www.nurc.gov.rw.
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was attacked, there was a retreat of the army commanders, police chiefs and all 
decision-making groups. If there was a famine, there would be a retreat of another 
group. If there was a feud among clans: another group. So it was for specific people 
to solve specific problems. It could be called by the mwami, the chief or the head of 
the military. People of the same level/age/responsibility in society would unite.’16 
Itorero camps are more recent and are used for specific professional groups, such 
as people from the health sector, from veterinary medicine, civil society, teachers, 
etc. In addition to civic education, these groups also receive professional training. 
The traditional roots of this mechanism are explained as follows: ‘Itorero was a 
traditional school to pass on life and knowledge. It started at village level: you 
would learn how to behave at home, how to respect visitors and elders, assignments 
for boys and girls, etc. It was given to children between 12 and 18 years old. They 
lived with mentors, not with their family. The children would be given physical 
training: sports, shooting, wrestling, jumping, … and literature, philosophy, 
medicine, veterinary medicine … the highest level was to graduate into the army. 
Some people distinguished in other fields, such as veterinary medicine. There 
were various education fields. Now, we want to use itorero to trace those values 
and to indicate traditional values that got lost. If we revive this, society will be in 
a better position for coexistence.’17
Other tradition-based activities promoted by NURC are umuganda, the one 
day a month communal work obligation, which had continued to exist, but is 
now combined with meetings during which government policy and problems are 
discussed; ubusubane, during which the community gathers for celebrations; and 
ubudehe, communal work for a specific project, paid by the government in cash 
or with animals.
In 2005, the NURC held National Unity and Reconciliation consultations in all 
districts in which several stakeholders participated. This enabled the compilation 
of an inventory of the numerous local initiatives aimed at reconciliation, 
without any specific foundation in tradition. The NURC counted approximately 
600 initiatives in 2006–2007, but is confessedly unable to update this inventory on 
a regular basis. In each district, a Unity and Reconciliation Forum was established 
which involved all stakeholders (local authorities, NGOs, women’s organisations, 
church organisations, etc.). This Forum must present an action plan annually 
and can obtain funds for activities. In reality, however, the NURC’s funds are 
rather limited and for the funding of local initiatives it depends on the means of 
other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Local Affairs which enters 
into performance contracts (imihigo, also marked as traditional) with the local 
authorities, which also include activities concerning gacaca and reconciliation. 
The NURC has attempted to promote local ownership of these activities, aided by 
volunteers – the abakangurambaga – who were recruited in the communities and 
16 Interview NURC.
17 Interview NURC.
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then received a limited training in peace monitoring. However, our interviews 
with the local population showed that except for the ingando and itorero solidarity 
camps and the monthly umuganda, the tradition-based activities promoted by 
the NURC are rather unknown or are at least not experienced as being based on 
tradition.
However, it is to be noted that the reading of pre-colonial history is 
problematic in Rwanda, since the various population groups have a different view 
of it (Ingelaere, 2008; Des Forges, 1999). While former diaspora, now in power, 
tend to romanticise the pre-colonial society as peaceful, non-violent and with 
clear social roles for everyone, only to be distorted by colonial powers, those who 
lived in the country after 1959 have learned to see this past as one of oppression 
of the Hutu population by the Tutsi elite. During the ingando and itoreo, and 
many other meetings, conferences and debates organised by the NURC, it is the 
former version of history, as established by the Urugwire village meetings, that 
prevails (Republic of Rwanda, 1999).18 NURC planned to organise more ingando 
and itoreo camps for several hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.19
5. POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Donors have never openly questioned the Rwandan decision to prosecute 
all perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision was 
even perceived as a positive one, considering the lack of prosecutions in most 
post-conflict countries and the fact that it corresponded with the ‘fight against 
impunity’ as part of their peacebuilding policies (which is also the reason why 
international human rights organisations did not reject gacaca as such). For 
the same reason, various donors also supported the ICTR and domestic courts. 
When it became clear that formal justice would not be able to cope with the huge 
number of detainees within a reasonable delay and the Rwanda government, 
following the Urugwire village meetings, was proposing gacaca justice as a 
tradition-based alternative,20 donors were facing a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
proposed process would make it possible to continue the fight against impunity, 
in addition to being original and innovative. On the other hand, the proposed 
mechanism presented serious risks for human rights violations, considering the 
lack of respect for international fair trial standards, the fear of ‘popular’ justice 
18 Urugwire report, pp. 10–14.
19 NURC, Strategic plan 2009–2011, Kigali, December 2008, p. 28.
20 Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President, Republic of Rwanda, report on the reflection 
meetings held in the office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to March 1999, 
Kigali, August 1999 (hereafter: Urugwire discussion). For a further overview of the creation of 
gacaca justice see: Clark, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008. 
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too soon after the genocide and the long sentences that could be pronounced.21 
These arguments were also shared by Rwandan lawyers. The decision to create 
gacaca courts was clearly a Rwandan political decision, in which international 
actors had no voice.
After a period of reflection and discussions with Rwandan authorities, 
sometimes after advice by an external expert (Uvin, 2001), a number of donors 
decided to accept the mechanism, on condition that certain observations would 
be met to reduce the risk of human rights violations (considering the ‘do no harm’ 
principle).
Donors especially insisted upon formal aspects. This, for example, included 
a pilot phase, after which the mechanism could still be adjusted, training for lay 
judges, sensitisation of the population, independent interim evaluations and 
monitoring by international and local NGOs. None of the donors considered 
the presentation of the mechanism as traditional to be a convincing argument, 
although they were of the opinion that this would increase the potential for local 
ownership with regards to the population (Samset, Peterson and Wang, 2007). 
Given that around that time the idea of attaching conditions to developmental 
aid was considered undesirable and even counterproductive, donors decided 
to provide their support to realise a result that included respect for human 
rights (Lenzen, 2009). The Rwandan authorities accepted all these proposals. 
Moreover, both donors and INGOs22 were granted access to government bills 
and amendment bills and could remark upon them. While donors consciously 
decided not to interfere with the substance of the mechanism, international 
NGOs did attempt to influence it, with limited success. And although donors 
furthermore formally pressed for the establishment of a victims’ fund and for the 
criminal prosecution of crimes committed by RPF soldiers, they did not truly 
insist upon these terms. The only issue in which the donors explicitly interfered 
was to prevent the gacaca courts from pronouncing the death penalty. Upon 
other issues, such as the transfer of prosecutions for sexual violence to the gacaca 
courts, the donors did not insist, despite the resistance by both international and 
national NGOs. Neither, finally, did the donors insist that the recommendations 
of the NGOs monitoring the gacaca process be taken into account, which limited 
the impact of said monitoring.
The donor support concerned a wide range of activities, meaning that the 
below overview cannot be regarded as an exhaustive one.
21 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights 
in Rwanda submitted by the Special Representative, Mr Michel Moussalli, pursuant to 
Commission resolution 1999/20, 25 February, 2000E/CN.4/2000/41, para. 162. Report of 
the Informal Seminar on Donor Support for a ‘modernised’ gacaca in Rwanda, Brussels, 
27 October 2000. 
22 Avocats Sans Frontières, RCN Justice & Démocratie, Penal Reform International, Centre 
Danois des Droits de l’Homme.
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While the main donors supporting gacaca justice were the European 
Commission, Belgium and the Netherlands, additional – sometimes occasional 
or only initial – funding was provided by UNDP, USAID, Switzerland and 
Austria. While most donors provided both direct support to the gacaca process 
through the Supreme Court23 and the Ministry of Justice, and to gacaca-related 
programmes of international and local civil society organisations, some donors 
(the UK, Canada) only supported civil society.
Other donors, such as the European Commission and Belgium (through 
its development agency BTC) decided only to support ‘neutral’ activities, such 
as paying for certain staff members, the publication of a journal Inkiko Gacaca, 
training coordinators and gacaca judges, logistics support and transport, 
presuming that they would incur less blame should the process fail. Their 
representatives now admit that this was a mistake, since their position also meant 
they commanded no expertise to provide technical feedback on the process. 
The Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, on the other hand, together founded 
a Bureau d’Assistance Technique (BAT), which provided both technical and 
logistical support to the Supreme Court. The Netherlands furthermore funded 
supplementary education for the gacaca judges, as well as activities to sensitise 
the local authorities and the population in general. Belgium, the Netherlands, the 
UK, the European Commission, USAID and Switzerland in addition supported 
monitoring of the process by Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) and Penal Reform 
International (PRI), as well as by the National Human Rights Commission and 
a consortium of local NGOs, united in the Projet d’Appui de la Société Civile au 
Processus Gacaca. The European Commission and the Netherlands also financed 
the final evaluations of the gacaca process.24 UNDP financed activities according 
to requests it received from the Rwandan authorities. These activities included 
the editing of handbooks and forms (implemented by Avocats Sans Frontières), 
documenting the process by centralising and archiving dossiers and registers, a 
historical study on the origins and evolution of the gacaca process, etc. USAID 
financed the process only indirectly through NGO activities, such as the training 
of gacaca judges and monitoring (by ASF) and promoting the participation of 
women in the process, supported by local NGOs. Canada also supported some 
local NGOs in their promotion of victim participation in the process. The 
United Kingdom did not offer any direct support to the process, but did provide 
important budget support to Rwanda. The UK furthermore supported certain 
NGO activities, such as the PRI’s monitoring. The gacaca projects of the Rwandan 
civil society, which received donor support, comprised a wide array of activities, 
23 The Supreme Court initially housed a 6th Chamber to deal with gacaca. It was later replaced by 
an independent National Service for Gacaca Justice.
24 Several donors furthermore offered much more limited support, such as computer systems 
materials by USAID, other equipment by Norwegian Church Aid, prisoner transport by 
Trocaire.
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including research, sensitisation, monitoring and reporting, media coverage, 
training and conferences.
Only one donor, Switzerland, decided not to renew its support after an 
evaluation of the pilot phase. This donor considered the Rwandan authorities to be 
insufficiently open to the donor’s remarks regarding the lack of fair trial, the fact 
that the investigations were executed by the inyambakumi (person responsible for 
ten houses) instead of during public hearings, and the fact that suspects had too 
little opportunity to present exonerating evidence. Other donors, such as Belgium 
and Austria, decided against renewal of their support for more technical reasons. 
In general the donors – and a number of Rwandan actors – agree that there was not 
enough willingness on the Rwandan side to enter into a dialogue about possible 
amendments to the process, except for a few more technical recommendations 
(such as refraining from the immediate prosecution of witnesses for false 
testimony), since Rwanda heavily emphasised national ownership.
All in all, donors decided to support the gacaca process because it was a 
component of the official government policy and could therefore boast strong 
national ownership. This is also why they considered the responsibility for the 
outcomes of the process to lie with the Rwandan government, and they primarily 
felt accountable to their home base. They were aware of the risk of human rights 
violations and did wish to prevent these, but only exercised marginal control over 
the process. Although the donors’ financial support added to the success of the 
process, both donors and Rwandan actors are convinced that gacaca would have 
taken place without their aid. In hindsight, some donors feel that they could have 
taken a more critical stance and could have exerted more pressure on the process, 
but in general they perceive the result of the entire process more positively than 
negatively and, therefore, still consider their support justified.
The support for tradition-based activities for unity and reconciliation 
executed or promoted by the NURC is primarily coordinated by UNDP, for 
which UNDP receives financial support from several donors (among which DFID 
is the main donor; NURC is part of the 14 national organisations included in 
the Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector plan and will therefore enjoy 
sector support from several donors). An important part of this support consists 
of logistics for the ingando and itorero solidarity camps and, formerly, for Peace 
and Reconciliation Clubs at schools (not tradition-inspired). At donor level, there 
is concern about the top-down nature of the NURC activities, as well as about the 
romanticised version of history, which is promoted during ingando and itorero. 
Some donors (Belgium and the Netherlands) have explicitly refused to support 
this.
As said, many local reconciliation initiatives are proposed by local 
organisations and are later added by the NURC to their database, but these are 
in fact not tradition-based, although they do aim to restore social harmony. 
Such local initiatives are usually supported by either international NGOs, such 
as International Alert or Miserero, or by religiously inspired organisations such 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   66 21-4-2015   12:29:13
Intersentia 67
Chapter 5.  Official Hybridisation of Tradition: A Case Study on Rwanda
2n
d  p
ro
of
as the Commission Paix & Justice, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services and 
Broederlijk Delen, some of which are supported themselves by bilateral donors 
such as DFID, GTZ, the Netherlands, USAID or Belgium.
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CHAPTER 6
OFFICIAL COMPLEMENTARITY: 
A CASE STUDY ON NORTHERN UGANDA
Martien Schotsmans
1. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
Uganda is a former British colony that became independent in 1962. In previous 
decennia, the British had applied a divide-and-rule policy. As a consequence of 
this policy, the more economically and intellectually developed South supported 
the stuggle for independence that erupted all over Africa after the Second World 
War. Hence, the South opposed the North, where most military originated 
from. After independence, the governments of Obote and Amin continued and 
reinforced this regional opposition.
Although Uganda has known many intra-state conflicts before and after 
Museveni’s takeover in 1986 (Latigo, 2008), the current case study is limited to 
the conflict in Northern-Uganda between Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the Ugandan army (UPDF), supported by local defence units (LDUs). 
The reason for this is the fact that discussions regarding the role of traditional 
justice, as opposed to formal justice, have focused mainly on this conflict, and 
that external interventions have supported the revival of traditional structures 
and practices, which makes it an interesting object of analyses.
This conflict in Northern Uganda (mainly the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and 
Pader) dates from 1986. It has to be understood both in the context of internal 
politics, including discrimination of the Northern region of Uganda, and the 
regional conflict, since the government of Sudan was supporting the LRA until 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the conflict between the then 
Northern and Southern parts of Sudan in 2005, while Uganda was supporting the 
South Sudanese secession movement (Latigo, 2008). The LRA has used extreme 
violence and committed many crimes against the population, the most notorious 
being the abduction and use of children in the hostilities, estimated between 
30,000 and 50,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2003), in addition to sexual violence 
and other attacks against the civilian population. In order to secure the region, 
the Ugandan government decided to regroup about 80% of the population, over 
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1,700,000 persons, in internal displacement camps (IDP camps), where they 
have spent over 20 years and suffered from many crimes, committed by both 
the LRA and the UPDF. There are no exact numbers of persons killed, but my 
respondents estimated they mount up to 15,000. Although a relative security has 
been established in Northern Uganda,1 and most people have left the IDP camps, 
the conflict with the LRA has not officially ended and many people still fear a new 
outbreak of violence and the return (or even spiritual omnipresence) of Joseph 
Kony, who since a few years infests the border region between the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan.
2. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN SOCIETY
Before colonial times, what is now called Acholiland was not a centralised kingdom, 
as existed elsewhere in Uganda (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). Communities 
were governed by traditional chiefs, or rwodi, chosen by supernatural powers. 
Each rwot was assisted by a clan tribunal (kot kwor) that settled disputes within 
the clan, set reparations, performed purification rituals, etc. The rwot was further 
assisted by a council of elders, chosen by the clan members. The council members 
of each clan composed the Grand Council, which, among others, settled disputes 
between different clans (Latigo, 2008). Under the British colonial rule, traditional 
leaders were replaced or seconded by appointed, administrative chiefs, who were 
never fully accepted. The rwodi were officially abolished under the Oboti regime 
in 1966. De facto, the rwodi remained the cultural leaders, but without any official 
recognition. They have been reinstated by Museveni in 1993 and later by the 1995 
Constitution, with limited ceremonial and cultural functions and prohibition 
to participate in party politics or exercise any function in the national or local 
government (Beke, 2004).2
Besides the formal justice system, an administrative system of Local Council 
Courts is established at five different levels (Beke, 2004). They are composed of 
laypersons appointed by the Local Council, and have jurisdiction to deal with 
local civil disputes according to customary law or local byelaws.3
1 Meanwhile the LRA has moved to Southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
the Central African Republic, committing similar atrocities there. See for instance: Human 
Rights Watch, CAR/DR Congo: LRA Conducts Massive Abduction Campaign, Press release, 
11 August 2010. International Crisis Group, LRA: a regional strategy beyond killing Kony, 
Africa Report no. 157, 28 April 2010. 
2 Constitution, Art. 246(e) and (f).
3 Local Council Courts Act, 2006, 24 May 2006.
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3. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
In Northern Uganda, a draft transitional justice framework has been developed, 
but has not become operational yet. Peace negotiations regarding the conflict have 
been ongoing for many years (Latigo, 2008). In 2000, at the request of the Acholi 
population (the ethnic group of Kony and many of his abductees) an Amnesty 
Act was adopted, granting a blanket amnesty for crimes since 1986 to those who 
renounce affiliation to a rebel group. This was successful: by August 2009, a total 
of 23,521 ex-combatants had reported to the Amnesty Commission, of which 
53.75% of the LRA, the majority of which was below the age of 18.4
In December 2003, President Museveni referred the situation to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which in 2005 issued arrest warrants against 
Kony and his commanders. The intervention of the ICC concurred with renewed 
peace negotiations in 2006, which resulted in – among others – an Agreement 
on Accountability and Reconciliation and the Annexure to the Agreement 
on Accountability and Reconciliation. These were signed in 2007 and 2008 
respectively, by the Ugandan government and an LRA representative, but not by 
Joseph Kony, who requested in turn that the ICC arrest warrants be withdrawn 
first.
The agreements provide three transitional justice mechanisms: the 
establishment of a War Crimes Division at the High Court of Kampala to deal with 
‘serious crimes or human rights violations’, but not with ‘state actors’ (including 
military of the UPDF, who in the view of the Acholi committed many atrocities);5 
the establishment of a truth commission;6 and the ‘adoption and recognition 
of complementary alternative justice mechanisms’ to promote reconciliation,7 
including ‘traditional justice processes’.8 Thus, after a year-long vibrant debate 
on the choice between the ICC and traditional justice; that divided traditional 
leaders, the Uganda government, Ugandan and international NGOs, as well as 
scholars (Baines, 2007; Allen, 2006; Refugee Law Project, 2005, among others), 
both formal and traditional mechanisms have been officially accepted as part of 
the transitional justice policy.
Although the agreements have not been signed by Kony, the Ugandan 
government has engaged to implement them. An International Crimes Division 
(instead of a War Crimes Division, which was considered too limited) was 
established in 2008. Only one former LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo, has 
been accused so far. However, Kwoyelo could not be prosecuted, since he had 
applied for amnesty under the Amnesty Act of 2000, but never received a reply. On 
4 Amnesty Commission Kampala, 20 August 2009.
5 Clause 4.1 Agreement and clauses 7–9 Annexure.
6 Clause 2.3 Agreement and clauses 4–6 Annexure.
7 Clause 5.2 Agreement.
8 Clause 5.3 Agreement. Clause 1 of the Agreement refers to the mato oput ritual of the Acholi 
as well as to traditional rituals used by other cultures. 
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22 September 2011, the Constitutional Court of Uganda ruled that the Amnesty 
Act should have been applied to Kwoyelo and that the case should be halted.9 The 
Amnesty Act has been repeatedly criticised, was abolished, but was reinstated in 
May 2013. No prosecutions of UPDF military at the level of the military courts 
have taken place at the time of writing
The government also established a working group on transitional justice 
within the JLOS (Justice, Law and Order Sector) working group. The purpose 
was to provide research, conduct consultations and round-table discussions and 
make proposals on the implementation of the Agreement. After a long process 
of consultations, the JLOS Transitional Justice working group has prepared 
a Transitional Justice Policy Draft for the government, which was still under 
discussion at the time of writing.10 The Draft recommends the adoption of a 
Transitional Justice Act that would provide for a truth telling structure, witness 
and victim protection, the recognition of traditional justice mechanisms as a 
tool for conflict resolution, a reparations programme and the abolishment of 
blanket amnesty, among others. The JLOS Working Group section on traditional 
justice started its work around mid-2009, and has published an extensive 
study of traditional justice mechanisms (TJMs), based on desk research and 
consultancies.11 The study emphasises the restorative components of TJMs and 
proposes to design a framework for the use of TJMs, but remains vague on issues 
of jurisdiction, the integration with the formal system and possible conflicts 
with human rights. Meanwhile, local NGOs, such as the Refugee Law Project, 
have conducted preliminary studies on the possible hybridisation of traditional 
mechanisms (Beyond Juba, 2009).
4. THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE
Traditional and religious leaders have undoubtedly played an important role in 
the peace process in Northern Uganda. Their opposition to the arrest warrants 
issued by the ICC, which they saw as an obstacle to peace, is well documented 
(Allen, 2006). Even though the initial objective, i.e. to accept traditional justice as 
an alternative to prosecution for the LRA leaders, was not achieved, the combined 
efforts of the traditional and religious leaders and local NGOs, supported by a 
number of research projects of national and international scholars and by 
9 Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda, Constitutional Court of Uganda, constitutional petition 
no. 036/11, Judgment, 22 September 2011.
10 The Republic of Uganda, Justice Law & Order Sector, The National Transitional Justice 
Working Group, 3rd Draft, May 2013.
11 The Republic of Uganda, Justice Law & Order Sector, Traditional Justice and Truth Telling and 
National Reconciliation. Study Report (Final Draft), July 2012. 
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international donors have led to the inclusion of provisions on traditional justice 
in the Agreement.
In Acholi tradition, many ritual procedures exist for various situations. 
Caritas Gulu Archdiocese has documented an important number of them, 
pointing out the variety of terminology and practices (Caritas Gulu, 2006). Other 
ethnic groups have different rituals that are equally mentioned in the Agreement.
Among the Acholi, extensive use has been made of traditional cleansing 
and welcoming home rituals, such as nyono tong gweno (stepping on an egg on 
a special stick called laibi). These are intended to purify the returned persons 
form any bad spirit (cen) they might have attracted while being away, and which 
otherwise would affect the community. In addition, when people were leaving the 
IDP camps and returning home, ceremonies to cleanse the land of the bad spirits 
of people killed or having killed (tumo cere or tumu kir), have been performed, 
following the discovery of bodies or the appearance of such spirits.12
The main objective of such rituals, mostly applied to formerly abducted 
children and adults, seems to be purification and reintegration, not accountability 
for crimes. For this reason, victims in Northern Uganda expressed dissatisfaction 
with the fact that some LRA commanders had been granted amnesty and even 
received benefits from the government after a cleansing ceremony, without even 
acknowledging what they did or offering sincere apologies. To many people, 
amnesty for high and mid-level commanders should be conditioned by truth 
telling and compensation, which can be achieved through local practices such as 
mato oput (Conciliation Resources, 2010: 14; UNOHCHR 1996: 54). Mato oput, 
a term sometimes wrongly used to indicate any type of traditional reconciliation 
(Caritus Gulu, 2006: 79) seems to be the only accountability mechanism for 
homicide in Acholi culture (in addition to other mechanisms used to establish 
accountability for minor crimes). It comprises the following steps: the perpetrator, 
haunted by cen (bad spirit), or his family contacts the clan elders and reveals what 
has happened. He will then be confined to his house and not be allowed to share 
any meals or drinks with others, since the spirit of the killed person may also 
affect the community. The same applies to the families and clans of victim and 
perpetrator, thus preventing the conflict from escalating. Elders representing the 
chief or rwot will start mediation between the clans of victim and perpetrator 
to decide on the compensation to be paid. When an agreement is reached and 
implemented, which can even take years, the families will come together and 
a ceremony will be performed, including spiritual prayers, ritual sacrifices of 
animals, the drinking of mato oput (the juice of the bitter root of a specific tree) 
and finally the sharing of drinks and a meal. It is important to note that the 
12 Traditional elders in the village Kal Centre (a dismantled IDP camp they still preferred to live 
in at the time of the interview) extensively spoke about a ‘talking shoe’ that had appeared in a 
field to several people and explained it had belonged to a killed person. Cleansing ceremonies, 
involving the sacrifice of a goat, were performed, after which the land could be cultivated in 
peace again. Interview Village Kal Centre, Parish Kal, Sub-county Ongallo.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   75 21-4-2015   12:29:14
76 Intersentia
Martien Schotsmans
2n
d  p
ro
of
ceremonies, which can sometimes be observed by external persons, are only the 
last step of a lengthy procedure, which involves several previous steps, during 
which accountability is being established. The rituals confirm the reconciliation 
between the families and with the ancestors (own research, confirmed by Beyond 
Juba, 2009; Latigo, 2008; Baines, 2007). The Acholi tradition does not have the 
death penalty, not even for capital crimes.
Obviously, mato oput will not always be possible for LRA crimes, since 
many ex-combatants do not know whom they have killed. When an individual is 
haunted by the spirit of such a person, whose identity he does not know, another 
ceremony can be performed: lakere ket (or moyo kom). This ritual, however, is 
merely a ceremony to cleanse an individual from spiritual impurity and does not 
seem to include an element of accountability or compensation. It involves the 
killing of several animals, traditional dances and purification rites with water and 
fire (Caritas Gulu, 2006).13 Various respondents pointed out that other rituals, 
even if not directly focusing on accountability, may be steps in a long-term process 
that can eventually lead to accountability and reconciliation.
To our knowledge, mato oput has not been applied to LRA crimes, or only 
to a very limited extent, while it is more used for non-war related killings, even 
when a person returns after having served a prison sentence (Beyond Juba, 2009; 
Baines, 2007; Caritas Gulu, 2006; Allen, 2006). Indeed, ex-combatants have only 
returned from the LRA in the last few years and are still afraid to talk, while many 
do not know their victims and have benefited from blanket amnesty without 
any threat of prosecution. In addition, a huge compensation needs to be paid 
by the clan of the offender (which sometimes is also the clan of the victim) for 
which no money is available.14 These high rates might either lead to the non-use 
of mato oput (Caritas Gulu, 2006) or to the fact that victims accept the absence 
of compensation, as in other countries. However, since many LRA combatants 
had formerly been abducted and the government is blamed for not protecting 
the communities, the idea that the government should provide reparations is 
widespread (Beyond Juba, 2009).
Some people doubt whether there are useful or adjustable traditional 
mechanisms for the huge number of sexual offences, since tradition does not 
state any sanction apart from compensation for the husband or father (Beyond 
Juba, 2009). Rape victims sometimes experience positive effects from ritual 
cleansing performed during reintegration ceremonies, but no specific cleansing 
is performed for rape because of the social stigma. This last reason also explains 
why girls who were given ‘in marriage’ to a man in the LRA often do not want 
13 Interviews traditional chief, Caritas Gulu and one beneficiary of lakere ket ceremony, Gulu, 
August 2009.
14 The Ker Kwaro Acholi, the cultural institution of the Acholi traditional leaders, issued a Law 
to declare the Acholi Customary Law, 19 June 2001, which provides the payment of 35 herds 
of cattle and 3 goats for killing another person, in addition to lodging fees to the traditional 
leaders, as well animals and other items to perform the ceremony.
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formal prosecution (Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2005). They experience social 
pressure to stay with this man, especially when there are children, even though a 
majority wishes to leave (Carlson and Mazurana, 2008). In-depth field research 
shows that victims prefer the restoration of social harmony. Depending on the 
relationship to the offender, both ritual cleansing (for people they know) and 
punishment (for strangers) are mentioned as possible responses, but usually 
neither of these are available in daily practice (Porter, 2012).
In general, the idea is that people need to return to their home villages first, 
settle all the emerging land disputes, benefit from programmes focusing on 
economic revival and feel secure, before they will start talking. Once again, the 
timing of interventions is crucial, since people tend to want peace at any price 
when the conflict is at its height, but eventually do ask for accountability as well, 
once the violence has ended.
While it is early days to compare the yet non-operational transitional justice 
mechanisms in Uganda, clearly the International Crimes Division will not 
allow for accountability, truth telling or victim participation regarding low level 
perpetrators, nor regarding UPDF crimes. Whether ordinary courts will play a 
role in this regard is unlikely, considering the amnesty. With a cautious note on 
the challenges caused by the generation long displacement of the population, the 
dire poverty and others, traditional mechanisms such as mato oput seem to have 
the potential of providing more accountability, truth finding, victim participation 
and dialogue. Compensation might be problematic once again. It remains to be 
seen if the process of hybridisation of these traditional mechanisms will allow 
them to safeguard this potential while finding answers to the many challenges.
As stated above, traditional ceremonies have been used to cleanse returning 
ex-combatants and abducted children, and to purify the land. Considering the 
costs of both ceremonies, the role of international actors has been a vital one in 
this context.
5. POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
In Sierra Leone and Rwanda, multilateral and bilateral donors mostly provided 
support to activities in the context of official government policy concerning 
transitional justice, while informal activities on a smaller scale and a local 
level were supported more by international NGOs, foundations and the like. 
Although the same applies to Northern Uganda, there have been important 
donor interventions before the official transitional justice policy was developed, 
including interventions that reinforced traditional leadership, traditional 
values and traditional practices. There is no doubt that these interventions have 
contributed to the importance attached to traditional justice during the peace 
negotiations and in the transitional justice provisions of the peace agreement. 
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On  the other hand, the fact that the supported activities were not part of an 
official policy might be symptomatic for the lack of political will to implement 
the part of the peace agreement concerning traditional mechanisms, while most 
donors (with the exception of USAID) will base their decision for support on the 
actual policy. In the meantime, they have been supporting preparatory activities, 
such as consultations during the peace negotiations15 and the functioning of the 
JLOS workgroup for transitional justice, which has nevertheless up until now not 
led to any concrete proposal for implementation.
Regarding donor interventions concerning tradition-based activities before 
the peace agreement and considering the promotion of traditional practices 
in Northern Uganda, one could presume that donors support these because 
they were actually used on a local level. However, this is not the case since 
many traditions have fallen into oblivion since most Acholi remained in the 
IDP camps for twenty years, where it was not possible to perform traditional 
ceremonies. Some authors (Allen, 2006) even suggest that the donors’ financial 
support contributed to the re-invention – or even the invention – of tradition. 
As mentioned above, this is a false debate, as the underlying values, such as the 
necessity to acknowledge accountability, the offering and acceptance of apologies, 
the payment of reparations and the restoration of harmony with the community 
and the ancestors, are certainly still present among the population (Beyond 
Juba, 2009). Our interviews with participants of cleansing rituals show that they 
themselves are very much convinced of the importance and positive impact of 
the rituals. Belief in the fact that killing a person or committing other crimes 
summons evil spirits or at least brings bad luck over the involved person, his family 
and clan is still very much alive, also among young people. Even young people 
who do not share this world view are willing to submit to the rituals in order to be 
accepted back into their communities. These world views also cause problems in 
communities to which ex-combatants return after having been granted amnesty 
without any acknowledgement of accountability, reparations or cleansing, and feel 
threatened, stigmatised or discriminated against, for example in the allocation of 
land or other employment possibilities. Undergoing these rituals is supposed to 
decrease trauma and stigma. Obviously, such cleansing rituals cannot erase all 
consequences of the armed conflict, such as the dire economic circumstances, nor 
can they deal with root causes such as regional discrimination.
Three areas of support by international actors can be distinguished with 
regards to tradition-based activities implemented before the peace agreement.
First, restoration of the traditional institution. As mentioned earlier, 
traditional leaders were officially recognised again in Uganda since the 1995 
Constitution. A research conducted in 1998–1999 by the NGO ACORD on Acholi 
chiefs, identified ‘traditional leaders’, who then were (re)instated in 2000 (Allen, 
2006; ACCORD, 2002; Dolan, 2000), after which a Paramount Chief was elected.
15 USAID, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, MacArthur Foundation.
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Although traditional leadership existed in Acholiland before, appointing a 
Paramount Chief is a new creation, not a tradition that existed in pre-colonial 
times, meaning that its legitimacy is limited (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). 
Moreover, the DANIDA, the NUTI programme16 and the NGO Conciliation 
Resources17 supported the cultural organisation of the Acholi traditional leaders, 
the Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA). This organisation comprises a structure with 
ministers and a secretariat and is seen as neutral in the conflict. The KKA was 
also more inspired by structures created by the colonial rulers than by tradition, 
although the KKA itself claims that the institution has been around since the 
1400s (Latigo, 2008). The objective of donor support for these activities was to 
increase the local leaders’ capacity in peace negotiations. This also included 
human rights training, as well as awareness raising on sexual violence and its 
consequences. Furthermore, women and young people are part of the council 
of the wise, which assists the chief or rwot, although women are still excluded 
from the position of chief itself, and they cannot perform traditional ceremonies 
or intervene in dispute resolution (Beyond Juba, 2009). Several embassies that 
supported the peace negotiations in Juba financially supported the participation 
of traditional leaders, and of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI).
It seems that this financial support was not inspired by the actual role of 
traditional leaders, but by their assumed potential contribution to reconciliation 
in the peace process, which they indeed provided. An (at that time) influential 
report of Dennis Pain, which recommended the anointment of traditional leaders, 
to restore their credibility in this regard, might very well have influenced donors 
(Pain, 1997).18
Supporting traditional structures involves a risk of reinforcing traditional 
authority, which might create a power struggle with local administration and 
local courts. But in Northern Uganda, this is not considered a real risk, since 
traditional leaders are excluded from all political or administrative functions.
Subsequent studies, on the other hand, show that traditional leaders are 
respected more because of the role they played in the conflict settlement and the 
rituals for returned LRA members (Beyond Juba, 2009).
Second, restoration of traditional norms was supported. As mentioned 
earlier, traditional beliefs on the consequences of crimes are still present among 
the population. However, since traditional practices have been eroded by the life 
in IDP camps for two decades, and many elders have died meanwhile, the younger 
generation is sometimes less familiar with them, nor do they respect traditional 
leaders as before (Latigo, 2008).19 Thus, it was deemed important that they would 
16 Northern Uganda Transition Initiative, supported by the Office of Transition Initiatives of 
USAID.
17 Supported by DFID.
18 The importance of supporting traditional leaders was later confirmed by OECD-DAC in the 
DAC Guidelines. Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, 2001, p. 120.
19 Latigo, Tradition-based practices in Acholi, p. 109.
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be sensitised. The Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI), engaged in a tour 
of 62 IDP camps in 2005 to make people aware of ‘the tradition of reconciliation 
among the Acholi’. In total, 155,000 people attended the sessions. In addition, 
radio programmes were broadcast and a documentary on Acholi reconciliation 
was produced and broadcast.20 Another forgotten tradition, the wang oo, or 
bonfire where elders would explain tradition to young people through storytelling 
and traditional dances, has also been revived (Latigo, 2008; NUPI report, 2006).21
The criticism that these activities imply a reinvention of tradition is to be 
rejected. One can also see them as promoting the revival of important traditional 
values, which have their roots in the Acholi culture that – due to the unwanted 
circumstances of the conflict – had not been practiced anymore. They are 
comparable to the outreach and sensitisation activities on the role and mandate of 
the ICC in Uganda, which – in contrast – is not rooted in local culture or tradition 
at all. Moreover, the formal justice system was almost absent in Northern Uganda 
and its rehabilitation will also require sensitisation and training.
The problem is, however, that after the re-instatement of the body of 
traditional (and religious) leaders, they were perceived as the representatives of 
all Acholi, and their promotion of traditional solutions instead of prosecution 
by the ICC was seen as the Acholi position. In the meantime, surveys and 
research have shown that most Acholi are not as opposed to the ICC and its arrest 
warrants or prosecution on a national level as the leaders claimed (Pham and 
Vinck, 2010; UNOHCHR, 2007; Pham et al., 2007; Pham et al., 2005). Although 
opinion was divided, many respondents seemed to support a mixed solution, 
with criminal prosecution of the commanders and a combination of amnesty 
with confessions, apologies and traditional rituals for the others. These surveys 
and other investigations have put the legitimacy of traditional norms and values 
in perspective. The peace agreement, which combines formal prosecution with 
traditional mechanisms, seems to confirm this perspective.
Third, since the adoption of the Amnesty Act in 2000, restoration of traditional 
ceremonies has been supported: traditional ceremonies have been performed on 
thousands of returnees, supported by external actors.22 The above-mentioned 
NUPI project claims to have supported the ‘stepping on the egg’ ceremony for 
over 12,000 returnees. Caritas claims it has performed such ceremonies for over 
3,000 people.
UNICEF has also supported such ceremonies for children returning from 
the LRA through centres for the sheltering of these children (reception centres). 
Cleansing and healing were the main objectives of these ceremonies.
20 Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (Managing African Conflict), FY2006 Year-End Report. 
A summary of objectives and Results, 30 October 2006. Supported by USAID/OTI. 
21 With the support of USAID-OTI. In practice, the one I attended seemed the reverse, providing 
a forum to young people to vent out their frustrations and needs to the elders.
22 Mainly by USAID (NUPI and NUTI), the IOM, the NED-US. 
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Some claim that such ceremonies are not the ‘real thing’, especially when 
they are performed collectively (Allen, 2006). Although the effectiveness of 
such ceremonies is sometimes assumed too easily or overestimated, discussions 
regarding their real or invented character are based on the assumption that 
traditional rituals are static and lose their effectiveness if adjusted to post-conflict 
needs. Donors who support these ceremonies do not seem to be particularly 
attached to considerations regarding their ‘real’ nature and support such 
activities on a demand basis, leaving the assessment of their effectiveness to their 
local partners. Such (initial) blind support by some donors (mainly USAID) is 
criticised by other donors, who prefer to support research projects and government 
consultations before taking a decision.23
Finally, various donors present in Uganda do not support any activities 
regarding traditional practices yet, although they might be inclined to do so in the 
future, depending on the outcome of the ongoing process to develop a national 
transitional justice policy, based on the research projects24 and consultations25 
that they have been supporting.26 This means they plan to base their decision on 
official acknowledgement of yet to be created ad hoc mechanisms.
In conclusion, it seems that those donors who supported traditional practices 
have been led by motifs regarding the potential positive role of traditional leaders 
in the peace negotiations, as well as the positive impact of purification rituals for 
returned (abducted) ex-combatants.
Hence, they responded to requests by traditional leaders and local NGOs, 
while the legitimacy of the traditional leaders was insufficiently investigated. 
Moreover, the reinforcing impact of the donor interventions on the position of 
traditional leaders was not taken into account, which meant that – initially – the 
sometimes deviating opinions of the population were not heard. With regard to 
supporting tradition in the context of the peace agreement, donors seem to wait for 
the official transitional justice policy, without having a specific focus on tradition 
(whereas they do focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding). However, they 
did support activities of civil society organisations, such as research, coalition 
building, consultations, etc. When political will is lacking, such support can 
be a sensitive issue for the local government since the national government 
23 USAID’s NUTI programme is more aware of the need for evaluation and verification of the 
legitimacy of the activities. Interview USAID-OTI, Gulu.
24 Such as, for example, the Liu Institute for Global Issues of the University of British Colombia 
in collaboration with the Justice and Reconciliation Project of the Gulu District NGO Forum, 
supported by the Netherlands, the MacArthur Foundation and the Compton Foundation, the 
research of the Refugee Law project connected with the Makerere University and supported 
by Sweden, the Ford Foundation and Norway. The Conciliation Resources research was 
supported by the United Kingdom. 
25 Population consultations were supported by, among others, UNOHCHR and the MacArthur 
Foundation.
26 Mainly donors who also support the JLOS, i.e. the Netherlands, Austria and Irish Aid. To 
a certain extent Sweden, Norway and DANIDA. The donors also participate in the JLOS 
Working Group on Transitional Justice.
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is the donors’ first partner. That is why both political will and adjusting the 
mechanisms to human rights standards are considered vital. This explains why 
they choose to support the process instead of the possible outcomes of that 
process. It is furthermore important to understand that too much attention for 
the role of traditional leaders and for traditional reconciliation increases the risk 
of ‘localising’ the conflict, drawing attention away from its national root causes. 
Lastly, the momentum for donor support for the transitional justice process in 
general, and for the use of traditional mechanisms in that process in particular, 
may be disappearing almost unnoticed.
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CHAPTER 7
TRADITION IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE: BETWEEN LOCALISATION 
AND GLOBALISATION
Martien Schotsmans
1. INTRODUCTION
Everything discussed above shows that donors have no real policy for the use 
of traditional or tradition-based mechanisms in the framework of transitional 
justice. Support for such mechanisms is inspired by their peacebuilding policy 
in which the search for sustainable peace and local ownership come first, as 
well as respect for international norms, more particularly the duty to prosecute 
international crimes and respect for human rights.
The analysis below will feature three themes: the evolution of donors’ 
understanding of local ownership; donors’ fragmented approach to traditional 
elements without perceiving these in their context; and a legal pluralistic analysis 
of donors’ quest to deal with the tension between tradition and human rights. 
For each of these themes the findings of the research are analysed and policy 
recommendations are made to international actors.
2. LOCAL OWNERSHIP
As explained above, donors are participants in the debate on globalisation 
and localisation, but they wrestle with the concept and the practical aspects of 
localisation in the context of transitional justice. Initially, local ownership was 
understood to be state ownership, which had several consequences. It was later 
extended to national ownership, which had other consequences. Anyhow, the 
attention for local ownership led to attention for local – including traditional – 
mechanisms of conflict resolution.
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2.1. STATE OWNERSHIP
Since the risk of conflict is higher in fragile states, peacebuilding used to be 
primarily aimed at state building, i.e. strengthening the state structures and 
organisations.1 In addition, the Paris Declaration of 2005 on aid effectiveness 
recommends that donor countries align their support with the partner country’s 
policy. It therefore makes sense that multilateral and bilateral donors primarily 
support the official transitional justice policy. As we have seen, traditional 
mechanisms are supported as far as they are part of this policy. Initiatives that 
use tradition-based mechanisms that are not included in the official policy 
mainly depend on support from non-governmental donors such as foundations 
or INGOs. The latter group may receive support for this from multilateral or 
bilateral donors, who prefer to leave the management of such smaller and, in their 
view, more risky (i.e. sensitive or hard to check) projects to INGOs, which can 
sometimes lead to tensions between INGOs and local NGOs (Pouligny, 2003), 
but also to more (substantive and technical) support. This especially applies 
to projects aimed at reconciliation, cleansing and reintegration of returning 
soldiers into their community. Post-conflict countries often count dozens, if not 
hundreds of such projects which may or may not have a loose connection to the 
conflict and to reconciliation, and which are difficult to inventory (Daly and 
Sarkin, 2007). Nevertheless, more effort could be made to develop a policy with 
guidelines to support such initiatives. The tradition-based projects in Northern 
Uganda, supported by USAID-OTI, are an exception to the above-mentioned and 
preceded the official transitional justice policy.
As clarified above, traditional views on justice usually comprise the following 
components: acknowledgement of accountability, offering of apologies and 
the promise to not relapse into violence, the opportunity to accept apologies, 
reparations, reconciliation and reintegration into the community. Establishing 
criminal accountability is, however, considered a state monopoly (unlike 
reconciliation) and should respect international norms. In post-conflict 
countries, the formal justice system is usually unable to try all crimes committed 
on a large scale – let alone according to international norms – or only prosecutes 
the leaders. Our research has shown that when the offender and the victim are 
part of the same community, there is most certainly a need for mechanisms that 
lead to acknowledgement of accountability – even when an official amnesty has 
been declared – as a condition for reconciliation and social harmony. In such 
cases, accountability and reconciliation are not separate, isolated activities, and 
they are sometimes even referred to by the same term (Huyse and Salter, 2008). 
Absence of such mechanisms leads to tensions, discrimination and stigmatisation 
(Conciliation Resources, 2010; Boersch-Supan, 2009). We have furthermore shown 
1 OECD-DAC, Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations, April 
2007. 
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that tradition-based mechanisms can in fact bring about a full establishment of 
accountability according to local norms. Nonetheless, donors will not be inclined 
to support such initiatives unless they are part of the official policy. If this is not 
the case, a de facto accountability vacuum will emerge at the local level. Although 
local mechanisms are sometimes spontaneously used without external support, 
this support is essential to meet the huge demand for such practices considering 
the scale of the crimes committed. First, such support is needed because many 
communities are very poor and do not have the means to purchase the animals 
and goods necessary for the indispensable rituals, even if it is decided to renounce 
reparations. Second, external support, usually through local organisations, allows 
for the integration of modern values regarding, among others, gender equality 
and the prohibition of corporal punishment, through training and consultation, 
and to counterbalance the power of local leaders through NGO oversight, which is 
even more important when these leaders are part of the problem. Hence, donors’ 
focus on the official policy may overlook local needs regarding accountability and 
the subsequent tensions, while the objective of peacebuilding is the search for 
sustainable solutions.
A further disadvantage of aligning donor interventions with the official 
transitional justice policy is that interventions will depend on the political 
will of the authorities. If there is none, donors may put pressure through their 
diplomatic services, which often leads to agreements just on paper. Furthermore, 
donors can support all kinds of preparatory actions, such as capacity building for 
civil society organisations, allowing these organisations to advocate their views 
with the government, preliminary research to map existing mechanisms or to 
explore possibilities for hybridisation, popular consultations, participation of 
traditional or other leaders in negotiations and conferences, or indirect support 
through local NGOs for projects that may enhance the legitimacy of certain 
actors or mechanisms. In other words, interventions to support the process that 
is supposed to lead to the development of the official transitional justice policy 
or the implementation strategy. Some are not directly aimed at bringing about a 
transitional justice policy – such as the reinstatement of traditional leaders – but 
are a part of peacebuilding. Such interventions – even those that require a lot 
of time – have the advantage of increasing the chances for local ownership of 
the policy. Although donors have no policy with regards to the added value of 
tradition in itself, they should be more aware of the fact that the extent to which 
traditional leaders, values or mechanisms are part of the preliminary process 
determines the likelihood of these becoming part of the policy.
A final question is whether the fact that donors align their policy with the 
official partner country’s policy implies that donors feel less responsible for the 
outcome of their support. Our research has shown that donors primarily feel 
responsibility toward their home constituency, i.e. the parliament and (to a lesser 
degree) the public opinion of the home country. Donors think that the prime 
responsibility for the impact of a policy on the local population lies with the 
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partner country’s government itself, as donors have merely provided support to 
this policy.2
2 .2 . NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
More recently, the concept of local ownership was extended and understood to 
mean national ownership. That is why organisations from civil society and more 
recently the population itself have been involved in developing and implementing 
the official transitional justice policy through consultations.
Initially, this debate searched for an answer to the question how the available 
transitional justice mechanisms could be localised, for example by adding a 
local flavour (such as the ritual cleansing of child soldiers) or including local 
stakeholders in the mechanisms (such as the involvement of the religious and 
traditional leaders in the TRC in Sierra Leone, at the request of civil society). 
This did not involve using local mechanisms or questioning international 
norms in light of divergent traditional norms. Even the Rwandan gacaca courts, 
which were created by the government as a hybrid mix of formal justice and 
traditional elements and were subject to quite some criticism by the human rights 
movement, do not question the need for criminal prosecution – i.e. they respect 
the international legal duty to prosecute. The debate in Northern Uganda lifts 
this discussion to another level by proposing tradition-based accountability and 
reconciliation mechanisms as full-fledged alternatives to criminal prosecution. 
This questioning came from the same local NGOs and traditional and local 
leaders that received support from donors and international NGOs to create local 
ownership of the peace process and the transitional justice policy. This local claim 
on the debate came unexpectedly and created a lot of resistance, especially among 
international legal experts. This is exactly where globalisation and localisation 
cross paths: global views on how to deal with past crimes, the need for criminal 
prosecution and respect for human rights clash with sometimes opposing or at 
least divergent views of local stakeholders, who were consulted to enhance local 
ownership.
Obviously, this is a simplification of reality: popular consultations in Northern 
Uganda have shown that their views and attitudes are much more nuanced than 
the religious and traditional leaders claimed. For example people differentiate 
between the responsibility of the government and of the LRA, and between the 
responsibility of the commanders and executors and, as a consequence, their 
opinions on the most appropriate response to these crimes vary. This means that 
one has to be careful with the supposed representation of the population by local 
leaders (religious, traditional, NGOs) and that consultations must involve a wide 
range of local stakeholders.
2 Focus group discussion. Forum Cape Town, 22–25 March 2010.
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Systematic and subsequent popular consultations during the conflict and 
the peace negotiations furthermore show that opinions evolve over time and 
that people are more in favour of mechanisms that address the accountability of 
those responsible if they feel safe, while they feel less inclined to opt for criminal 
prosecution if they fear that this could lead to new eruptions of violence. This is 
shown by our studies in Sierra Leone, but also by consecutive surveys in Northern 
Uganda (Pham and Vinck, 2010; UNOHCHR, 2007; Pham et al., 2007; Pham et 
al., 2005). This means that developing a solid transitional justice policy takes 
time, and that people have to be given the chance to return to more or less normal 
living conditions. Only then will it become clear what the needs for sustainable 
coexistence are, so that consultations and especially the use of transitional justice 
mechanisms should only start later. Although the end of an armed conflict often 
creates a window of opportunity in which tough decisions on how to deal with 
the past can be taken more easily, the local population often needs more time to 
develop an opinion, which means that the implementation of transitional justice 
at that level will take more time as well. That is why donors who intervene in 
transitional justice should extend the timeline of their peacebuilding programmes 
beyond the first post-conflict years and should at the same time, with support 
from civil society, ensure the momentum for transitional justice (on a state level 
but also at their own level) does not get lost.
It is unfortunate that in many consultations, civil society actors and the 
population are still asked for their opinion on specific mechanisms, instead of 
asking them what kind of response they feel is appropriate, considering the type 
of crime, the perpetrator and the circumstances, and which values are important 
for them in such cases. Apparently, the ‘tool box’ approach to transitional justice 
is still dominant in such consultations. For example, a survey in Northern Uganda 
(Pham and Vinck, 2010) included the question: ‘What do you prefer: amnesty, 
amnesty with a truth commission, prosecutions on a national or international 
level, or traditional mechanisms?’ The same survey, however, started by asking 
people what ‘justice’ meant for them, and collected the following responses: ‘Most 
defined it in terms of holding offenders accountable (29%), holding trials (25%), 
being fair (18%), and reconciling (9%).’ These are interesting answers that urge the 
authors to a completely unwarranted conclusion: ‘In other words, most attached 
procedural and institutional concepts to the idea of justice.’ These kind of surveys 
ask people limited, superficial questions which do not take the underlying values 
of their global vision on justice and social harmony into account. There is a strong 
need for more thorough, qualitative research (as opposed to having an expert 
flown in for a limited time or holding surveys with standard questions). In many 
countries, legal anthropology research is available dating from before the armed 
conflict, but it is only rarely taken into consideration. Such research could be a 
useful source of information, even though it needs updating to take into account 
the evolving opinions of the population during and after the conflict.
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Obviously, the situation at the local level is not isolated from national and 
international levels. All these levels are interrelated and the local population is 
aware of developments at other levels. Hence, local tradition-based initiatives 
can be encouraged or discouraged by respectively good or bad examples at 
national or international levels, and the other way around. These may include 
criminal prosecutions (but also the selectivity or lack thereof), offering apologies 
or gestures of reconciliation by political leaders. Hence, the need to develop an 
integrated approach and to avoid reducing the responsibility for dealing with past 
crimes to a local problem, for example by emphasising the need for tradition-
based mechanisms on the one hand while, on the other hand, the national 
responsibility for causing or perpetuating the conflict is ignored (Beyond Juba, 
2009; Allen, 2006).
Civil society sometimes lacks power to enforce its proposals – such as for 
traditional mechanisms as an alternative to international criminal prosecution – 
and relies on the government to do this, while the latter possibly has other – more 
political – priorities, as the Uganda case study shows. In such event, the support 
of donors and other international actors will prove crucial for empowering civil 
society organisations to influence policy with diplomatic interventions. Where 
civil society organisations are weak and lack international support – for example 
because their proposals violate international norms or because donor countries 
themselves have other, often political, priorities – they will find it difficult to get 
their views accepted.
The government may have a political interest in influencing the results of 
consultations, for example through preliminary sensitisation campaigns. If 
one really wants to uncover the population’s opinions, careful planning and 
supervision of the consultations are indispensable. Such precautionary measures 
will, however, not be enough to neutralise the lack of freedom of speech in 
some countries, and the corresponding tendency of the population to follow the 
government discourse.
On the other hand, the population’s opinion will not be the sole determining 
factor in the debate, especially when it comes to international crimes, on which 
the international community is also a stakeholder: partly because of its interest 
to end conflict and to create sustainable peace, partly because the nature of the 
international crimes themselves – i.e. violations of international common law 
norms (including treaty stipulations) which are meant to protect values that are 
important for the entire international community (Cassese, 2003) – forces the 
international community to take action, following international agreements. 
That is why transitional justice needs a holistic approach in which all these views 
receive equal attention.
What should be taken into account is the fact that consultations and 
participation create the expectation that their outcomes will be considered, even 
if these run counter to the opinions of the international community. That is why 
consultations cannot be seen as just the latest standard or default condition in 
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peacebuilding programmes: what is the point of consulting the population if 
decisions are made without taking their views into account? One could doubt 
whether such an approach can actually lead to local ownership.
Finally, consulting the population requires an open mind to understand and 
accept complex views that cannot be aligned with ready-made concepts about, for 
example, accountability and reconciliation. One of the requests that arose from 
the study is to reconsider the equivalence between accountability and criminal 
prosecution. Donors, however, are not always fully aware of the complexity of 
local views.
The recommendations that follow from the above analysis are expounded in 
Chapter 16.
3. FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO TRADITION
As donors have no specific policy regarding the use of tradition-based mechanisms 
in transitional justice, but attach importance mainly to local ownership, they 
are not really invested in the debate on the real or (re)invented nature of such 
mechanisms. Rather, the fact that an activity is labelled as ‘traditional’ is for 
donors a sign that this activity is familiar to the population and will therefore 
create legitimacy and ownership. This potential was often confirmed by the 
research. This was the case in Rwanda, regarding the use of gacaca (UNOHCHR, 
1996), in Sierra Leone with the proposals of the TRC to use traditional methods 
(Manifesto ’99, 2002, financed by UNOHCHR), and extensively in the debate in 
Northern Uganda. During our research, donors repeatedly pointed out that they 
work with what they find ‘on the ground’, meaning that they also collaborate with 
traditional leaders if these leaders are locally perceived as unavoidable gatekeepers 
to the community. However, they do this without questioning or at least critically 
assessing these traditional leaders’ unavoidable position.
It was already mentioned above that the traditional leaders in Sierra Leone were 
involved in the TRC activities, as provided by the Commission mandate. This was 
a response to a request from the civil society and the Paramount chiefs themselves, 
who were consulted with support from UNOHCHR. Donors had already – after 
preliminary consultations – supported a project for the reinstatement of the 
Paramount chiefs, at the request of the government (which clearly had political 
motives in mind, given the role of the chiefs in Parliament and during elections).3 
At that time, the role the chiefs had played in causing the conflict did not appear 
to be an important issue, and they still seemed to enjoy a certain legitimacy, 
perhaps because the abuse of power was simply part of a widespread pattern of 
corruption, patronage and nepotism and was not considered exceptional. But the 
3 Statement on the formal recognition of Paramount chiefs, by president Kabbah at Kenema, Bo, 
Makeni and Port Loko, 26–30 January 2003. 
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matter did gradually come to the forefront during the TRC hearings and finally 
urged the Commission to state in its report that it was ‘surprised by the number 
of complaints about violations committed by many of the Chiefs during the 
conflict, for which they neither as a group nor individually expressed remorse or 
offered any explanation to their communities. In reality, while the Commission 
had to rely on the chiefs as leaders of their communities and had to work closely 
with them … the Commission has not felt entirely comfortable having to rely on 
traditional structures to help foster reconciliation’ (TRC report, 2004, Vol. 3B). 
The TRC even identified the abuse of power by the traditional chiefs as one of the 
causes of the conflict, since these abuses alienated quite some young people from 
their communities, causing them to leave the communities and become part of 
the mass of dissatisfied and easily mobilised young people (TRC report, 2004, 
Vol. 3B). The TRC’s recommendation that subsequent governments put the chiefs’ 
role and manipulation on the national agenda for further debate, considering the 
high potential for future conflict, has been ignored. More thorough preliminary 
research could have revealed the dubious role the traditional chiefs played and 
might have led to a more critical approach to the proposal to include them, as well 
as to a more thorough examination of the issue by the TRC itself.
Donors, however, rarely see more than the outside of what is presented and 
have a superficial approach to tradition. This turns tradition into a kind of exotic 
spice to add some local flavour to a standard mechanism from the transitional 
justice ‘toolbox’, just to present it as authentically ‘local’. Even if it is indeed a local 
mechanism, donors sometimes pay too little attention to the context in which 
the use of traditional mechanisms is proposed, or to the cosmovision a tradition 
is part of. This happens mostly in cases where mechanisms are used ‘only’ for 
reconciliation or reintegration. However, people’s cosmovision or world views 
constitute a larger whole that will evolve over time and under outside influences. 
One cannot split it up to use what comes in handy at a given moment, while 
disregarding the overall picture.
This situation can best be illustrated by expanding on what was already 
mentioned above (section 2.3.1.) with regard to Sierra Leone. After the war, 
donors supported reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, many of whom 
were kidnapped as children. These reintegration ceremonies were inspired by 
tradition and involved, among others, ritual cleansing. What the donors did not 
consider at that time was that although these ceremonies allowed the involved 
ex-combatants to return home, they would not be accepted as full members of the 
community because they had not been initiated into one of the secret societies. 
Initiation into such a society (including genital mutilation for girls) provides 
the participants with the required social status in their community, gives them 
a voice in decision-making processes, grants them respect and allows them to 
marry a person of equal status. These days it is possible to refuse initiation, but 
this will oblige that person to leave the community, or to stay without enjoying 
any status and the right to marry an initiated person. Non-initiated males will be 
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excluded from important decisions regarding the community, which are taken 
by the secret societies. Some young people who returned have yielded to social 
pressure and have undergone the initiation, including genital mutilation or other 
harmful practices such as scarification. Participants in the Fambul Tok project 
who opted for this after the end of the project saw the initiation as the final step 
of their reintegration process. Others refused (many girls had been raped and had 
children when they returned, making initiation pointless), but experience many 
difficulties in being fully accepted (Schotsmans, 2011).
International actors must therefore ask themselves whether the application 
of the ‘do no harm’ principle is limited to the activity they support, or reaches 
beyond and includes the indirect, contextual consequences, the inevitability of 
which would have been revealed by thorough preliminary research.
In addition, the risk of political manipulation of tradition leaders, of the 
tradition-based mechanisms or the use of the label ‘traditional’ is not always 
thoroughly assessed. The example of localising the conflict in Northern Uganda 
was already mentioned above, while in Sierra Leone the traditional leaders are 
known as ‘agip’: ‘any government in power’, meaning servants of those in power, and 
their restoration and subsequent participation in official mechanisms is therefore 
in the interest of the government. In Rwanda, the use of the label ‘traditional’ 
has taken a new turn with the promotion of the solidarity camps ingando and 
itorero – a new type of initiation and reintegration ritual for ex-combatants, 
former prisoners, university students and other professional groups – and other 
NURC activities, especially with a view of achieving national unity. The fact 
that reconciliation is imposed as a top-down policy by the authorities and the 
romanticised presentation of the country’s pre-colonial history cause concern 
(Purdeková, 2008; Mgbako, 2005).
In the same vein, the impact of donor support on local power relations is 
insufficiently examined. Support for tradition-based mechanisms entails the 
risk of strengthening the same traditional structures that were sometimes 
identified as causes of the conflict, while change is just what is needed to 
prevent recurrence (Pouligny, 2006). The same goes for the risks related to the 
conservative and discriminatory nature of traditional mechanisms. A careful 
analysis and assessment thereof should lead to providing the necessary checks 
and balances, both at the top (i.e. the government and donors) and at the bottom 
(i.e. the beneficiaries). The integration of women and young people both in the 
preliminary decision-making process and in the implementation of decisions, as 
well as the involvement of local NGOs, can contribute to this goal. Furthermore, 
the way in which perpetrators and victims of sexual violence are treated should 
receive a lot more attention, since traditional mechanisms overly emphasise 
compensation for the family and cleansing of the victim, while the views of the 
women themselves are not sufficiently considered (Porter, 2012). These practices 
obviously reflect gender (in)equality in the society as a whole, which will be 
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subject of other donor interventions. The recommendations of the above analysis 
will be expounded in Chapter 16.
4. HYBRIDISATION
Since the patriarchal nature of traditional mechanisms often entails a risk of 
unequal treatment of men, women and youths on the one hand and a violation 
of the rights of the defence on the other, donors often face a dilemma: to support 
local mechanisms, thereby running the risk of human rights violations, or to 
only support formal justice without contributing to justice and reconciliation 
at the local level. In practice, in supporting such mechanisms they have 
always disclaimed responsibility for possible human rights violations, while 
simultaneously supporting activities to promote human rights. The actual 
integration of traditional elements and human rights into hybrid mechanisms 
was mostly left to local partners.
This brings us to the dilemma donors face with regard to the tensions between 
divergent normative orders.
As said, international actors do not oppose the use of traditional elements 
in the framework of transitional justice if these elements are used only for 
reconciliation or reintegration purposes, insofar as human rights are respected 
(such as the prohibition of corporal punishment or the discrimination of women). 
Objections do arise, however, in cases where tradition-based mechanisms are 
proposed as alternatives to criminal accountability, as happened in Northern 
Uganda, since this violates the international paradigm and the duty to prosecute. 
Of all generally accepted objectives of transitional justice (accountability, truth 
finding, reparations, reconciliation and preventing recurrence), the objective of 
accountability is the one on which global and local views clash the most.
The study of legal pluralism – an angle of research only sparingly used in 
transitional justice (see for example: Nagy, 2009) – offers us some interesting ideas 
on how to handle this challenge. Some of these are already applied in transitional 
justice.
The study of legal pluralism points out that a single social field can present 
several normative orders, which neither ignore nor eliminate each other (see 
section 3.1.4.2). Every society comprises a number of social fields and each of 
these fields is semi-autonomous: meaning that each field is partly able to regulate 
its activities independently, but still has to take the norms of other, overlapping 
fields into account. Every social action always takes place in the context of plural, 
overlapping semi-autonomous fields (Moore, 1973).
Legal pluralism originally studied the interaction between formal and 
informal legal systems, but the field of research was gradually expanded to include 
the interaction between multiple formal legal systems. For our research, these are 
exactly the three relevant normative orders: the international, the state and the 
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non-state (although again one can distinguish several orders within each of the 
three fields).
Scholars of legal pluralism have tried to distinguish models, i.e. possible ways 
to manage the overlaps. Some of these models can be grouped under the label 
of state-central legal pluralism (also known as ‘weak’ legal pluralism, Griffiths, 
1986). This departs from a normative state perspective and entails that non-state 
sources of law can be accepted as long as they can be brought to state control in the 
framework of continual evolution toward an order in which the state is the sole 
source of law. For example, the official gacaca courts in Rwanda replaced the post-
genocide gacaca and the so-called Christian gacaca. On the other hand, scholars 
distinguish ‘strong’ legal pluralism, in which the co-existence of equivalent legal 
orders is accepted as an empirical reality, regardless of their recognition by the 
state. Obviously, this means that legal pluralism is everywhere and unavoidable. 
This leads to complex conflict patterns, which legal centralists often negatively 
describe as competition, but which can be more positively interpreted as an 
opportunity for a very dynamic process of interaction and negotiation between 
several social fields. This dynamic process will eventually establish which norms 
will in fact be applied to a certain place and time (Griffiths, 1986). The outcome 
of the process will be determined by, among other things, the power structures in 
which it takes place. This can lead to an adjustment to the dominant legal order 
– such as an adjustment to the international human rights debate – but also to 
manipulation, resistance or other unexpected results (Merry, 2003; Merry, 1988).
In relation to our research on transitional justice, we found that this dialectical 
process is rarely granted enough time, while already-existing techniques of state-
central legal pluralism are privileged.
First, the overlap can simply be ignored: this is the case when one assumes 
that tradition-based mechanisms are solely involved in reconciliation and 
reintegration and are ill-suited to establish criminal accountability. In this 
case, donors will have no difficulties in supporting the government’s criminal 
prosecution on the one hand and supporting – usually indirectly – tradition-
based mechanisms on the other, or leaving the latter to other parties. But, as said, 
these are often not distinct concepts on the ground, as they are all part of one, 
overall view on justice, meaning that the absence of accountability will impede 
reconciliation. Ignoring the problem, therefore, will not solve it.
Overlaps can also be managed by establishing priority or jurisdiction rules, 
in other words by establishing which mechanism applies to which case. Examples 
are the primacy of the ICTR and the complementarity of the ICC; the ratione 
materiae jurisdiction in Rwanda, where the assessment of the most serious crimes 
(first category) was – initially – left to the formal courts, while the other crimes 
(second and third categories) were tried by the gacaca courts; and ratione personae 
jurisdiction in Rwanda and Uganda, according to which military personnel can 
only be tried by military courts and not by tradition-based mechanisms. In 
the event that such choices are not made, rules will have to be established for 
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the mutual recognition of decisions. Uganda’s Agreement on Accountability 
and Reconciliation, for example, stipulates that the principle of non bis in idem 
applies between traditional and formal justice, meaning that the same individual 
will only have to answer to one of these (art. 3.10). Whether this provision will 
actually be turned into practice is not clear. In these examples, each mechanism 
is respected and the tasks are simply divided.
These rules, however, do not suffice to solve the problems that donors are faced 
with, as they wish to support only those mechanisms that respect international 
norms and human rights. The problem’s essence is not that overlapping norms 
exist, but that normative orders clash.
Since tradition is not a static but a flexible phenomenon, always evolving, 
and as human rights education has become an automatic component of 
peacebuilding, modern norms are gradually being integrated in most tradition-
based mechanisms: for example, women and youths are to a certain extent 
involved in activities, such as the gacaca courts and in the Fambul Tok project, 
although certain aspects of the dominant position of men cannot be questioned 
(such as the chief ’s function or the role of men in traditional rituals). The use of 
physical violence to reveal the truth or as a punishment is also gradually being 
eliminated, although some aspects of certain rituals can still be quite radical 
(such as the temporary house arrest and drinking animal blood during mato oput 
in Northern Uganda). The involved parties furthermore often receive training 
on modern mediation techniques, trauma and sexual violence, although this 
does not automatically lead to a shift in the mentality and the approach to sexual 
violence.
However, to the extent that tradition-based mechanisms are also used to 
establish accountability, they need to respect international fair trial standards, 
such as the impartiality and independence of the judge, and the rights of defence 
(arts. 14–15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). It is in this 
respect that international and traditional norms clash most. Concerns about the 
lack of respect for these standards are entirely justified, considering the abuse of 
power by some traditional leaders in the past, and the fact that some mechanisms 
can lead to severe punishment. This puts donors in an uncomfortable position 
when asked to support such mechanisms. Generally, donors assume they can 
solve the dilemma by adding a clause that requires respect for human rights to 
peace treaties (e.g. 3.3. of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
in Uganda) or funding agreements. Such clauses are now a standard practice and 
seem to become a kind of disclaimer allowing donors to cover their liability for 
human rights violations. In practice, simply adding a clause will not suffice to 
solve the conflict.
All the solutions mentioned above in fact try to solve the overlap between 
different normative orders by understanding globalisation as a hierarchy, in which 
the normative order of the international level has precedence over the order at the 
national level, which in turn has precedence over the order at the non-state level. 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   96 21-4-2015   12:29:15
Intersentia 97
Chapter 7.  Tradition in Transitional Justice: Between Localisation and Globalisation
2n
d  p
ro
of
Just as components of traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution cannot be 
singled out to add some local flavour to existing transitional justice mechanisms, 
norms inherent to the international criminal law paradigm cannot be isolated and 
transplanted to tradition-based accountability and reconciliation mechanisms, 
which are based on a completely different view on conflict resolution (partiality, 
community participation, restoration of social harmony). This means that such 
tensions cannot be resolved by transplanting norms of a higher, dominant 
hierarchal order to a ‘lower’ normative order.
Instead of seeing this clash of views and paradigms as a conflict that should 
be resolved, one can also consider the confrontation of normative orders as an 
opportunity for an encounter, for a dynamic interaction to create a new, hybrid 
space, as proposed by ‘strong’ legal pluralism. The hybridisation of normative 
orders can concern different aspects: it can involve a mix of mechanisms (such 
as the mixed Sierra Leone tribunal), which Clark dubs external hybridisation. 
It can also take the shape of a mix of norms or even paradigms, i.e. internal 
hybridisation (Clark, 2010). The Rwandan gacaca courts are a clear mixture of 
both mechanisms and norms: they bring together both retributive and restorative 
aspects, both procedural rules of formal courts and those of traditional community 
participation, both a legal framework and room for local variation within the 
framework (Clark, 2010; Ingelaere, 2008; Waldorf, 2006). The more aspects 
of different semi-autonomous social fields are combined in a new normative 
order, such as the gacaca courts, the stronger the debate and the criticism will 
be, depending on the perspective of every critic and his or her social field(s). As 
we know, the gacaca courts were criticised by international legal experts because 
they do not respect international norms concerning criminal justice, while 
Rwandan respondents who participated in them criticised gacaca because of 
the lack of attention for the values of acknowledging accountability, apologies 
and reparation payments. Gacaca, however, does not question the equation of 
accountability and criminal prosecution but even reinforces it. In other countries, 
such as Northern Uganda, part of the non-state level (supported by part of the 
international level) does question this equation, arguing that the international 
normative order is in conflict with the traditional one. This view is, just as in 
the case of gacaca, criticised by international legal experts, but has also received 
international support. It is interesting to see that this support is not only provided 
by sociologists and legal anthropologists (Quinn, 2009; Baines, 2007), who, as 
expected, hold on to ‘strong’ legal pluralism (without naming it as such), but also 
by advocates of ‘weak’ pluralism, or state centralists (who, again, do not use such 
terms). The latter argue that tradition-based mechanisms (in Uganda) comply 
with the stipulations of art. 17 of the Rome Statute in order to be considered as 
prosecution ‘by a State which has jurisdiction over it’, which should make any 
prosecution of the same person for the same act by the ICC inadmissible. They 
furthermore argue that the use of tradition-based mechanisms should be a 
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sufficient reason for the ICC to refrain from prosecution in ‘the interest of justice.’ 
(art. 53.1.C) (Keller, 2007).
This barricade war between legal centralists, legal pluralists and legal 
anthropologists creates only more confusion in the minds of the donors and does 
not help them in making policy choices. On the one hand, as members of the 
international community, they have an interest in seeing international crimes 
prosecuted; on the other hand, they support peace negotiations during which the 
transitional justice policy is usually developed and they need to identify locally 
anchored solutions.
Given the fact that both formal and tradition-based mechanisms are included 
in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation in Uganda, it is no 
wonder that the actual implementation of the agreement turns out to be a lengthy 
process. To accept the interaction between these semi-autonomous normative 
orders on paper is one thing. To create from this an actually functioning hybrid 
order that is perceived as legitimate on an international, national and local level, 
and that operates in a coherent way, is a steeper challenge. In other words: the 
dynamic, dialectical process that should finally result in the hybridisation of 
international criminal law paradigms and local accountability paradigms is still 
ongoing and may require more time than expected. The fact that donors at the 
moment primarily support preparatory actions, such as consultations, studies, 
work groups, etc., is not at all a wrong decision, provided that these efforts can be 
sustained as long as needed and that the lengthy process is not an expression of 
the government’s lack of political will.
The further course and outcome of this dialectical process will provide 
many lessons for other post-conflict situations in which similar normative 
conflicts arise. But considering that the process is unique to every context and 
in every post-conflict country, the resulting hybrid solutions are not eligible 
for transplantation to other post-conflict situations, since these will in turn 
comprise quite different semi-autonomous social fields. Nor can we create new 
standard models of tradition-based mechanisms. For the same reason, no general 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the position of such hybrid mechanisms 
with regard to other transitional justice mechanisms with which they might be 
combined, or with regard to timing and sequencing. It is possible that current 
processes of hybridisation of the international normative order regarding criminal 
prosecution and of the non-state, local normative orders regarding accountability 
for mass crimes will lead to the creation of a new, inclusive transitional justice 
paradigm (Brems and Viaene, 2010), but at the moment it is unclear what such 
a paradigm will look like. In any event, such a new paradigm will also have to 
develop principles to guide the hybridisation processes, such as respecting 
each other’s values and interests and searching for common, underlying values 
(Berman, 2007). Finally, new, hybrid standards will have to be designed to assess 
the newly created hybrid mechanisms. The recommendations from the above 
analysis will be expounded in Chapter 16.
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CHAPTER 8
AT THE CROSSROADS 
OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
Giselle Corradi
1. INTRODUCTION
Justice sector aid is a relatively new area of activity for international actors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the resources allocated to the justice sector are 
limited when compared to other sectors, international actors play an increasingly 
important role in this field. In this context, they are confronted with the fact that 
legal pluralism is prominent in the life of most Africans. In some countries as 
much as 80–90% of all disputes are resolved through so-called traditional justice 
mechanisms.1 Though widely accessible, these institutions present a number of 
challenges, most notably in the area of human rights. For example, they tend to 
discriminate on the basis of gender and apply corporal punishments (Wojkowska, 
2006). At the same time, these legal orders may also contain norms that protect 
human rights or that may allow their protection (Gomez Isa, 2011; Hellum, 
2007). However, the legitimacy of some human rights is often contested in this 
region as these norms contradict certain aspects of African cultural and religious 
traditions (An-Na’Im, 2003). In other words, justice sector aid in Africa faces the 
task of contributing to building justice institutions that provide legitimate and 
effective remedies in legally plural contexts where state justice is not dominant 
and human rights remain contested.
At the crossroads of theory and practice, Part III of this book explores the 
connections between the policies and interventions of development actors that 
engage with local legal orders in the context of justice sector aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa and important insights generated by socio-legal scholars on how to go 
about these challenges. The overall aim of this endeavour is to provide a critical 
analysis of the main strategies currently supported by development actors, and 
hopefully, contribute to the translation of socio-legal theory into guidance for 
further practice. Due to the relevance of the topic, particular attention is paid 
1 Wojkowska, 2006.
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to a sub-field within justice sector aid, namely human rights assistance. In this 
context, Part III pays systematic attention to the relationship between local legal 
orders, legal pluralism and human rights, as well as the strategies pursued by 
international actors in this specific domain.
Part III of this book focuses on international assistance to the justice sector 
provided at national and local levels, targeting state and civil society actors. 
In order to analyse these interventions, four general types of interventions 
have been identified.2 First, interventions may deal with law drafting and law 
reform. Examples of this type of intervention include drafting legislation, 
the removal of clauses that exempt customary laws from complying with the 
national constitution and the ascertainment or self-statement of customary 
laws, amongst others. Second, interventions may aim at supporting or reforming 
institutional arrangements. For instance, reforming the institutional framework 
for legal pluralism, (re)defining jurisdictional boundaries and referral procedures 
between state and local legal orders, and reforming appointment procedures 
within local justice forums. Third, interventions may attempt to build capacity 
amongst state and local justice providers by means of training state court judges, 
training local justice providers on national legislation and human rights dialogue 
with local justice providers, amongst others. Finally, interventions may focus on 
empowering justice users, such as initiatives for the dissemination of national 
legislation and the provision of mobile courts, legal aid and paralegal services. 
As the tables below clarify, each of these types of interventions may be conducted 
at the level of the state – the formal justice system – or at the level of local legal 
orders.
2 Different international actors have produced various classifications of interventions in the 
justice sector. Although the terminology differs, there is a lot of overlap between the various 
typologies. For extensive lists of possible interventions, see Skaar et al. (2004) and Samuels 
(2006). The typology of interventions proposed in this introduction results from the analysis 
of data collected during field visits and an extensive review of grey literature.
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Table 1.1. Examples of interventions dealing with legal pluralism at state level (formal 
justice institutions)
Law reform Institutional support 
and reform
Building capacity of 
justice providers
Empowering justice 
users
– Removal of 
exemptions clauses 
for customary law
– Introduction of 
compliance or 
repugnancy clauses 
for customary law
– Development of 
‘conflict rules’ for 
traditional and 
formal justice
– Research related 
activities
– etc.
– Recognition of 
traditional courts
– Incorporation of 
traditional courts in 
state justice system
– Regulation of 
jurisdiction of 
traditional courts
– De/refining 
procedures for 
referrals and appeals 
between formal and 
traditional justice
– etc.
– Training of formal 
justice providers 
on matters related 
to customary law, 
traditional justice 
and legal pluralism
– Sensitisation of 
formal justice 
providers on 
linkages between 
formal and 
traditional justice 
such as referral 
procedures
– etc.
– Provision of legal 
aid and paralegal 
assistance
– Civic education 
programmes
– Human rights 
awareness raising
– Sensitisation on 
human rights of 
vulnerable groups
– etc.
Table 1.2. Examples of interventions dealing with legal pluralism at the level of local 
legal orders
Law reform Institutional support 
and reform
Building capacity of 
justice providers 
Empowering justice 
users
– Self statement, 
ascertainment or 
codification of 
customary law
– Appointment of 
experts to determine 
content of customary 
law
– Participatory 
standard setting 
processes for 
customary law
– Community debates 
on the content 
of customary 
law (including 
identification 
of structural, 
procedural, and 
substantial rules)
– etc.
– Infrastructural 
and organisational 
support for 
traditional courts
– Improvement of 
record keeping in 
traditional courts
– De/refining 
procedures for 
appointment 
and removal of 
traditional justice 
providers
– Procedures for 
monitoring and 
inspection of 
traditional courts
– De/refining 
procedures for 
appeals, referrals 
and enforcement in 
traditional courts
– etc.
– Training of 
traditional justice 
providers on 
national laws and 
human rights 
standards
– Sensitisation of 
traditional justice 
providers on 
linkages between 
formal and 
traditional justice 
such as referral 
procedures
– Training on record 
keeping and 
documentation of 
case outcomes
– Training in 
techniques of dispute 
resolution
– Provision of legal 
materials and advice 
services
– etc.
– Provision of legal 
aid and paralegal 
assistance
– Civic education 
programmes
– Human rights 
awareness raising
– Sensitisation on 
human rights of 
vulnerable groups
– etc.
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Chapters 11 to 14 rely on this typology for the presentation of a ‘mapping’ of 
interventions in the four case study countries.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Part III of this book relies more on the concepts of legal pluralism and ‘local’ 
(rather than ‘traditional’) legal orders. This is the case in view of the fact that 
these terms emphasise a users’ perspective, i.e. the locally available justice options, 
which are often many. As already explained, in most cases this excludes formal 
justice institutions sponsored by the state. However, throughout Part III of this 
book, local legal orders are also identified in terms of ‘customary’, ‘traditional’ 
‘informal’ and ‘non-state’, depending on the terminology that is most frequently 
employed in the different case study countries that were examined. Actually, there 
is no single word that captures all the dimensions implicated in the justice options 
that are locally available. For example, a legal NGO may not be a ‘customary’ 
legal actor but may nevertheless base much of its work on local custom. Similarly, 
official customary courts may belong to the justice structures of the state so that 
they cannot be called ‘non-state’ in sensu stricto, while in their operation they may 
combine local custom and state norms. For their part, local state actors, such as the 
police and the lower courts, may officially or unofficially endorse local normative 
orders. In other words, local legal orders often cross the boundaries of ‘modern’ 
vs. ‘customary’, ‘formal’ vs. ‘informal’, or ‘state’ vs. ‘non-state’ dichotomies. 
Bearing this in mind, these labels have been nevertheless employed since they 
are a useful way of distinguishing aid that is targeted towards these as compared 
to state sponsored formal justice institutions. The term ‘legal orders’ covers the 
norms, the actors and the mechanisms involved in local justice processes.
‘International actors’ refers to multilateral and bilateral assistance agencies, 
development banks, United Nations agencies, international non-governmental 
organisations, international consultancy firms and international foundations in 
their roles as donors, implementers, technical advisors and stakeholders in policy 
dialogue. The word ‘donor’ comprises all international providers of any kind 
of aid, such as loans and grants. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
justice sector aid entails a chain involving multiple links between international 
and domestic development actors (ICHRP, 2000). For example, it may include 
a primary donor, such as a bilateral agency, a donor country implementing 
agency, such as an international non-governmental organisation, a beneficiary 
country partner, such as a local non-governmental organisation, a primary 
beneficiary, such as local justice providers, and the ultimate beneficiaries, the 
justice users. In addition, despite justice sector aid often being delivered in the 
form of projects, i.e. grants and loans that are explicitly programmed to a series 
of inputs and outputs linked to some larger objective, there is a trend towards 
moving away from ‘projectised’ activities towards sector support modalities in 
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which the recipient is typically a government through a ministry or an ad hoc 
body that manages and executes a programme (Bergling 2006). Therefore, the 
role of international actors is necessarily examined in relation to that of domestic 
actors, such as the government and local civil society organisations. In this sense, 
this part of the book refers to ‘development actors’, ‘legal development actors’ 
and ‘development practitioners’ meaning all the actors involved in the chain of 
justice sector aid. When necessary, a distinction is made between different kinds 
of international development actors. For example, the main focus of multilateral 
and bilateral development agencies and development banks is state building 
and strengthening the capacities of the state, whereas that of international non-
governmental organisations entails closer collaboration with domestic civil 
society organisations and citizens in general. This may result in different or 
parallel ‘chains’ that may be constrained by different factors and pursue different 
strategies of action.
3. SITUATING THE STUDY WITHIN BROADER 
DEBATES
The topic of Part III of this book forms part of broader ongoing debates on law 
and development dealing with how justice sector aid can contribute to building 
equitable justice institutions that benefit the poor and disadvantaged (Golub, 2003; 
Sage and Woolcock, 2005; Van Rooij, 2009; Sage et al., 2010). In addition, some 
authors have examined this issue in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding 
efforts (Widner, 2001; Sannerholm, 2007; Amisi et al., 2007; Sending, 2009; 
Donais, 2009; Isser, 2011). In both cases, these discussions point out that so far 
most aid to the justice sector has been top-down and concerned with building 
formal state justice institutions, which mainly benefit and are dominated by 
wealthy, educated, urban elites, while neglecting the perspectives and experiences 
of the wider population (Golub, 2003; Sage and Woolcock, 2005; Sage et al., 2010; 
Isser, 2011). They also highlight that classical ‘rule of law’ approaches to justice 
sector reform focus on ‘institution building’ from a technical point of view, are 
based on an idealised western model of justice and ignore the role of local contexts 
and power relations. Therefore these initiatives have not delivered the expected 
outcomes (Golub, 2003; Sage and Woolcock, 2005; Sannerholm, 2007; Donais, 
2009; Sending, 2009; Sage et al., 2010; Isser, 2011). As a result, these discussions 
underscore the importance of complementing these efforts with context sensitive 
‘bottom-up’ approaches that promote local ownership, access to justice and the 
legal empowerment of the poor, including engagement with the local legal orders 
that most people actually resort to (Sage and Woolcock, 2005; Amisi et al., 2007; 
Sannerholm, 2007; Van Rooij, 2009; Sage et al., 2010; Isser, 2011).
In recent years, a growing body of literature started to examine the connection 
between justice sector aid and local legal orders (Le Roy and Kuyu, 1997; Penal 
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Reform International, 2000; Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Thorne, 2005; Chirayath et 
al., 2005; Kimati, 2005; Odinkalu, 2005; Wojkowska, 2006; Weilenmann, 2007; 
ICHRP, 2009; Toomey, 2010; Mapaure, 2010; HAKI, 2011; Isser, 2011; Albrecht 
et al., 2011; Kyed, 2011; Ubink, 2011a, 2011b; Harper, 2011a, 2011b; UN Women, 
UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Though the regional focus of these studies is not 
always Africa in particular, the sheer relevance of legal pluralism in this part 
of the world means that in practice many of them draw on examples from this 
region. As introduced very briefly in Chapter 1, in the first place, this literature 
emphasises why it is necessary for development actors to include local legal orders 
within justice sector aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is argued that development 
actors should pay attention to local legal orders since most Africans will continue 
to rely heavily on them (Le Roy and Kuyu, 1997; Penal Reform International, 
2000; Chirayath et al., 2005). This is the case due to several reasons, such as that 
formal justice institutions may remain inaccessible despite reforms (Chirayath 
et al., 2005), that trying to wipe out local legal orders will not work since they 
are the expression of underlying visions of the cosmos (Le Roy and Kuyu, 
1997), and that African customary institutions are closely linked to the social 
organisation of agrarian multiplex societies (Penal Reform International, 2000; 
Weilenmann, 2007). Secondly, it is pointed out that in many cases local legal 
orders have more authority and legitimacy than formal justice institutions so that 
excluding them from justice sector aid is exclusionary in itself (Chirayath et al., 
2005). Third, it is highlighted that local legal orders often present problems in 
terms of accountability and human rights which justice sector aid cannot leave 
unaddressed (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Chirayath et al., 2005). Finally, it has been 
recently argued that supporting formal state justice institutions while ignoring 
local legal orders weakens the provision of justice as a whole, as poorly connected 
justice institutions generate confusion and jurisdictional gaps (HAKI, 2011).
In addition, most of these studies contain normative analyses of how 
development actors should engage with local legal orders. In this regard, there 
seems to be a consensus on a number of central issues. First, development actors 
need to understand the specific social, historical, political and cultural background 
of local legal orders (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; ICHRP, 2009; Toomey, 2010; 
Clarcke, 2011; Obarrio, 2011; Isser, 2011; UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). 
This includes a critical examination of the dialectic dynamics that constituted 
customary and modern justice institutions during the colonial and post-colonial 
periods as well as appreciating the internal logic, the social bases and the world 
view that underpin local legal orders (Le Roy et al., 1997; Obarrio, 2011; Isser, 2011). 
Second, development actors need to follow a user’s perspective (Nyamu-Musembi, 
2003; Isser, 2011; UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Methodologically, this 
requires meaningful local participation (ICHRP, 2009) and in-depth knowledge 
of local empirical realities, i.e. who the local justice providers are, which justice 
mechanisms are available, how provision is experienced by different groups of 
local justice users and what these groups see as legitimate forms of justice and 
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security (Albrecht et al., 2011). This should lead to the formulation of practical 
solutions to the problems affecting local populations rather than investing in 
building ideal justice institutions (Isser, 2011). Third, development actors need to 
acknowledge the political dimension of their interventions and support processes 
that improve downwards accountability (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Odinkalu, 
2005; ICHRP, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2011; Clarcke, 2011; Ubink et al., 2011). On 
the one hand, there is a concern that interventions may leave intact despotic 
community level power relations or even reinforce them by formally sanctioning 
them (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Odinkalu, 2005; Clarcke, 2011; Ubink et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, it is pointed out that the choice of supporting certain providers 
and agendas over others is in itself political and that national leaders often try to 
benefit politically from the inclusion of customary leaders into justice sector aid 
(Albrecht et al., 2011; Isser, 2011; Kyed, 2011). In this context, what international 
actors should do is facilitate processes of negotiation where a plurality of actors is 
considered and included in the dialogue (Albrecht et al., 2011; Isser, 2011; Kyed, 
2011). This is related to a fourth key issue, namely that development actors should 
rethink the model of state that underpins justice sector aid and consider a political 
order that includes a plurality of institutions in a non-exclusive manner (Le Roy 
and Kuyu, 1997; Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Weilenmann, 2007; Albrecht et al., 2011; 
Kyed, 2011). In other words, it is not an ‘either/or’ equation since in practice, both 
local and state justice institutions interact and play a role in the provision of justice 
(Isser, 2011). Therefore, interventions should support a variety of justice providers 
and enhance the negotiation capacities of all relevant stakeholders (Weilenmann, 
2007), while blending the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses of both local 
and state legal orders (Clarcke et al., 2011). According to some authors, this entails 
a dual approach with top-down and bottom-up elements (HAKI, 2011) where 
international actors facilitate a constructive dialectic between locally driven 
initiatives and nationally determined policies (Albrecht et al., 2011). Finally, most 
authors coincide that addressing these issues demands a sustained, gradual and 
long-term commitment, which poses a challenge to international development 
actors, who are usually under pressure to show results in a relatively short term 
(Toomey, 2010; Wojkowska et al., 2010; Albrecht et al., 2011; Isser, 2011).
At the level of human rights, many of these studies stress that development 
actors need to be aware of the social purpose of local practices that contravene 
human rights (Isser, 2011; Harper, 2011a). In other words, development actors 
need to understand why these practices make sense locally and address the 
socio-cultural complexities that surround them (Isser, 2011). This relates to the 
fact that there may be fundamental differences in the raison d’être between local 
and state legal orders (Harper, 2011). Local legal orders are generally concerned 
with restoring intra-community harmony by repairing relationships and creating 
a framework for reintegration whereas state legal orders aim at protecting 
individual rights and cause deterrence through retributive punishments. 
Consequently, measuring the performance of the former by applying the logic of 
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the latter is unhelpful and misleading (Harper, 2011).3 Moreover, many human 
rights violations may have a social and economic explanation so that development 
actors need to devise solutions that go beyond modifying legal rules and practices 
to encompass broader processes of social change (Harper, 2011; Chopra et al., 
2011).
In addition, a number of studies have analysed the relationship between 
legal plurality, local legal orders and human rights specifically. The International 
Council on Human Rights Policy has developed a framework for advocacy and 
policy in relation to human rights and plural legal orders (ICHRP, 2009). This 
framework highlights the need to critically assess any policy or demand for the 
preservation, reform or introduction of plural legal orders along six dimensions: 
the basis of the policy or demand, the motivation of those who advocate it, its 
internal coherence, the extent to which the policy advances human rights 
nationally, the wider national context and the impact of the policy on intra- and 
inter-group rights. It also proposes another six dimensions for assessing the 
operation of plural legal orders, including the process for developing the content 
and structure of plural legal orders, the resources of local and state legal orders, 
their substantive content and procedural functioning, safeguarding the existence 
of rights and whether the broader context is conducive to rights protection. The 
framework also highlights the need to move beyond ‘balancing’ human rights 
and culture, towards the adoption of intersectional approaches to identity, seeing 
culture, custom and religion as changing and internally contested and a situated 
analysis that regards rights-holders as simultaneously individuals and members 
of multiple collectives (ICHRP, 2009: 147). Furthermore, a study conducted by 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights identifies the main areas where local legal 
orders are at odds with human rights and discusses how development actors 
should address each of them (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Based on 
case studies from different developing regions in the world, the study suggests 
that problematic issues need to be balanced against the performance of state 
justice in those same areas. While the study recognises that states have the duty 
to ensure human rights protection even by local legal orders, it recommends that 
international actors acknowledge the role of local legal orders in providing access 
to justice and adopt a pragmatic gradualist approach to meeting international 
requirements while providing support to that end.
As international actors begin to programme in relation to local legal orders, a 
recent generation of studies begins to produce knowledge on the practices of these 
actors from an empirical viewpoint (Mapaure, 2010; Albrecht et al., 2011; Chopra 
et al., 2011; Harper, 2011c; Harper et al., 2011; Leonardi et al., 2011; Rawls, 2011; 
Ubink, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Ubink et al., 2011). Some of these studies suggest that 
3 For example, this would happen if local legal orders were expected to comply with due process 
guarantees in a strict way, as this presupposes a context of adjudication, whereas local justice 
forums tend to mediate.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   110 21-4-2015   12:29:15
Intersentia 111
Chapter 8.  At the Crossroads of Theory and Practice
2n
d  p
ro
of
despite rhetoric acknowledgements, development actors have so far been hesitant 
to support local legal orders and take them seriously (Isser, 2011; Albrecht et 
al., 2011; Clarcke, 2011; Ubink et al., 2011; Kyed, 2011). For example, current 
initiatives to involve local justice providers within justice sector aid may reflect 
more an attempt to reclaim state sovereignty through the incorporation of non-
state actors as allies than the intention to strengthen local legal actors in their 
own right (Albrecht et al., 2011; Clarcke, 2011; Kyed, 2011).4 In relation to human 
rights, a number of authors explain that most interventions have so far addressed 
important challenges in a superficial way (Mapaure, 2010; Chopra et al., 2011; 
Harper, 2011c). First, based on the assumption that local legal orders are at odds 
with human rights due to a lack of knowledge, development actors have tried to 
educate local justice providers on human rights in a top-down way, which has often 
generated resistance (Mapaure, 2010; Chopra et al., 2011). Second, interventions 
have attempted to adapt local legal orders by requiring the participation of women, 
prohibiting harmful practices and ascertaining or modifying customary laws 
without grounding these initiatives on internal demands or generating changes 
in a participatory way (Chopra et al., 2011; Harper, 2011c; Leonardi et al., 2011). 
Finally, development actors have introduced linkages between local and state 
legal orders and have sought to expand local access to dispute resolution forums 
without always paying due attention to local power dynamics and the experiences 
of justice users (Chopra et al., 2011; Clarcke, 2011; Harper, 2011c). Nevertheless, a 
number of initiatives seem to be yielding positive results. For example, supporting 
local communities to ‘self-state’ customary laws that protect human rights in a 
specific domain and around which there is a widespread local consensus (Ubink, 
2011c), and engaging in meaningful dialogue with local leaders about customary 
practices that contravene human rights (Chopra, 2007; Rawls, 2011). Based on an 
evaluation of seven interventions aimed at empowering local justice users Harper 
et al. conclude that:
‘with the capacity to challenge power imbalances, access the law and legal services, 
exercise choice regarding alternative recourse options and obtain remedies that do 
not contravene minimum rights standards, people living in poverty can improve 
the justice outcomes available to them and become agents of change for their own 
betterment’ (Harper et al., 2011: 173).
Part III of this book contributes to this growing body of knowledge from an 
empirical and normative point of view, and pays particular attention to the 
issues raised within the discussions on human rights. At the empirical level, it 
investigates how international development actors engage with legal pluralism 
4 This is less the case of international non-governmental organisations, which tend to focus on 
improving local access to justice as compared to bilateral or multilateral actors whose focus is 
state building (Albrecht et al., 2011).
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and local legal orders within justice sector aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. What 
kind of policies and interventions do they support in this area? What strategies 
do they follow for advancing human rights at the level of local legal orders? At 
the normative level, it explores how socio-legal theories are of relevance to the 
practice of international development actors in this area and how they can be 
translated into guidance for practitioners. Why are these theories relevant for 
justice sector aid in Sub-Saharan Africa and how can they be applied?
4. MULTI-SITED QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
METHODS
As explained in Chapter 1, the process of data collection and analysis took place 
in different phases. A first exploratory phase consisted in a systematic review 
of grey literature produced by international development actors, which was 
available online. During this phase, the focus laid on identifying which actors had 
produced documents discussing their views on local legal orders, legal pluralism 
and human rights in relation to justice sector aid. Subsequently, a revision of 
programme documents for the African region allowed the ‘mapping’ of countries 
in which these actors were supporting interventions in this area. On the basis of 
this mapping, four case studies were selected for fieldwork: Malawi, Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone and Zambia. This choice was motivated by the fact that different 
international agencies were active in each of these countries thereby allowing the 
collection of data from a broader spectrum of practices.5 Prior to the field research, 
a broad range of information was gathered on the history of these countries, in 
particular how the colonial and post-colonial history affected the legal landscape, 
the characteristics of local legal orders and legal pluralism, and the relationship 
between local justice processes and human rights. The purpose of the fieldwork 
was to gather detailed information about the types of strategy that development 
actors support in relation to these issues and their rationales for doing so.
An interview guide was developed in advance on the basis of a review of 
socio-legal and grey literature and identified the topics that would be covered in 
the four case studies. At the same time, the semi-structured interview method 
allowed enough flexibility to incorporate new topics that emerged in the course of 
the field research. Interviews with representatives from multilateral and bilateral 
development organisations, government officers, international non-governmental 
organisations, and domestic non-governmental and civil society organisations 
5 At the time the empirical research was conducted, the main development actors providing 
support to local legal orders in Malawi were the British bilateral cooperation (DFID) 
and UNDP; in Sierra Leone the British bilateral cooperation (DFID), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, in Mozambique the Danish bilateral 
cooperation (DANIDA), the European Union (EU) and UNDP, and in Zambia the Danish 
bilateral cooperation (DANIDA) and the European Union (EU).
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led to a good overview of the different initiatives supported by development 
actors at different levels and their discourses on the reasons why they considered 
these approaches appropriate. Local justice providers that had been involved in 
interventions, such as traditional leaders and paralegals, were also interviewed 
on their perspectives on these initiatives and representatives from civil society 
organisations and local experts were consulted in respect of their ideas about the 
research topic. All interviews were conducted in English or Portuguese and most 
of them were recorded, except for a few in which the interviewee did not agree 
to it.
During the phase of analysis, all recordings were carefully listened to and 
interview notes taken on the field were expanded. Subsequently, a number of 
interviews were fully or partially transcribed by the researcher. Not all interviews 
were transcribed due to the fact that in many cases interviews yielded mainly 
factual information about the kinds of activities supported by development 
actors, which did not require a word-by-word analysis. Those interviews or parts 
of interviews where more complex issues were discussed, such as development 
actors’ discourses on their rationales for engaging or not with local legal orders, 
the limitations of interventions and their perceived effects, were transcribed. 
Both the transcribed interviews, the expanded interview notes and the field 
notes taken on the basis of observations were coded inductively. The categories 
emerging from this process were analysed in the light of insights generated by 
the review of socio-legal literature and discussions held with peer researchers and 
colleagues.
In addition to the fieldwork, an international forum was organised in Cape 
Town from 23 to 25 March 2010, which brought together representatives of 
stakeholders identified during the field research, including officers from donor 
organisations, the government and international and local non-governmental 
organisations. The forum served as a platform to discuss preliminary findings 
and explore further questions with these actors. Invited representatives from 
the selected countries were asked to present their views and reflect on their 
experiences with regard to development actors’ engagement with local legal orders. 
A series of focus group discussions were organised during the forum, which 
aimed at collectively exploring a range of relevant topics. The first focus group 
dealt with the normative framework for legal pluralism and reform proposals to 
state recognition and regulation of local legal orders. The second one explored 
development actors’ current approaches to local legal orders and human rights. 
And the third one addressed how processes of social change unfold at grassroots 
level and what this implies for human rights interventions. All discussions were 
held in English. They were recorded, transcribed and analysed by inductive 
coding. Finally, a more refined version of the preliminary results was presented at 
an international seminar organised for this purpose in Brussels on 14 February 
2011. The seminar was attended by a mixed public of academics and practitioners. 
The presentation of the research results was preceded by a keynote address and 
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was followed by a discussion with a panel of experts.6 The systematic involvement 
of different stakeholders throughout the whole process of the research proved to 
be a highly stimulating and enriching exercise, not only in terms of validation but 
also for acquiring more insights into development actors’ ways of thinking about 
the provision of aid, human rights and local legal orders.
One of the limitations of this methodology is that it did not allow for an 
evaluation of the impact of interventions. The latter would have required the 
selection of one intervention in particular whereas this study aims at understanding 
a broader range of strategies deployed by development actors at different levels. 
In addition, time and budget constraints did not allow for long term fieldwork, 
which would have led to the generation of ethnographic insights into the processes 
through which interventions interplay with local realities or into how the political 
economy of justice sector aid and the internal logic of development organisations 
influences the policies and interventions that are supported. Again, this would 
have required the selection of one specific intervention or development agency in 
particular to be analysed for a longer period of time. That said, these limitations 
did not preclude the collection of relevant data on the basis of which to provide 
interesting results on the research questions and suggest complementary research 
agendas.
5. STRUCTURE OF PART III
Part III of this book contains eight chapters. Next to this introductory chapter, 
Chapters 9 and 10 present an analysis of the relationship between local legal 
orders, legal pluralism, human rights and justice sector aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in general. Chapter 9 deals with the context in which development actors operate 
and the background of their interventions. It first describes the main common 
threads running through the plural legal landscapes of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
as well as some of the salient characteristics of local legal orders in this region 
and how the latter relate to human rights. After providing important insights 
into the challenges involved in supporting local justice processes in this region, 
the chapter discusses the background of justice sector aid and human rights 
assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa and how international development actors 
purport to position themselves towards local legal orders. Building further on 
the contextual issues presented in Chapter 9, Chapter 10 explores how socio-legal 
theory on legal pluralism and human rights relates to the practice of justice sector 
and human rights aid in relation to local justice processes. The chapter discusses 
6 The keynote speaker was Prof. Anne Griffiths, University of Edinburgh, and the participants 
in the panel were Dr Tanja Chopra, independent consultant for international organisations 
such as the World Bank and UN Women, Mr Fergus Kerrigan, Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, Ms Kersty McCourt, Open Society Justice Initiative and Dr Albrecht Stockmayer, of 
the German International Cooperation. 
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a number of critical insights generated by socio-legal scholars on two significant 
challenges that development actors encounter in Sub-Saharan Africa: a context 
of legal pluralism where state justice is not dominant, and that of cultural and 
contextual diversity, where human rights are often not known, not accepted or 
considered irrelevant. The chapter explores how these theories and concepts may 
inform different kinds of intervention.
Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14 present the four case studies on Malawi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia respectively. These chapters follow 
the same structure. First, they outline a series of key contextual features, such 
as the historical background of each country and how the latter gave shape to 
current configurations of legal pluralism, the justice landscape, the institutional 
framework for legal pluralism and the status of human rights within local justice 
processes. Second, they present the empirical data on the kind of policies and 
interventions that international actors support in this area. And third, they 
provide an analysis of international actors’ practices.
Chapter 15 closes Part III with a comparative analysis of the four case studies. 
The chapter identifies salient trends regarding the type of interventions that 
international actors are supporting in the region and examines how the latter 
relate to the theoretical insights presented in Chapters 9 and 10.
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CHAPTER 9
JUSTICE SECTOR AID 
IN LEGALLY PLURAL AFRICA
Giselle Corradi
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the context in which development actors operate and the 
nature of their interventions regarding local legal orders in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
it is necessary to sketch out two issues. On the one hand, a number of common 
threads running across the justice landscapes of the continent, including a brief 
overview of how historical developments affected current configurations of 
legal pluralism, some of the features that are usually associated with an ‘African 
approach’ to justice, and how local legal orders relate to human rights.1 And on 
the other, the background of justice sector aid and human rights assistance in 
this region as well as the kind of policies and interventions that international 
development actors support in the area of legal pluralism and human rights. This 
chapter outlines these issues and provides the background to the discussion in 
Chapter 10.
2. THE PLURAL JUSTICE LANDSCAPES 
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
2.1. LEGAL PLUR ALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As documented by different authors, the colonial encounter modified African 
endogenous legal orders in important ways, so that it is not possible to see 
current customary law institutions as a ‘surviving’ pre-colonial form of social 
control (Snyder, 1981; Mann and Roberts, 1991; Daannaa, 1994; Mamdani, 1996; 
1 Obviously, this entails an oversimplification of what are otherwise complex, diverse, and at 
times contradictory realities. The purpose of this section is to illustrate some of the key issues 
that need consideration in relation to legal pluralism and human rights in this region.
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Chanock, 1998; John-Nambo, 2002). Moreover, pre-colonial Africa was far from 
a static, unified and egalitarian universe in which an immutable customary 
order maintained a stable peace (Chanock, 1998).2 A variety of forms of social 
organisation, ranging from acephalous societies to kingdoms and conquest states, 
gave rise to different legal orders. Appointed chiefs, kin-based hereditary chiefs, 
spiritual leaders, Islamic leaders and a number of authorities within age and 
gender groups shared jurisdiction over persons and were kept in check by elders, 
lineage based councils or the clan organisation (Mamdani, 1996; John-Nambo, 
2002). Neither in small-scale communities nor in larger groupings there existed 
a single ‘tribal’ identity, as most Africans belonged to overlapping networks of 
association and exchange that placed them under the authority of a chief for a 
certain matter and under that of a professional association for another (Ranger, 
1983). Pre-colonial customs were flexible and adaptive to competition and shifting 
power imbalances, rather than reflecting a homogeneous, static and consensual 
order (Ranger, 1983; Chanock, 1998).
As from the final decades of the nineteenth century, colonial domination 
transformed certain aspects of these justice institutions.3 In particular, existing 
checks and balances on authority and the fluid nature of custom were undermined 
(Mamdani, 1996; Ranger, 1983). This resulted from the introduction of ‘indirect 
rule’, a bifurcated system of governance, whereby the colonial powers governed 
directly in the colonies where they settled and indirectly through co-opted chiefs 
in territories under colonial domination but which were not occupied.4 Indirect 
rule went hand in hand with legal dualism. In the colonies, European legal orders 
were transplanted and applied to resolve disputes involving non-natives, whereas 
in the hinterlands selectively reconstituted or imposed chiefs were granted the 
right to rule over the people allocated to their tribes by passing rules (bylaws), 
executing them and settling disputes according to local customs (Mann and 
Roberts, 1991; Mamdani, 1996). This mainly covered personal relations, such 
as marriage, succession, and access to productive resources, while colonial 
administrators reserved the jurisdiction over serious criminal offenses for 
themselves (Mamdani, 1996). Next to the ‘native courts’ presided over by chiefs, 
an intermediate level of courts, staffed by white officials who were charged with 
the general administration of the native population, listened to appeals and tried 
to resolve the cases presented to them according to their understanding of local 
customs, except in cases where the latter were considered ‘repugnant’ to public 
order (Mamdani, 1996).
2 In Central Africa for example, the late pre-colonial period in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century saw the rise of conquest states and an increase in the slave trade, constituting a time of 
violence and rapid change (Chanock, 1998).
3 Christian missionaries also played a role in this by promulgating rules of behaviour based on 
the bible (Nader, 2001).
4 Indirect rule was originally introduced in the territories under British domination, but 
other colonial powers, such as the French and the Portuguese, also resorted to this form of 
governance later on (Mann and Roberts, 1991).
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In this process, colonial administrators understood African customs as 
unchanging rules that had always governed local societies and that needed to be 
pinned down in the form of official customary laws (Ranger, 1983). In addition, 
chiefs became part of an authoritarian framework for local governance. Their 
authority was unbound from local checks and balances and they were the sole 
local authority recognised (Mamdani, 1996).5 Their power was enhanced and 
backed by the colonial administration in order to extract forced labour, forced 
crops, forced sales and forced taxes, leading to abuses and popular discontent 
(Mamdani, 1996). All of this happened in a period in which the introduction 
of cash crops and migrant labour caused important transformations in relations 
of production resulting in far reaching consequences in generational and gender 
relations that shifted existing power bases and hierarchies (Chanock, 1998). In 
this context, the reification of customs as fixed ‘customary laws’ was manipulated 
by vested interests as a means of asserting and increasing control. As explained 
by Ranger:
‘Elders tended to appeal to “tradition” in order to defend their dominance of the 
rural means of production against challenge by the young. Men tended to appeal 
to “tradition” in order to ensure that the increasing role, which women played in 
production in the rural areas, did not result in any diminution of male control over 
women as economic assets. Paramount chiefs and ruling aristocracies in polities 
that included numbers of ethnic and social groupings appealed to “tradition” 
in order to maintain or extend their control over their subjects. Indigenous 
populations appealed to “tradition” in order to ensure that the migrants who 
settled amongst them did not achieve political and economic rights’ (Ranger 1983: 
254).
Upon independence, the colonial masters transferred control over these power 
structures to local elites without popular participation (An Na’Im, 2003). All 
African states kept the law institutions imported from Europe as their official 
justice system, but due to their accessibility, customary law institutions were 
often retained as a temporary solution, until modern courts could be spread out 
(Mamdani, 1996). During the phase of decolonisation, between the late 1960s 
and the mid-1970s, three kinds of policy were adopted regarding legal pluralism. 
First, the continuation of a bifurcated system of common law and customary law, 
with parallel sets of courts and laws, such as in Sierra Leone (Mamdani, 1996). 
Second, the unification of the system of courts with different levels of retention of 
customary law, which varied between (i) the adoption of a dual structure of courts 
with a single review process, such as in Chad and the Central African Republic, 
5 Though according to Englebert (2002), in some cases, colonial authorities granted traditional 
authorities more autonomy so that collaboration with the colonial powers did not always result 
in a loss of legitimacy.
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(ii)  the abolition of customary courts but the retention of customary law to be 
applied by a unified system of courts, such as in Tanzania, Niger and Mali, and 
(iii) the integration of civil or common law and customary law in one body of law 
to be applied by one system of courts, such as in Senegal and Ghana (Mamdani, 
1996). The third and less common policy entailed the abolition of both customary 
courts and customary laws and the top-down introduction of one single modern 
justice system for the whole country, as it was the case in Mozambique (Mamdani, 
1996).
These policies resulted in official customary courts and laws operating next 
to unofficial ones. Though in many cases civil or common law was open to all 
in theory, in practice, it remained out of reach to most who continued to access 
justice through locally available forums, even if the latter were not recognised 
by law. According to Mamdani (1996), this means that reforms tended towards 
deracialisation rather than democratisation of justice processes. In some cases, 
such as Malawi, the official customary courts became in effect a state court system 
abused as a political tool throughout the one party era of Banda (Manda, 2012). 
In several countries, these frameworks were subsequently reviewed as a result of 
changing political circumstances, and in particular with the end of the Cold War 
and the wave of democratisation that took place throughout the continent, though 
this did not necessarily mean a turn towards more democratic processes of local 
governance (Englebert, 2002; Buur and Kyed, 2007). Independently from changes 
in the framework for legal pluralism, the prevalence of official and unofficial 
customary justice processes remained a common thread throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa, as well as most states’ lack of capacity to provide justice services 
to the majority of the population through the law institutions inherited from 
the former colonial powers (Penal Reform International, 2000).6 As a matter of 
fact, official state justice remained chronically under-resourced and understaffed 
in most of the region until today, with decaying infrastructures and outdated 
legal frameworks (Piron, 2005). This has been exacerbated in those regions that 
went through violent conflict (Isser, 2011). This is particularly relevant from the 
viewpoint of human rights, as it means that the justice institutions of the state, 
which are supposed to be the primary agents in the protection and promotion of 
human rights, are not only far from the population in terms of physical distance 
and capacity, but also in terms of ownership. An Na’Im goes even further to 
explain that African societies tolerate the existence of the post-colonial state with 
profound mistrust and prefer to have little interaction with its institutions and 
processes (2003: 14).
6 In some cases, this includes Islamic courts and laws, which are often intertwined with ‘local 
custom’.
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2.2 . LOCAL NOR MATIVE OR DERS AND DISPUTE 
PROCESSING FORUMS
Despite considerable variation in the normative orders and justice mechanisms 
that can be found throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, a number of common features 
are often associated with ‘an African approach’ to justice. Different scholars 
emphasise that local justice processes in Sub-Saharan Africa are generally geared 
towards the negotiation or mediation of an agreement rather than being concerned 
with deciding who is right and wrong according to a priori defined impersonal 
rules that are applied in a derivative way, as it is normally the case within formal 
state justice (Allot, 1968; Holleman, 1974; Alliot, 1983, 1985; Le Roy, 1995, 2004). 
In these processes, rules, customary, religious or statutory, may be resorted to as 
‘resources’ and even combined in the negotiation of a decision by a local forum, 
but they tend not to determine the outcome of a dispute (Oomen, 2005; Comaroff 
et al., 1981). Moreover, customs cannot be considered to diverge from statutory 
rules in terms of content only, for it is their nature that makes them different: they 
are oral and derive from the social practices that are locally observed constituting 
models of conduct and behaviour rather than rules in a strict sense (Bennett, 
2004). Therefore, they are highly flexible and adaptive to new circumstances 
(Bennett, 2004). At the same time, these customs are very local, resulting in a rich 
variety of normative repertoires (Eberhard, 2001; Menski, 2006: 424–425).
In rural areas in particular, where social relations are based on past and 
future economic and social interdependence amongst community members, 
disputes are not handled in isolation from their overall context but tend to focus 
on the roots of the conflict beyond the particular incident that brought the 
parties to the forum (Penal Reform International, 2000). Conflicts can potentially 
create disorder affecting the community as a whole and are therefore not seen as 
involving the two parties only (Lubkemann et al., 2011). Consequently, dispute 
processing does not necessarily result in a consensual agreement between the 
parties, but rather in an outcome that is acceptable and backed by the community 
(Nader, 2001; Lubkemann et al., 2011). Next to the fact that the problem is viewed 
from the perspective of corporate rather than individual interests, which implies 
a high degree of public participation, the emphasis lies on reconciliation and the 
restoration of social order. This means that like cases are not necessarily treated 
alike (Penal Reform International, 2000). For example, the claims that individuals 
can make and the solutions that are sought depend on the status of the parties and 
of those who have a stake in the case at hand (Lubkemann et al., 2011). Power 
dynamics are therefore at the core of the disputing process (Oomen, 2005). 
Decisions often include restorative penalties, the enforcement of which relies on 
social pressure and sometimes physical violence (Lubkemann et al., 2011). No 
professional legal representation is provided and arbitrators are appointed from 
the community according to their status (Penal Reform International, 2000).
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Some authors emphasise the link between this approach to justice, with 
its emphasis on mediation and models of behaviour, and the cosmologies that 
are at play in African societies (Alliot, 1983, 1985; John-Nambo, 2002; Le Roy, 
1995, 2004; Okafor, 2006). The Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Juridique de Paris has 
developed this perspective in detail by showing how different founding myths 
are intimately related to our perceptions of reality and social practice, including 
our understanding of justice institutions, even in secular contexts (Alliot, 1983, 
1985; Le Roy, 1995, 2004). In Africa, founding myths often rest on the idea that 
the world emerged from chaos (ibid). As such, it is the multiple, the unstable and 
the unorganised which constitute the foundation of the world (ibid). Therefore, 
the unity of society is not perceived as the result of obedience to a uniform 
and superior order embodied in impersonal rules and adjudication by a higher 
authority, as it is the case in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but as the affirmation 
of complementarities and mutual interdependence (ibid). Since this order is 
always fragile,
‘the ideal is not to let conflicts lead to an open confrontation. And if the latter 
cannot be avoided, a solution is sought, not so much by relying on previously fixed 
rules, but in conformity to what is perceived case by case as being in the interest of 
the group’ (Alliot, 1985: 87 in Eberhard, 2001: 16).
The aim is thus to solve conflicts inside the group where they emerged, emphasising 
the responsibility of the group for its own future (Le Roy, 1995; Eberhard, 
2001; John-Nambo, 2002).7 In addition, justice processes in Africa often have a 
supernatural dimension (John-Nambo, 2002; Okafor, 2006) and the emergence of 
a conflict is often seen as a ‘social disease’ with different forces at play, where the 
behaviour of the living can have serious repercussions in the invisible world and 
vice-versa (John-Nambo, 2002; Okafor, 2006).
This is not to say that all these characteristics are ‘essential’ to local disputing 
processes in Africa. Different world views, life strategies and approaches to 
justice co-exist for a while in this region. Such interactions have often resulted 
in hybrid legal configurations (Santos, 2006). Moreover, the prevalence of violent 
conflicts in many parts of Africa poses several challenges to the operation of 
these institutions, such as breakdown of internal accountability mechanisms, 
mass displacement and population movements, returning refugees and changes 
in lifestyle (Isser, 2011). In addition, the prominence of these features may vary 
depending on the setting (e.g. rural vs. urban) and the type of forum (e.g. official 
vs. unofficial ones), amongst others. For example, in urban contexts, where social 
cohesion may be less intense than in rural ones, social pressure may not be as 
7 According to John-Nambo (2002), this explains why it is not possible to ascertain or codify 
custom, as this would take away the responsibility to solve a conflict from the group where it 
emerged.
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efficient in ensuring compliance with the decision of a local forum.8 The kind 
of justice forums people resort to in urban as compared to rural contexts may 
differ too and official low courts may rely more often on official customary law 
than unofficial traditional authorities.9 In other words, there exists considerable 
diversity in the justice processes that people encounter on their pathways to 
justice. This diversity can be found at various levels. On the one hand, multiple 
legal actors participate in disputing processes, e.g. courts created by the state to 
apply customary law, traditional authorities that administer justice officially or 
unofficially, religious leaders, gender group leaders, spirit mediums, legal NGOs, 
community policing councils, the police and in a minority of cases, formal state 
courts. These instances may compete or collaborate with each other so that local 
justice processes can be conceptualised as multi-layered and polycentric (Oomen, 
2005). On the other hand, the modalities of dispute processing may also vary 
depending on the actors involved, ranging from adjudication or arbitration 
according to state or customary law by some forums to mediation by others.
This plurality in normative orders and forms of dispute processing has a 
number of consequences for the advancement of human rights. First of all, the 
polycentric nature of local justice processes entails that there are many sites where 
struggles with human rights implications may take place, ranging from official 
and easily identifiable forums, such as a chief ’s court, to more ‘hidden’ spaces, such 
as gender and age groups. Therefore, it is paramount to understand the relevance 
of all locally available justice actors and the extent to which their practices respect 
human rights. Secondly, the tendency towards mediating disputes rather than 
adjudicating them according to specific rules means that if the outcome of a 
dispute is at odds with human rights the problem may not reside exclusively at 
the level of the content of local norms since, as explained above, the role of norms 
is relative. In addition, customary norms are flexible and may adapt to changing 
circumstances, so in principle they cannot be regarded as being inherently at odds 
with human rights.10 This is not to deny that norms play a role in the decision 
of an outcome and if local normative orders are in line with human rights, the 
chances that they can inspire a decision that respects human rights may be higher. 
However, it is necessary to look at other factors that may play a greater role. Nader 
(2001) has noted that mediation and negotiation require conditions of relative 
equal power in order to produce fair outcomes. If decisions are embedded socially 
within the community, power disparities between individual disputants may be 
mitigated by corporate interests but this may not always be the case, especially in 
urban contexts. Finally, if outcomes and their enforcement are strongly linked 
to some publicly backed understanding of social order, and this understanding 
leads to violations of human rights, changing the practices of justice providers so 
8 Chapter 6 shows this trend in the area of family law.
9 This is the case for example in Sierra Leone. See Chapter 4.
10 This might be less the case with religious norms, though their interpretation also provides 
quite a margin for adaptability.
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that they respect and protect human rights also requires bringing about broader 
social changes so that such decisions are not totally out of tune with local notions 
of what is legitimate to enforce.
2 .3. LOCAL LEGAL OR DERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
When assessing the relationship between local legal orders and human rights, 
two distinct but interconnected issues need to be considered. On the one hand, 
the extent to which local practices and normative orders are in line with human 
rights. And on the other, the extent to which local dispute processing forums 
operate according to human rights norms, are responsive to human rights claims 
and take decisions that are in line with human rights. Both are interconnected 
since, as explained above, local dispute processing forums are generally embedded 
in local understandings of social order. This adds another dimension to such 
assessments, namely, the extent to which human rights are locally known and 
accepted.
In terms of how local practices and normative orders relate to human rights, 
it is well documented that several customs and certain interpretations of Islamic 
law in the area of family relations and access to resources infringe the rights of 
women and children (Howard, 1982; Armstrong et al., 1995; Butegwa, 2002; 
Nyamu-Musembi, 2002; Uchechukwu, 2002; Banda, 2005; Ssenyonjo, 2007; UN 
Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Most of these laws and customs derive from 
pre-colonial forms of social organisation, which despite being hierarchical, with 
entitlements depending on status, gender and age, did not necessarily imply 
patriarchal oppression (Ilumoka, 1994).11 However, communal forms of support 
provided by the extended family and the clan have tended to erode due to new 
forms of social, political and economic structures (Ilumoka, 1994). In a context 
where there is a growing tendency toward urbanisation and nuclearisation of 
the family, the survival of customs that perpetuate gender inequality, but not 
of others, which emphasise men’s responsibilities and reciprocal duties in the 
family, poses great challenges to women’s wellbeing and, by implication, to those 
who depend on them (Armstrong et al., 1995).
Several customs in the area of family relations do not confer the same rights 
to men and women in marriage, divorce, succession and custody of children 
(Howard, 1982; Armstrong et al., 1995; Uchechukwu, 2002; Banda, 2005; 
Ssenyonjo, 2007; UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Bridewealth, i.e. the 
transfer of cattle or livestock and/or money by a prospective bridegroom or his 
family to the family of the woman whom he intends to marry, is a widespread 
11 Colonial administrators reinforced and ‘froze’ such practices by constructing a version of 
official customary law in which women were considered minors under the guardianship of a 
male (Armstrong et al., 1995).
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practice throughout most patrilineal African societies and is generally considered 
one of the legal conditions for a valid customary marriage (Armstrong et al., 1995; 
Banda, 2005; UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Traditionally, bridewealth 
is given to the father of the bride, but there are cases in which single mothers receive 
it for their daughters, showing the flexible nature of customs (Banda 2005: 108). 
The practice binds together the two families and compensates for the transference 
of the woman’s productive and reproductive capacities from her lineage to that 
of the husband.12 In other words, it allows the husband and his family to acquire 
control over both the wife and her offspring (Armstrong et al., 1995). Many 
African women value this practice as it supposedly shows a man’s commitment 
and acts as a guarantee that he will not abandon the marital home or he would 
lose his investment (Banda, 2005). However, bridewealth makes it difficult for 
women to choose with whom they want to marry since their custodians may 
easily give preference to the best offer. It also easily traps women in undesirable 
or violent marriages because the repayment of bridewealth is generally a requisite 
for granting a divorce (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). In addition, men 
often interpret that the payment of bridewealth gives them almost total power 
over their wives and children as they have ‘paid’ for them (Armstrong et al., 
1995). In a context where the reproductive role of women is to produce children 
for her husband’s lineage, it is easy for men to regard their wives as their ‘sexual 
property’ and demand sexual services against the will of the wife (Banda, 2005). 
This not only exposes women to sexual and psychological violence, but it also 
infringes their sexual and reproductive rights (Howard, 1982). The practice also 
contributes to child betrothal as girls are given in marriage in order to receive 
cattle or other property from the prospective husband, who may be a polygamist 
much older than the girl (Armstrong et al., 1995).
Local customs also tend to grant different rights to men and women in 
marriage.13 For instance, the custom of polygyny violates the principle of gender 
equality because men can take more than one wife, while the same does not 
apply to women. Men can also resort to more substantive grounds for requesting 
a divorce. For example, women’s ‘barrenness’, adultery or disobedience is often 
considered a legitimate reason when invoked by men but not when invoked by 
women (Howard, 1982; Banda, 2005). If a woman cannot bear children or dies 
prematurely without having borne a child, the wife’s family may have to provide 
a ‘substitute wife’ in sororate marriage in order to avoid having to pay back the 
bridewealth; violating the rights of girls and women to free choice in marriage 
(Armstrong et al., 1995; Banda, 2005). In addition, it is most common that marital 
property and commonly acquired freehold land is registered on the name of men 
12 In matrilineal societies, women continue to live within their own lineage and therefore 
bridewealth is not applicable.
13 This is also the case in Islamic law, which is often interpreted in conservative ways that deny 
women’s rights, such as in many parts of Sudan, Kenya and Nigeria (Halim, 1994; Banda, 
2005).
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exclusively, because it is considered that marital property belongs to the husband, 
while men increasingly dispose of it as they see fit without the consent of their 
wives (Butegwa, 2002).
In patrilineal rural societies, the wife resides with the family of her husband 
and is allocated fields for cultivation and/or livestock in his ancestral lands. 
Therefore, upon divorce she is expected to return to her natal family, losing 
access to this land, animals and most of her possessions (Armstrong et al., 1995). 
Despite the fact that many current unions include marital property such as 
freehold land, houses and cars, which are acquired with the income generated 
by women, many men continue to expect that women will leave all this property 
behind (Armstrong et al., 1995). The assumption is that upon return to their 
homes, women will be cared for by their families, which is often not the case. In 
patrilineal societies, it was also customary that upon divorce the children would 
remain within the family of the man, who considered them an asset (Armstrong 
et al., 1995). However, this is no longer a clear-cut practice because children need 
to go to school and thus begin to represent a burden rather than a working force 
(Armstrong et al., 1995). Customarily, maintenance is linked to affiliation and 
custody, so many men refuse to pay maintenance for a child who is not living 
within his family (Armstrong et al., 1995; Banda, 2005). In some parts of Africa, 
the increasing number of single mothers is giving rise to significant changes in 
customary land allocation practices, so that women are now allocated residential 
sites, though this is often done in the name of a relative male (Claassens and 
Mnisi, 2009).
Similarly, local customs generally exclude women from inheritance rights. 
For example, it tends to forbid widows from inheriting her husband’s property 
and it often concedes them no right to bury a husband (Armstrong et al., 1995; 
Uchechukwu, 2002; Banda, 2005). Widows are often in a difficult position, having 
to choose between returning to their natal group under harsh conditions, accepting 
a male relative of the husband in a levirate marriage, or residing with married 
children (Uchechukwu, 2002). Furthermore, a widow often faces expulsion by 
the husband’s family, who grabs both the personal and jointly acquired property 
and leaves her (and often her children) totally destitute, while blaming her for 
killing the husband by means of witchcraft (Uchechukwu, 2002). In addition, 
in some parts of Africa widows are subjected to burial and mourning rituals, 
such as ‘cleansing ceremonies’ entailing sexual intercourse, confinement and 
restricted freedom of movement, which run against their dignity, right to health 
and sometimes life (Uchechukwu, 2002). Refusal to go through these rituals may 
have severe consequences, such as disinheriting the children (Armstrong et al., 
1995). This is not the case of widowers, who can resume normal lives after the 
burial of the wife (Uchechukwu, 2002). In some parts of Africa, orphan children 
also find themselves in a vulnerable position as their custodians may want to take 
care of them in order to have access to their inheritance, while sending them to 
work rather than to school (Save the Children, 2007). Moreover, under customary 
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laws, women frequently have fewer inheritance rights within their own family as 
compared to their male counterparts and succession to positions of authority also 
tends to exclude them (Armstrong et al., 1995). Family land usually goes to male 
children or the eldest son, who is expected to administer it in the benefit of all 
members of the family, though the latter is not certain, with many men disposing 
of inherited land and property for their own personal benefit (Butegwa, 2002).
Another problematic issue is that local customs allow or even encourage wife-
beating and physical violence against children for disciplinary purposes, with 
only ‘abusive’ forms of aggression being condemned (Howard, 1982; Armstrong 
et al., 1995). Such violence is often exercised by those in a position of authority, 
such as a father or a husband in respect of a daughter or wife or the custodians 
of children (Armstrong et al., 1995). Also, a number of harmful traditional 
practices, such as female genital cutting, ritual scarification and puberty rites as 
well as female and child religious bondage are sustained by local customs in some 
parts of Africa despite their detrimental effects on the physical, psychological and 
emotional integrity of women and children (Howard, 1982; Banda, 2005).
Many of these practices are based on an ideology of male superiority that 
perpetuates the subordination of women. Men are given more value as they are 
supposed to take care of the wellbeing of the family, while female socialisation 
devalues their own interests in favour of those of men (Armstrong et al., 1995). 
Such discrimination begins early. For instance, girls are more likely to assume 
more tasks in the household or be sent to work, while boys remain at school due 
to the expectation that later on they will provide for the family (Armstrong et 
al., 1995). This means that women have heavier responsibilities in the household, 
inferior employment and income, inferior access to land and positions of authority 
and lower levels of health and education, which is not only problematic because 
it seriously curtails the human rights of women and those depending on them, 
but it also leads to the feminisation of poverty, constituting a great obstacle to 
sustainable development (Morrison et al., 2007).
At the same time, local normative orders may contain norms that provide 
a strong protection of socio-economic and cultural rights, and in particular 
subsistence rights, such as the right to food and water. For example, in Mhondoro, 
Zimbabwe, local norms protect livelihood rights, such as the right to drinking 
water, in ways that resonate with human rights and without any form of 
discrimination (Hellum, 2007).
In view of how local justice forums relate to human rights, it is necessary to 
consider substantive, procedural and structural aspects of their operation (UN 
Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Though it is impossible to present a picture 
of how all local justice providers in all of Sub-Saharan Africa operate, a number 
of issues have been identified as widespread amongst different local justice 
providers and in particular customary justice forums. In substantive terms, 
decisions are often inconsistent with human rights, either because they breach 
the rights of women and children by endorsing the discriminatory practices 
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that were described above, or because they sanction cruel and inhuman forms 
of punishment (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). For example, amongst 
the Shona of Zimbabwe, the family of a murder victim can be compensated in 
‘blood’ by receiving a woman, often a young girl, in marriage from the family of 
the perpetrator so that she will bear a child to replace the person who has been 
murdered (Banda, 2005: 121). In more traditional areas of Nigeria, the police have 
been reluctant to intervene to protect women victims of violence if the level of the 
alleged abuse did not exceed the customary norms of those areas (Ssenyonjo, 2007: 
52). In Somalia, a woman who is raped is often forced to marry her attacker in 
order to protect her honour, ensure the payment of the bridewealth, and establish 
a bond between the clan of the man and the woman in order to prevent future 
violence (Wojkowska, 2006). Many local justice forums also hold individuals 
accountable on the basis of witchcraft (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). 
In some regions, such as central Mozambique, the supposed perpetrator is 
subjected to insults and severe physical violence from spirit mediums and their 
assistants (Jacobs, 2010). That said, there are also instances in which local forums 
and customs provide better protection of certain rights, such as access to land 
(Nyamu-Musembi, 2002). For example, in Kenya local clan authorities are more 
likely to recognise customary land tenure rights of women as compared to formal 
state courts, where formal titles are the only legal basis to protect these rights 
(Nyamu-Musembi, 2002), and in South Africa, women living on family land 
resist being evicted by male relatives by relying on their customary ‘birthright’ to 
belong, while formal laws offer them no protection (Claassens and Mnisi, 2009).
At the level of procedure, the operation of these forums is generally known 
to the parties. The right to be present at the hearing and present evidence and 
witnesses are normally respected (Penal Reform International, 2000). Moreover, 
these forums tend to operate in the local language, are available within walking 
distance and resolve many cases on the spot or within days (Wojkowska, 2006). 
However, amongst the problems associated with local justice forums are the non-
observance of the principle of the presumption of innocence and that some of 
the methods that are used for extracting a confession are physically harmful, 
which jeopardises the right to a fair trial (Penal Reform International, 2000). For 
example, in Liberia trial by ordeal is a common practice in order to identify a 
guilty party, make a party confess the truth and ‘get rid of the witch’ (Isser et al., 
2009). Some forms of this practice entail the ingestion of poison, the application 
of hot metal to the skin and the immersion of one’s hand in a pot of boiling 
oil, while it is supposed that the supernatural power of the ritual will protect 
the innocent from harm (Isser et al., 2009). Many local justice procedures also 
tend to discriminate against women. For instance, in Sudan, Islamic religious 
courts give less worth to female witnesses (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 
2012) and in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, where customary law treats women as 
minors, women cannot stand in court but need to be represented by their male 
custodians (Howard, 1982). It is also problematic that women do not have the 
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same possibilities to access local forums as men (Banda, 2005). For example, 
women may not dare present claims for fear of being rejected by their families 
or bringing shame to the family’s honour (Banda, 2005). However, this may vary 
from local to local forum. In Malawi, for example, women prefer to bring their 
cases to village mediators rather than to the courts of the chiefs since the former 
offer them more confidentiality as compared with the public proceedings of the 
latter (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Finally, local justice forums tend 
not to respect the right of children to meaningful participation in cases affecting 
their interests (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012)
At the structural level, the lack of formal procedural and substantive rules 
in combination with the erosion of local accountability mechanisms often 
leads to abuses of power, arbitrariness and unpredictability of decisions and 
politicisation of local justice processes (Wojkowska, 2006). In addition, in most of 
Africa customary courts remain male-dominated so that men are in a privileged 
position to define what is custom (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). The 
same applies to religious forums and the interpretation of religious norms (UN 
Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Though more equal gender representation 
in local justice forums is not a guarantee that female justice providers will enjoy 
the same level of authority as their male counterparts or that female litigants will 
see their position improved, it is nevertheless desirable that they participate in the 
internal dynamics of shaping custom (Nyamu-Musembi, 2002).
Finally, there are a number of human rights concerns that arise out of the 
co-existence of various legal orders (ICHRP, 2009). For instance, the risk that the 
non bis in idem principle is violated where different legal orders compete with 
each other, barriers in access to justice that may arise out of powerful litigants 
exerting pressure to have a case heard in a forum that will favour them and lack 
of clarity over jurisdiction and the applicable law (ICHRP, 2009).
All these challenges take place in a context where, despite human rights being 
generally endorsed by formal legal orders, they are often not known at grassroots 
level or partially rejected. On the one hand, there is the problem of local knowledge 
of human rights, which tends to be low amongst justice seekers and many local 
justice providers (UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP, 2012). Nyamu-Musembi 
(2002: 138) explains that familiarity with rights plays a role in shaping interactions 
at a local level as well as the choices that people make in specific situations. She 
gives the example of Kenya, where women are disadvantaged by not being familiar 
with local institutions that were created to protect their rights in land (Nyamu-
Musembi, 2002). In a similar vein, Banda (2005: 129, 174) describes how most 
rural women with unregistered customary law unions in Uganda do not consider 
themselves entitled to anything and therefore rarely advance claims on property, 
while many women in Sierra Leone believe that a husband has the right to beat 
his wife and that it is the duty of the wife to have intercourse with her husband 
whenever he demands it. On the other hand, even when human rights are locally 
known, this does not mean that they are all equally embraced. For instance, in 
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much of Liberia and Namibia the term human rights has negative connotations 
(Isser et al., 2009; Mapaure, 2010). In Liberia, children’s rights and the rights of 
criminals are generally considered as a threat to social order and waywardness 
among the youth (Isser et al., 2009), while in Namibia human rights are called 
‘monsters’ (Mapaure, 2010). According to Ibhawoh (2000) and An Na’Im (2003) 
this is partly related to the fact that the development of human rights regimes 
in Africa has not often been grounded on cultural traditions while there is an 
urgent need to pursue this goal. Eventually, most of the human rights problems 
raised in this section, and certainly those related to gender, need to be seen in the 
context of evolving power relations. As the next chapter shows, it is also against 
this backdrop that challenges to the cultural legitimacy of human rights in Africa 
need to be evaluated and addressed.
3. JUSTICE SECTOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS AID 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE EMERGENT 
ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL LEGAL ORDERS
Justice sector aid and human rights assistance are relatively new areas of 
intervention for international development actors in Sub-Saharan Africa (Piron, 
2005). Nonetheless, this field has already experienced a number of important shifts 
affecting the way in which local legal orders have been approached (Bennett et al., 
2013). Some of these shifts relate to general trends in international development 
aid while others relate specifically to the nature of international aid to the justice 
sector (Bennett et al., 2013).
In Sub-Saharan Africa, justice sector assistance started to gain momentum 
by the early nineties, with the wave of democratisation that followed the end of 
the Cold War. The fall of authoritarian regimes, the introduction of multiparty 
democracy and the adoption of international human rights instruments in much 
of the region coincided with the emergence of ‘governance’ as a new concept in 
aid policy. In this context, effective state institutions were regarded as essential 
for establishing a stable and predictable environment that would facilitate 
international investment. This led international development actors in the 
region to provide aid for strengthening state institutions, and in particular the 
capacity of the justice sector (Piron, 2005). Initially, these interventions followed 
what is generally called the ‘rule of law orthodoxy’, i.e. a top-down, state centred 
institutional approach (Golub, 2003). During this initial phase, international 
development actors provided support for courthouse construction and repair, 
purchase of furniture, computers, and other equipment and materials, drafting 
new laws and regulations, training judges, lawyers and other legal personnel, 
establishing management and administration systems for judiciaries, building up 
bar associations and international exchanges for judges, courts administrators 
and lawyers (Golub, 2003; Piron, 2005). During this same period, some bilateral 
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agencies also started to provide support to civil society organisations to advance 
human rights as a late response to Apartheid in South Africa and the increased 
political repression in Rwanda in the years that preceded the genocide (Piron, 
2005). The idea that human rights would not be realised automatically as a result 
of economic development but had to be pursued as independent goals started 
to take root during this period as well (Trubek, 2003). At the same time, justice 
sector assistance to the region began to increase due to the prevalence of violent 
conflicts and the need for post-conflict justice sector reform (Piron, 2005). 
During this period international development actors showed little interest in 
local legal orders, which were rather considered an obstacle to development and 
human rights that would disappear by itself with the reinforcement of state justice 
(Corradi and Schotsmans, 2012).
About a decade later, the field of development assistance went through an 
important paradigm shift. On the one hand, the adoption of the Millennium 
Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals made poverty reduction 
the official objective of international cooperation. On the other hand, important 
changes took place in relation to how official aid was to be provided in order to 
improve its effectiveness. The Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for 
Action (2008) set out the principles of this new consensus that commits donors 
to harmonising their efforts, aligning their support to the strategies and policies 
of partner countries and managing aid for results and mutual accountability, 
while partner countries are expected to exercise leadership and coordinate 
support, thus enhancing ownership of development aid. These two developments 
had different repercussions on justice sector aid and human rights assistance in 
Africa, and in particular on how local legal orders were approached in relation 
to human rights. The poverty reduction paradigm led to a reflection on how 
justice sector aid contributed to alleviate poverty and as a result some donors felt 
compelled to adapt their approach to assisting this sector and be more responsive 
to local realities (Piron, 2006). For example, the World Bank went to emphasise 
that criminal law and justice programmes were necessary for improving the 
lives of the poor, who were disproportionately affected by high levels of crime 
and insecurity (World Bank, 2003). This resulted in an increased concern with 
enhancing access to justice and promoting human rights at local level by means 
of support to civil society organisations to provide legal aid services and legal 
education campaigns.14 In Africa, different international development actors also 
realised that state justice was not available to the majority of the population who 
rather resorted to a variety of local forms of justice. Bearing in mind that building 
justice institutions is a complex and lengthy task, particularly in post-conflict 
situations, international agencies started to consider how local legal orders could 
contribute to improving access to justice.15
14 See for example DFID, 2000 and UNDP, 2003.
15 See for example, DFID, 2004; UNDP, 2005 and DANIDA, 2010.
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In many cases these actors came to the conclusion that it was necessary to 
reinforce the relationship between local justice processes and human rights. 
For example, the World Bank launched a specific research and development 
programme called ‘Justice for the Poor’ that focuses on grassroots governance 
and justice institutions in Kenya and Sierra Leone. The main objectives of this 
programme are to understand how justice works at the local level, and to inform 
and support pro-poor programme design and implementation in the domain 
of justice reform.16 Amongst the rationales found within this programme for 
engagement with local justice frameworks are the following two arguments: 
on the one hand, the fact that these frameworks form a fundamental aspect 
of a community’s identity and belief system, and on the other, the need to act 
on discriminatory practices they may perpetuate.17 In a similar vein, UNDP 
expresses the view that local justice can ‘fill in the gap’ or ‘compensate’ for the 
state’s inability or unwillingness to provide justice (UNDP, 2005: 101). As regards 
possible areas of tension between local justice and human rights, UNDP suggest 
that interventions should promote the positive features of these justice frameworks 
and reform the negative ones (UNDP, 2005). In South Sudan for instance, this 
organisation provides support for training traditional leaders on human rights 
so that they incorporate these standards into traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms.18 The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development also states that in cases where local norms contradict international 
human rights, it is necessary to develop strategies to alter those values and 
facilitate the implementation of statutory or customary law in compliance 
with human rights and the national constitution (GMECD, 2002). In line with 
this, the German International Cooperation agency has supported a number 
of projects in Ghana and Ethiopia that discussed how local customs related to 
women’s rights (Weilenmann, 2007). DFID also identifies a range of activities 
that donors can support in order to address non-state justice institutions’ non 
compliance with human rights, such as facilitating the development of state 
policy and legislation requiring non-state justice to comply with constitutional 
provisions, funding trainings for traditional authorities, establishing alternative 
forums to which cases can be appealed and modifying non-state norms so that 
they become more responsive to the needs of disadvantaged groups (DFID, 2004). 
Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark also recognises the role of 
informal justice in promoting access to justice and recommends engagement with 
these frameworks as an integrated part of support to justice sector reform. In 
this context, the Ministry deems of particular importance to assess the likelihood 
that these interventions lead to gradual adherence to human rights in areas such 
16 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTJUSFOR
POOR/0,,menuPK:3282947~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:3282787,00.html.
17 Ibid.
18 http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_
governance/access_to_justice.html.
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as accountability, non-discrimination, equality in procedures and outcomes, 
impartiality of decisions and respect for the physical integrity of justice users 
(DANIDA, 2010).
Conversely, the evolutions in the area of aid effectiveness brought about new aid 
modalities that reinforced state centred assistance, such as direct budget support 
and ‘sector-wide approaches’, where partner countries define a national poverty 
reduction strategy and sector policies that embody the government’s priorities. 
In many cases, national policies in the justice sector focus on reinforcing formal 
state justice and tend to neglect local legal orders and their impact on human 
rights. As it will be shown in Part III of this book, these two contradictory trends 
seem to constrain the way in which justice sector aid addresses the promotion of 
human rights within local legal orders.
4. CONCLUSION
International actors providing justice sector and human rights aid in Sub-
Saharan Africa are confronted with several considerable challenges. In the first 
place, they face a context of legal pluralism, where state justice is not dominant. 
At the same time, state justice has historically benefited from a privileged 
epistemological position. However, given the characteristics of the justice 
landscapes in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is problematic to assume that state courts 
and laws can provide justice services and advance human rights on their own, 
or that they are per se in a better position to do so as compared to other locally 
available legal orders. Secondly, local legal orders differ in many ways from the 
justice institutions that most international and domestic development actors are 
familiar with. Customary justice institutions, which are prominent in the region, 
are neither backward vestiges from the past nor idyllic and harmonious. Colonial 
and post-colonial dynamics shaped them in important ways. On the one hand, 
these dynamics often led to a gap between the official customary law institutions 
recognised by the state and the unofficial local legal orders that are the living 
reality at grassroots level. On the other hand, they tended to erode customary 
checks and balances and undermine the downward accountability of traditional 
authorities. In addition, local legal orders are multi-layered and polycentric, 
including a wide array of actors and dispute processing mechanisms. While 
various local customs and legal practices contravene human rights in important 
ways, these legal orders also contain elements that protect human rights or that 
may allow their protection. Moreover, they are dynamic and adaptive to new 
circumstances and demands. However, human rights are not always known or 
accepted by local populations.
International development actors start to grapple with these realities in a 
context that presents contradictory dynamics. The shift towards poverty reduction 
means that they are more prone to engage with local realities, including local legal 
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orders, and support the implementation of human rights at this level, whereas 
new aid modalities centre development assistance around state institutions. As it 
will be shown by Chapters 11 to 15, these two contradictory trends seem to have 
an effect on how international and domestic development actors address legal 
pluralism and the promotion of human rights within local legal orders. But before 
turning to the empirical findings, the next chapter discusses how important 
insights generated by the socio-legal scholarship on legal pluralism and human 
rights relate to the practice of development actors in the justice sector.
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CHAPTER 10
LINKING SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 
AND JUSTICE SECTOR AID
Giselle Corradi
1. INTRODUCTION
As explained in the previous chapter, international actors providing justice sector 
and human rights aid in Africa encounter specific challenges, such as a context 
of legal pluralism, where state justice is generally weak or distrusted, and of 
cultural diversity and contextual specificity, with human rights not necessarily 
being known or considered legitimate by all. This chapter analyses how important 
insights generated by the socio-legal scholarship on these two challenges relate 
to the practice of legal development actors and can feed into it. The first part of 
the chapter examines the main discussions in the field of legal pluralism and the 
second one in that of human rights’ universality and cross-contextual application. 
At the same time, this chapter lays the foundations for the analysis presented in 
Chapter 15.
2. LEGAL PLURALISM AND JUSTICE SECTOR AID
While there are numerous definitions of legal pluralism, Woodman’s 
characterisation of this phenomenon from a ‘top-down’ as well as from a 
‘bottom-up’ perspective is particularly useful for the purposes of the present 
analysis. According to him:
‘Legal pluralism in general may be defined as the state of affairs in which a category 
of social relations is within the fields of operation of two or more bodies of legal 
norms. Alternatively, if it is viewed not from above in the process of mapping the 
legal universe but rather from the perspective of the individual subject of law, legal 
pluralism may be said to exist whenever a person is subject to more than one body 
of law’ (Woodman, 1996: 157).
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   143 21-4-2015   12:29:17
144 Intersentia
Giselle Corradi
2n
d  p
ro
of
The advantage of this double outlook is that it makes it possible to examine 
the relationship between legal plurality and human rights assistance from two 
complementary perspectives. From a structural point of view, it is possible to 
analyse how legal pluralism affects individual and collective actors’ possibilities to 
claim their human rights and how interventions may impinge on these structures 
while they are affected by them. From an agency standpoint, it is possible to 
examine how interventions can build on local actors’ individual and collective 
strategies in navigating plural legal orders, including the use of ‘resources’ that 
may become available or disappear as a result of interventions.
It is also necessary to make a distinction between two aspects of this 
phenomenon, i.e. ‘normative pluralism’ and ‘pluralism in forums of dispute 
resolution’ (Le Roy, 2004: 260). The former refers to pluralism as it is manifested 
at the level of norms, rules and values that inform daily life and that might be 
mobilised in conflictive situations, whereas the latter consist of the multiplicity of 
legal actors, institutions and processes that might be involved in different forms 
of dispute processing. The remainder of this section analyses how key insights 
generated within discussions on legal pluralism are relevant for development 
actors seeking to advance human rights within local legal orders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
2 .1. LOOKING BEYOND STATE JUSTICE
The concept ‘legal pluralism’ departs from the observation that individual and 
social behaviour are regulated by more than one normative order (Vanderlinden, 
1971, 1989; Moore, 1973; Galanter, 1981; Griffiths, 1986). This results from the 
fact that human activity takes place in a multitude of social fields (Moore, 1973) 
or social networks (Vanderlinden, 1989), each of which generates and coerces its 
own rules. As a result, individuals are subject to as many regulatory orders as 
social networks they participate in (Vanderlinden, 1989). The concept shows that, 
from an empirical point of view, it is inadequate to regard the state as the sole 
source of normative ordering. Such a position would amount to an ‘ideology of 
legal centralism’ since regardless of whether or not a state recognises different 
bodies of law as official (e.g. statutory, religious or customary), a multitude of 
regulatory orders coexist de facto in all societies (Griffiths, 1986). In addition, a 
distinction is made between ‘weak’ or ‘state’ legal pluralism and ‘strong’ or ‘deep’ 
legal pluralism (Griffiths, 1986; Woodman, 1996). The former follows a normative 
standpoint by considering the state as the source of legal plurality and it examines 
how different bodies of law, e.g. religious or customary, may be accommodated 
within the state institutional framework. The latter is concerned with an empirical 
reality, namely how different sources of normative authority coexist de facto in a 
given society, independently from whether a state gives them official recognition.
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What is relevant to the present discussion is the acknowledgement that 
justice sector and human rights aid always operates in a context of legal pluralism, 
regardless of whether a state officially endorses more than one legal order. This 
means that different kinds of interventions might be set up in response to these 
different aspects of legal pluralism. While ‘weak’ or ‘state’ legal pluralism raises 
questions related to the coordination of different bodies of laws within the 
state institutional framework (e.g. how linking statutory and customary justice 
may enhance the protection of human rights), ‘strong’ or ‘deep’ legal pluralism 
confronts development practitioners with the issue of the relative capacity of the 
state to effectively influence and regulate the conduct of its citizens as compared 
to other sources of authority, such as chiefs and traditional leaders, who may 
actually exert more influence at local level. At the same time, it means that it is 
necessary to consider both aspects of this phenomenon for they complement each 
other. On the one hand, it is necessary to examine who is actually involved in 
local justice processes and how these actors stand towards human rights, and on 
the other, what the official status of these actors is and how the latter affects the 
protection of human rights.
2 .2 . CONSIDERING HOW LEGAL OR DERS INTERSECT 
EACH OTHER
This bring us to another central tenet of legal pluralism, namely the fact that 
normative orders, including state laws and institutions, do not operate in 
isolation but intersect and interpenetrate each other. In other words, they are 
semi-autonomous, i.e. each social field generates and coerces its own rules but 
these fields operate in a dialectic and mutually constitutive manner (Merry, 1988). 
As explained by Merry:
‘state law penetrates and restructures other normative orders through symbols 
and through direct coercion and, at the same time, … non-state normative orders 
resist and circumvent penetration or even capture and use the symbolic capital of 
state law’ (Merry, 1988: 881).
The fact that normative orders exist in relation to each other has different 
implications. In the first place, it precludes any sharp divide between ‘customary’ 
and ‘modern’ legal orders. Secondly, it implies that these interactions affect the 
way people get access to justice and human rights (Forsyth, 2009: 36–37). By 
considering the interaction between state and local justice providers, interventions 
can attempt at promoting supportive rather than competitive relations between 
different legal actors. On the contrary, totally ignoring the relative position of 
state justice providers in a legally plural context could at best result in missing an 
opportunity to engage in meaningful interaction with local actors and at worst 
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generate unexpected resistance or even the rejection of state justice institutions. 
This is relevant in the context of intervention that aim at improving local access 
to justice by building state courts at lower administrative levels or by supporting 
‘mobile courts’. Such interventions can enhance their legitimacy by sensitising 
state court judges about legal pluralism and local legal orders and by promoting 
dialogue between them and local legal actors.
At another level, this insight reveals that the social space between the 
legislator and the legal subject cannot be conceived of as a ‘normative vacuum’ 
for state laws necessarily ‘travel’ through a social medium that is full of non-
state normative activity (Griffiths, 1986: 34). By implication, it is the interaction 
between state law and other forms of normative ordering that gives shape to the 
law as people experience it on the ground and which determines how conduct is 
regulated in practice (Moore, 1973; Griffiths, 1986). From this standpoint, it is 
possible to reconsider the role of legal reform in generating social changes. While 
state laws may enjoy significant symbolic power, they do not have the monopoly 
of social control. Therefore, it becomes necessary to assess how these laws are 
likely to interact with other normative orders and local practices.1 The other side 
of this coin is to view the semi-autonomous nature of legal orders as the result of 
an inter-subjective process. Since the life of most individuals and social groups 
takes place at the intersection of legal orders, the latter are combined and mixed 
giving rise to a phenomenon called ‘inter-legality’ (Santos, 2002: 437). According 
to Santos (2002: 437), as different legal spaces interact, intersect each other and 
are superimposed in our lives, a mixture and interpenetration of elements from 
different legal orders arises both in our minds and in our actions. Consequently, 
social practice is a constant bridging between legal orders (Santos, 2002: 437).
Understanding the legal experiences of justice seekers from this perspective 
can provide a more solid basis for programming in certain areas, such as legal 
education and human rights awareness raising (Tsanga, 2007). Instead of 
assuming that access to justice and human rights is mainly constrained by a 
lack of knowledge so that the dissemination of state laws will ‘enlighten’ local 
actors, practitioners need to understand that these interventions rather provide a 
new layer of normativity that may compete with or enrich other locally existing 
normative repertoires. As pointed out by Tsanga (2007: 438), ‘the lack of familiarity 
with the state system … does not mean that people are not familiar with any 
justice system at all.’ Therefore, legal education should go beyond state laws and 
engage the wider context where national legislation is supposed to operate within 
(Tsanga, 2007).
1 See Griffith (2003) for a critique to instrumentalist approaches to legislation and a sociological 
theory of how and under which circumstances legislation is likely to influence social behaviour.
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2.3. ASSESSING THE LEGAL NATUR E OF NOR MATIVE 
OR DERS AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF STATE 
LAW
So far, the terms ‘normative’, ‘regulatory’ and ‘legal’ have been used interchangeably. 
However, a series of debates can be found in the academic literature about ‘the 
question of the distinctiveness of state law’ and ‘the question of the distinction 
between non-state law and social order generally’ (Woodman, 1998).2 The first 
discussion revolves around the issue of whether a difference should be made 
between state law and other forms of normative ordering, whereas the second 
one focuses on how to determine when a normative order is also ‘legal’.3 Up until 
today, no ultimate answers have been provided to these questions. Nevertheless, 
there is an increasing recognition of the importance of analysing these topics in 
concrete contexts, while considering who is asking the question and for which 
purposes (Forsyth, 2009; Twinning, 2003; Von Benda-Beckman, 2002; Merry, 
1988).
There are several reasons why these debates are relevant to justice sector and 
human rights aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the first place, there is the question of 
whether interventions should privilege state law and justice above other sources 
and processes of social ordering. While there is no evidence that the state offers 
a superior form of justice than other legal orders, it is not difficult to imagine 
why the development of state capacity to deliver justice services and respect and 
protect human rights is seen as crucial within justice sector aid. On the one hand, 
there is the empirical reality that state law has considerable coercive and symbolic 
power (Merry, 1988). On the other hand, it is the state that will eventually provide 
an overarching framework when conflicts between different legal orders arise. 
Moreover, in the current global architecture, states are the primary actors who 
are expected to organise and provide justice services, including the protection 
and promotion of human rights. However, from a legally plural point of view, even 
when ‘state building’ is the main objective of interventions, and by implication 
it is the capacity of the state to respect, protect and fulfil human rights that is 
privileged, such efforts need to take account of other relevant legal forces that 
are present in the social space for they will anyway influence the way the state 
is able to operate. As was shown in Chapter 2, this is particularly relevant in 
the Sub-Saharan region where state justice coexists to a great extent with other 
legal orders. Moreover, this issue confronts us with the question of who gets to 
define the forms of justice that are embraced by a state and how human rights are 
interpreted within them.
2 See also Tamanaha, 1993, 2000; Von Benda-Beckman, 2002.
3 Ultimately, these debates revolve around the question of what is law. The fact that there is so 
far no satisfactory answer to this question has led some scholars to dismiss the concept of legal 
pluralism (Tamanaha, 1993), whereas other doubt the usefulness of the question itself (Merry, 
1988; Woodman, 1998; Santos, 2002).
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As regards the second discussion, if interventions engage with legal plurality, 
those normative orders and actors that get the label of ‘law’ or ‘legal’ might have 
more chances of being considered for programming purposes than those that 
are merely viewed as informal or diffuse forms of social control. Differently put, 
these issues relate to the question of what normative orders and justice providers 
should justice sector aid consider for programming next to state justice, which 
ones not, and why. In this sense, it could be argued that no single form of ordering 
should be excluded a priori, since it is their actual role in relation to the provision 
of justice that should determine their inclusion or not. As a result, the question 
of whether a certain normative order constitutes or not a form of ‘law’ becomes 
irrelevant, and it could even be counterproductive if interventions fail to identify 
actors and processes that are crucial to advancing access to justice and human 
rights just because they do not present typically ‘legal’ characteristics.4 As regards 
assistance to local legal orders, it is not necessarily those structures that are most 
visible, formally defined or even officially recognised that are the only or the most 
important ones at grassroots level. As the next point illustrates in more depth, it is 
necessary to depart from an analysis that is grounded on the experiences of those 
who navigate plural legal orders.
2 .4. UNDERSTANDING LEGAL OR DERS AS R ESOURCES
One crucial insight generated by the socio-legal scholarship is that law functions 
as a resource that can be mobilised for reproducing or contesting power 
relations and negotiating social realities (Starr et al., 1989; Lazarus-Black et al., 
1994; Oomen, 2005). In addition, a distinction is made between two sides of a 
continuum where power struggles can manifest themselves, i.e. hegemony and 
ideology (Lazarus-Black et al., 1994: 6). The former refers to a form of power that 
naturalises ‘the way things are’, while it tends to sustain the interests of dominant 
groups. The latter refers to the oppositional practices that resist and question this 
order, making it unstable and dynamic. Legal orders, state or customary, can 
therefore both enable or constrain hegemonic and oppositional discourses and 
practices (Nyamu-Musembi, 2005; Lazarus-Black et al., 1994; Starr et al., 1989). 
In other words, even if local legal orders tend to operate in ways that are at odds 
with human rights, the contestation of such practices need not necessarily be 
found in state law but can come from within.
Moreover, in legally plural contexts, legal orders can be either selectively 
invoked or ignored both by users and by providers depending on how they 
are expected to serve the purposes of the actors concerned. On the one 
4 For example, interventions in the area of women’s rights show that the family, the religious 
sphere, and other spaces that do not necessarily show typically ‘legal’ characteristics are of 
utmost importance in the regulation of gendered relations.
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hand, individuals and collective actors can attempt to navigate these orders 
strategically in pursuing certain interests, a phenomenon that has been termed 
‘forum shopping’ (Von Benda-Beckman, 1981). Furthermore, norms can be 
borrowed from different frameworks as resources in the negotiation of certain 
interpretations of the law (Oomen, 2005). This means that it is important to make 
human rights norms and forums that protect them available and known at local 
level so that they can be resorted to as a ‘resource’ in local negotiations.
On the other hand, the term ‘shopping forums’ has been coined to describe 
situations where forums compete for disputes, which they use to advance their 
own political ends (Von Benda Beckman, 1981). As highlighted by Kyed (2009), the 
distribution of power deriving from the administration of justice is a contentious 
and politically sensitive field at several levels: legal actors compete for authority 
and income deriving from the provision of justice, political party interests are 
pursued by supporting and forming alliances with strategic local actors, and 
tensions around the hierarchy of state and non-state authority can emerge. This 
is important at the level of interventions that modify the official status of a local 
legal order. Since all legal orders, state or customary, can both serve hegemonic 
and oppositional practices, it is necessary to examine empirically whose interests 
are served by modifying the official status of a certain legal order and how this is 
likely to affect access to justice and human rights (ICHRP, 2009: 84).
2 .5. HOW ‘THE LEGAL’ IS DEFINED
By way of introducing the next section, an important question to consider is 
whether the ontological and epistemological categories of meaning that define 
‘legal orders’ within justice sector aid are of cross-cultural application. From this 
perspective, ‘law’ might be just one of the many possible ways whereby societies 
put their reproduction into form (Eberhard, 2001: 174). Consequently, one of the 
central concerns of cross cultural approaches to law is avoiding that the own 
experience of ‘the legal’ is taken as the universal point of reference against which 
other traditions are measured and (mis)understood (Vachon, 1990; Eberhard, 
2001). By breaking away from a conception of legal pluralism in terms of ‘different 
versions of a same phenomenon’, where this ‘same phenomenon’ is implicitly 
constructed by reference to the own experience, a pluralist conception of legal 
pluralism gives up the idea of unity and introduces the need for an intercultural 
and dialogical approach (Vachon, 1990; Eberhard, 2001). The analysis then 
moves towards the underlying paradigms of reality or ‘mythos’ that shape our 
visions of the cosmos and therefore give rise to different social institutions for the 
regulation of behaviour. As explained by Alliot, it is especially the invisible realm 
that matters in this regard:
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‘[Societies] construct their own mental universe, carrying fundamental models 
which produce meaning, which are revealed through the vision of the visible and 
the invisible of each of its members, through his/her vision of peoples, of his/her 
society, of the groups to which he/she belongs and with whom he/she is in relation, 
and his/her vision of him/herself. Each partial view refers to the others and sheds 
light on them. But the view a society has of the world and of itself explains more 
specifically the legal behaviour and the limits of the legal’ (Alliot, 1983: 90 in 
Eberhard, 2001: 179).
While understanding law in a plural way requires the kind of openness towards 
diversity that takes seriously the role of cosmologies in mediating our experiences 
of the world, it is as crucial to avoid a cultural essentialist trap since various mythoi 
may coexist in a same social space and relate to different aspects of reality (Le Roy 
et al., 1997). Therefore a pluralist methodology moves beyond ‘either (modern) / 
or (traditional)’ dichotomies towards ‘and / and’ articulations and blends that 
acknowledge the hybrid practices of real-life people (Le Roy et al., 1997). In other 
words, attention for plurality in relation to the law entails both discarding monist 
conceptions of justice, e.g. ‘Western-like’ justice as the only option to development 
and the advancement of human rights, as well as discarding binary approaches, 
i.e. state vs. traditional justice. At the same time, it reveals the importance of 
considering how the diverse forms of normative ordering that are present in a 
society can be combined into hybrid configurations that respond to different 
needs at the local, regional, national and international levels (Le Roy et al., 1997).
The next section expands on this and related issues, this time with a focus 
on the challenges entailed when advancing human rights in diverse contexts and 
milieus.
3. ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS 
CROSS-CONTEXTUALLY
The promotion of human rights within local legal orders in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and beyond is not immune to the well-known universalism vs. relativism debates 
on human rights. Bluntly put, universalist arguments sustain that human rights 
are universal since they flow from the inherent dignity of every human person, 
whereas cultural relativists argue that human rights reflect only the particular 
cultural viewpoint of the West on morality. Against this backdrop it would seem 
that, depending on the position one follows, promoting human rights within 
local legal orders may either be a moral duty or an act of cultural imperialism. 
However, one of the ways out of this conundrum is to question the kind of ideas 
that lie behind key concepts, such universality and cultural diversity (Merry, 
2006a; Cowan et al., 2001), and examine how they inform the policies and 
interventions of development actors.
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3.1. R ECONCEPTUALISING HUMAN RIGHTS’ 
UNIVERSALITY
At the level of human rights, several authors have shown that instead of looking 
at their universality as an a priori given, it might be worth considering how 
this framework can become a universal construction a posteriori. This implies 
looking at human rights as flexible and evolving, so that they can make room to 
accommodate inputs from different cultural traditions (Messer, 2009; Donelly, 
2007, 1984; Brems, 2001; Hellum, 1998; An-Na’Im, 1992). In other words, 
universality can be seen as a multidimensional process of inclusion, where on 
the one hand standards at a transnational level can evolve in order to incorporate 
contributions from different contexts, and on the other hand, at the national and 
local levels, human rights can be flexibly interpreted and implemented in order to 
respond to different needs and realities, while at the same time they can operate 
as pointers for social and cultural change (Brems, 2001). As several scholars 
argue, universality does not require uniformity (Messer, 2009; Donelly, 2007, 
1984; Brems, 2001; Hellum, 1998; Wilson, 1997).
Moreover, human rights are more likely to be observed if they enjoy some 
degree of local ownership and legitimacy. For this purpose, intercultural 
dialogues have been advanced as one of the ways forward (De Sousa Santos, 
2002: 271; Eberhard, 2002; An-Na’Im, 1992). An-Na’Im (1992: 21) identifies two 
levels where these dialogues should take place, i.e. ‘internal reinterpretation’ of 
local ideas and values within communities and ‘cross-cultural dialogue’ amongst 
cultural traditions on the meaning and scope of human rights. He sets the task 
as follows:
‘The cultural legitimacy thesis accepts the existing international standards while 
seeking to enhance their cultural legitimacy within the major traditions of the 
world through internal dialogue and struggle to establish enlightened perceptions 
and interpretations of cultural values and norms. Having achieved an adequate 
level of legitimacy within each tradition, through this internal stage, human rights 
scholars and advocates should work for cross-cultural legitimacy, so that peoples 
of diverse cultural traditions can agree on the meaning, scope, and methods 
of implementing these rights. … I propose to broaden and deepen universal 
consensus on the formulation and interpretation of human rights through 
internal reinterpretation of, and cross-cultural dialogue about, the meaning and 
implication of basic human values and norms’ (An-Na’Im, 1992: 21).
De Sousa Santos (2002: 271–272) adds that these dialogues need to lead to 
‘cosmopolitan human rights’, i.e. the globalisation of moral and political struggles 
against social oppression and human suffering. He departs from the premise that 
each cultural tradition is incomplete, implying that all cultures are problematic 
vis-à-vis human rights. The objective of intercultural dialogues on human rights 
is thus to raise the consciousness of reciprocal incompleteness and weaknesses. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to base such dialogues on discursive tolerance and 
readiness to incorporate alternative and marginalised forms of knowledge (De 
Sousa Santos, 2002: 272). The call to move from ‘globalised Western human 
rights’ to ‘cosmopolitan human rights’ indicates that it is not enough to take other 
perspectives into account. What is at stake is the possibility to participate and 
share in the construction of global knowledge (De Feyter, 2007, 2011; Eberhard, 
2001). This entails harnessing spaces within the global human rights architecture 
for bottom-up contributions and processes of right discovery that are based on 
lessons learned from attempts to put human rights into practice at local level (De 
Feyter, 2007, 2011; De Feyter et al., 2011). In addition, it is a matter of opening up 
spaces where hegemonic ideas can be questioned and where those participating in 
the intercultural encounter allow themselves to be changed by it (Eberhard, 2001).
The first question that is then relevant for legal development actors when 
engaging with local legal orders is what kinds of human rights ideas lie at the basis 
of their praxis and how they position themselves explicitly or implicitly around 
the issue of human rights universality? In other words, what kind of universality 
are they promoting? One of the areas where this question can be examined is 
that of programming for human rights training and awareness raising. Are 
these interventions conceptualised as an exercise in ‘bringing’ a priori defined 
human rights to communities? How much room do they make for bottom-up 
contributions and to what extent do they engage in intercultural dialogues? Are 
they aware of and adapted to the cosmologies and local realities where human 
rights are supposed to operate? To what extent do they consider the differences 
between implementing human rights within forums of dispute resolution that 
operate according to a logic of adjudication as compared to forums that rather 
resort to the logic of mediation, as it is often the case of local legal orders in Africa? 
If human rights are flexibly and cross-culturally understood, their ‘localisation’ 
does not necessarily involve a process of cultural homogenisation since depending 
on the context, different actors will understand and relate to this framework in a 
different way (De Feyter et al., 2011; De Feyter, 2011, 2007; Merry, 2006a; Wilson, 
1997: 12). The next point builds further into these insights by examining the role 
of cultural diversity in these processes.
3.2 . R ECONCEPTUALISING CULTUR E AND CUSTOMS
If different ‘cultural traditions’ should be able to contribute to inclusive definitions 
of human rights, it is also worth exploring how we think about culture. In this 
sense, various scholars have pointed to the dangers of conceptualising culture 
as homogeneous, reified, bounded, coherent and determining (Cowen, 2009; 
Benhabib, 2002; Cowen et al., 2001; Wilson, 1997). Such a view obscures the 
internal heterogeneity and contestation that takes place inside any cultural group. 
On the contrary, a critical approach to culture acknowledges its many voices, its 
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dynamism and the power that inhabits meaning (Wilson, 1997; Wolf, 1980). In 
addition, culture does not only consist of beliefs, values and ideas, but also of 
practices and habits that predispose people to act in certain ways (Merry, 2003: 67; 
An-Na’Im, 2002). As shown in the previous chapter, the same line of reasoning can 
be applied to local customs, which cannot be captured by essentialist approaches. 
An essentialist view of culture and local customs, or the assumption that each 
individual belongs to only one culture and by implication one legal order, is thus 
highly problematic (Cowen et al., 2001; Cowen, 2009). Therefore, understanding 
these terms in a critical way implies that ‘cultures’ and ‘local customs’ are not 
by definition for or against human rights. Certain aspects of a cultural and legal 
tradition may be supportive of human rights, others may undermine them, while 
this is in a constant process of change (Merry, 2003).
In the first place, this implies that development actors should not look at 
culture and local legal orders as enemies of human rights (Merry, 2003). Actually, 
these frameworks may possess valuable ‘tools’ for protecting and advancing 
human rights (Merry, 2003). For example, they may provide ways of framing 
the protection of human dignity with a great potential for the realisation of 
subsistence rights (Gomez Isá, 2011; Hellum, 2007). Development actors may 
thus play an important role by supporting research that uncovers areas of synergy 
between international standards and local normative orders, which may feed into 
critical assessments of national policies and legislation and contribute to the 
development of human rights standards that respond to local realities (De Feyter, 
2011; Hellum, 2007). Moreover, it means that development actors are confronted 
with the need to consider plurality and power dynamics both amongst different 
cultural traditions and within them. On the one hand, this is relevant at the level 
of how human rights are interpreted by state court judges and to what extent 
they are aware of the need for flexibility in this domain. On the other hand, this 
relates to the relationship between individual and collective rights. For example, 
collective rights to culture may be interpreted to include the right to access 
endogenous forms of justice, leading to legal reforms that grant official status 
to local justice institutions. While this could represent a progressive measure 
that aims at accommodating legal and cultural pluralism, it is also necessary to 
consider how participatory the process is by which these institutions are defined 
(Buur et al., 2007; ICHRP, 2009). This insight is also relevant for interventions 
that promote ‘internal reinterpretations’ and intra-group dialogues on customary 
norms and values, such as ‘self-statement’ or ‘ascertainment’ of customary law 
initiatives. Next to the discussion on whether this kind of intervention ‘freezes’ 
tradition, it is crucial to consider that there might be impediments to internal 
contestation due to power differentials amongst community members (An-Na’Im, 
2002: 27). Therefore, cultural claims and definitions of customary laws need to be 
critically scrutinised in terms of who is asking the questions, who is providing 
the answers and whose interests they advance (UN Women, UNICEF and 
UNDP, 2012). Some authors argue that it is the task of external actors to support 
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disadvantaged members to participate more equally in the process of defining 
and contesting culture (Benhabib, 2002). As regards local customs, this could be 
done by means of facilitating access to legal resources, such as the dissemination 
of laws that promote human rights and the provision of accessible legal services 
to enforce them. As illustrated in the previous section, rather than displacing 
local normativites, these initiatives could provide a new normative layer that 
may become a useful resource for negotiating the interpretation of customs and 
facilitate that ‘the shadow of the law’ influences the way local legal orders operate 
(Galanter, 1981; Wilson, 2006: 78; Oomen, 2005).
3.3. UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORTING LOCAL 
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
Next to a critical understanding of human rights’ universality, culture and local 
customs, the promotion of human rights within local legal orders requires an 
analysis of how the economic, political and socio-cultural context interplays with 
them. In this sense, Chopra et al. (2011) argue that legal development actors need 
to move away from approaches that aim at ‘amending’ justice systems towards an 
understanding of the underlying socio-economic, cultural and political structures 
that lie at the root of human rights violations. According to them, development 
actors need to depart from the lived realities of justice seekers on their pathways 
to justice (Chopra et al., 2011). Two key issues emerge from this perspective. First, 
the need for an ‘actor-oriented’ approach to human rights (Nyamu-Musembi, 
2005), and second, the acknowledgment that the advancement of human rights 
can be externally supported but, for it to be sustainable, it needs to be demanded 
‘from within’ (Chopra et al., 2011; An-Na’Im, 1992, 2002; Nyamu-Musembi, 
2002).
Actor-oriented approaches to human rights depart from the views of local 
actors. They examine how rights are mobilised in concrete situations by focusing 
on how people understand their rights, how they claim them and what they hope 
to achieve with them.5 Nyamu-Musembi defines this approach as follows:
‘Actor-oriented perspectives are based on the recognition that rights are shaped 
through actual struggles informed by people’s own understandings of what they 
are justly entitled to. They imply an approach to needs, rights and priorities that is 
informed by the concrete experiences of the particular actors who are involved in, 
and who stand to gain directly from the struggles in question’ (Nyamu-Musembi, 
2005: 31).
5 By implication, certain contexts may require an examination of whether people think in terms 
of ‘rights’ at all.
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In other words, this perspective seeks to understand the strategies of action that 
people are able to mobilise in pursuing their goals, including their ability to 
draw on locally available legal resources (An-Na’Im, 2002; Swidler, 1986). In this 
sense, human rights can be a powerful framework on condition that local actors 
perceive them as an effective ‘tool’. Coming back to legal pluralism and the idea 
that all individual and collective actors participate in various social fields that 
produce and enforce norms in a semi-autonomous way, it is important to bear 
in mind that some of these fields may support human rights ideas, some may 
resist them, and not all of them may exert the same influence in regulating the 
behaviour of these actors. In other words, individual agency is deeply shaped by 
social relations that may support or constrain human rights related strategies of 
action (Cowen, 2009).
When combined with structural analyses, actor-oriented perspectives reveal 
the need to assess through which channel(s) human rights ideas are supposed to 
be implemented locally and how these relate to the rest of the normative forces 
that operate in that same context (Hellum, 1995). For example, if development 
actors provide human rights support to the formal courts only, it is necessary to 
consider how effective these courts are in dealing with local stakes as compared 
to other justice providers. This is crucial since those who resort to formal justice 
will assess how this ‘resource’ works in practice. Depending on this, formal 
justice may or may not take root in a local context and become part of the ‘legal 
consciousness’ of justice seekers (Merry, 2006a). But ideally, interventions should 
take account of all relevant local normative forces, which include not only the 
most formalised justice institutions, but also other social fields that generate 
and enforce norms, such as the family, the church, the school and the local 
community. This is important since these spaces may not only reproduce norms 
that contravene human rights but they may also generate norms and practices 
that can be harnessed for protecting human rights. Therefore, various parallel 
and not necessarily only ‘legal’ interventions might be necessary in order to 
address the various fields of human interaction that affect the possibilities of 
local actors to access human rights. For example, human rights aid can follow a 
multi-layered strategy, where legal reforms that promote human rights nationally 
are complemented by human rights dialogue with local justice providers and the 
population at large and, depending on the operation of local legal orders, the 
provision of alternative justice options that protect human rights. As explained 
above, grassroots dialogue needs to go beyond local practices that contravene 
human rights. As a matter of fact, it is equally important to identify and reinforce 
those local practices that protect human rights and build on them when devising 
certain interventions, such as legal education, so that a link can be established 
between local normative orders and national legislation (Tsanga, 2007).
This is related to the importance of promoting progressive changes ‘from 
within’. As different scholars argue, for human rights to fulfil their emancipatory 
potential, they need to be locally grounded (An-Na’Im, 1992, 2002; Merry, 
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2006a, 2006b; Hinz, 2010; Zwart, 2012). The process of appropriation and 
reinterpretation of international standards to fit local struggles has been termed 
the ‘vernacularisation’ of human rights (Merry, 2006a, 2006b). This implies a 
bi-directional process. On the one hand, international standards are framed in 
terms of local symbols and terminology, and on the other hand, local struggles 
and grievances start to be understood and fought in the language of human rights 
(Merry, 2006a, 2006b). This means that in order to make sense locally, human 
rights ideas need to be presented in terms that resonate with local cultural norms, 
values and practices. Here, a central concept is that of ‘framing’, which is the 
way an idea is packed and presented so that it generates shared beliefs, motivates 
collective action and defines appropriate strategies for action (Merry, 2006b: 41). 
This can be achieved by collaborating with the right local actors, who can act as 
intercultural ‘translators’ or ‘brokers’ (Merry, 2006b: 41). These actors are in a 
position to understand the logic of emancipation that international human rights 
seek to promote and at the same time their embedment in the local context allows 
them to think ‘systemically’ and estimate the kinds of reactions and consequences 
that these ideas may have locally. Therefore, they are in a more legitimate position 
to challenge local practices and ideas. These actors can range from religious 
and customary leaders and healers to local NGOs, community mediators and 
paralegals, who can be local partners in awareness raising campaigns, human 
rights dialogue and self-statement of customary law interventions, amongst 
others. However, the identification of local partners might not be an easy task as 
development actors need to be enough acquainted with each particular context 
and its dynamics (Chopra et al., 2011). Moreover, there might be no ‘intercultural 
brokers’ readily available, so that it becomes necessary to engage in a long-term 
process of mutual capacity and trust building.
Another way to implement human rights by relying on local socio-cultural 
arrangements is the ‘receptor approach’ (Zwart, 2012). This approach seeks to 
identify local values that can act as ‘receptors’ for human rights principles. This 
can be done by detecting and making visible social arrangements that protect 
human rights and, if these fall short of human rights, by adding elements to adapt 
these institutions without eliminating them (Zwart, 2012). Similarly, the ‘soft 
approach’ to human rights grounds human rights on indigenous foundations while 
emphasising the latter’s flexibility to respond to new needs and demands (Hinz, 
2010). In both cases, this requires a detailed analysis of how social institutions 
work and how their internal logic relates to human rights (Hinz, 2010; Zwart, 
2012). Development actors can finance such research and provide support for 
local capacity building to conduct this kind of research, while facilitating that it 
feeds into subsequent interventions, such as human rights dialogue at grassroots 
level and trainings for state court judges, amongst others. The main point within 
these approaches is that implementing human rights across diverse socio-cultural 
contexts is more a matter of looking for home-grown solutions rather than of 
replacing local institutions by externally imposed ones. In this sense, it could be 
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argued that human rights do not require the wholesale elimination of institutions 
that present challenges to human rights, but only of those elements that are 
harmful. Moreover, people tend to follow strategies of action that are more or 
less well known to them and they are unlikely to take new paths that imply 
serious ruptures with established ways of life (An-Na’Im, 2002; Swidler, 1986). 
Consequently, abolitionist approaches are not likely to bring about the desired 
results, not the least because they might be perceived as cultural imperialism 
(Nyamu-Musembi, 2000, 2002). Therefore, interventions need to focus on 
discussing the concrete negative consequences of certain local practices in order 
to forge a common ground with local actors to pursue solutions to problems that 
are locally identified as such.6
4. CONCLUSION
Departing from the premise that legal pluralism and the implementation of 
human rights across diverse socio-cultural contexts constitute two challenges 
that legal development actors are confronted with in Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
chapter has shown how socio-legal theory on these issues can provide valuable 
entry points for devising interventions. As a matter of fact, development practice 
constitutes a significant channel through which these theories can be applied 
in the real world and it is necessary to continue exploring how development 
practitioners can capitalise on this knowledge.
Indirectly, this chapter has also shown that as long as interventions pay 
thorough attention to the how question, promoting human rights within 
local legal orders does not need to represent in itself an exercise in cultural 
imperialism. Much to the contrary, this kind of undertaking could represent 
an excellent opportunity for understanding international standards in a critical 
way and contribute to more inclusive definitions of human rights. As has been 
discussed above, human rights as well as culture and local customs are flexible 
and dynamic so that they may be reconciled. The chapter has illustrated several 
ways in which legal development actors may contribute to this goal. This requires 
looking beyond state justice institutions, understanding the interaction amongst 
local legal actors and normative repertoires, looking at how behaviour is 
regulated from an empirical point of view, being sensitive to different paradigms 
of reality, conceptualising human rights, culture and custom in a critical way and 
supporting ongoing dynamics of change ‘from within’.
The next four chapters present empirical data on how development actors 
have approached this topic so far in four case studies, i.e. Malawi, Mozambique, 
6 See for example Chopra (2007) in respect of human rights dialogue on widow’s inheritance 
rights in Kenya and Ubink (2011) on self-statement of customary laws protecting widow’s 
inheritance rights in Namibia.
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Sierra Leone and Zambia, while Chapter 15 reflects on what can be learned from 
these experiences.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alliot, M. (1983) Anthropologie et Juristique. Sur les Conditions de l’Elaboration d’une 
Science du Droit, Bulletin de Liaison du LAJP, 6, 83–117.
Alliot, M. (1985) La Coutume dans les Droits Originellement Africains, Bulletin de 
Liaison du LAJP, 7–8, 79–100.
An-Na’Im, A. (1992) Towards a cross-cultural approach to defining international 
standards of human rights: the meaning of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment. In An-Na’im, A. (ed.) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: 
A Quest for Consensus. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Benhabib, S. (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brems, E. (2001) Human Rights: Universality and Diversity. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Buur, L. and Kyed, H.M. (2007) Introduction: Traditional Authority and Democratization 
in Africa. In Buur, L. and Kyed, H.M. (eds.) State Recognition and Democratization in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Chopra, T. (2007) Promoting Women’s Rights by Indigenous Means: An Innovative 
Project in Kenya, Justice for the Poor, 1(2), 1–4.
Chopra, T. and Isser, D. (2011) Women’s Access to Justice, Legal Pluralism and Fragile 
States. In Albrecht, P., Kyed, H.M., Isser, D. and Harper, E. (eds.) Perspectives 
on Involving Non-State and Customary Actors in Justice and Security Reform. Rome: 
International Law and Development Organisation.
Cowan, J. (2009) Culture and Rights after Culture and Rights. In Goodale, M. (ed.) Human 
Rights. An Anthropological Reader. Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Cowan, J., Dembour, M.B. and Wilson, R. (eds.) (2001) Culture and Rights: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
De Feyter, K. (2007) Localising Human Rights. In Benedek, W., De Feyter, K. and 
Marella, F. (eds.) Economic Globalisation and Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
De Feyter, K. (2011) Sites of Resistance. In De Feyter, K., Parmentier, S., Timmerman, C. 
and Ulrich, G. (eds.) The Local Relevance of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
De Feyter, K. and Parmentier, S. (2011) Introduction: Reconsidering Human Rights 
from Below. In De Feyter, K., Parmentier, S., Timmerman, C. and Ulrich, G. (eds.) 
The Local Relevance of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donelly, J. (1984) Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 6(4), 400–419.
Donelly, J. (2007) The Relative Universality of Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 
29(2), 281–306.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   158 21-4-2015   12:29:18
Intersentia 159
Chapter 10.  Linking Socio-Legal Theory and Justice Sector Aid
2n
d  p
ro
of
Eberhard, C. (2001) Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue, An Anthropological 
Perspective. Lecture for the Summer Course ‘Cultural Identities and Human Rights’ 
organized by the International Institute for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, 9–13 July 
2001.
Eberhard, C. (2002) Droit de l’Homme et Dialogue Interculturel. Paris: Editions Des 
Ecrivains.
Forsyth, M. (2009) A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: the Kastom and State Justice Systems 
in Vanuatu. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
Galanter, M. (1981) Justice in many rooms: courts, private ordering and indigenous law, 
Journal of Legal Pluralism, 19, 1–47.
Gomez Isa, F. (2011) Freedom from Want Revisited from a Local Perspective: Evolution and 
Challenges Ahead. In De Feyter, K., Parmentier, S., Timmerman, C. and Ulrich, G. 
(eds.) The Local Relevance of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Griffiths, J. (1986) What is Legal Pluralism?, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law, 24, 1–55.
Griffiths, J. (2003) The Social Working of Legal Rules. Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 48, 1–3.
Hellum, A. (1995) Actor Perspectives on Gender and Legal Pluralism in Africa. In 
Petersen, H. (ed.) Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law. Boston: 
Dartmouth Publishing.
Hellum, A. (1998) Women’s Human Rights and African Customary Laws: Between 
Universalism and Relativism – Individualism and Communitarism, The European 
Journal of Development Research, 10(2), 88–104.
Hellum, A. (2007) Human Rights Encountering Gendered Land and Water Uses. 
Family Gardens and the Right to Water in Mhondoro Communal Land. In Hellum, 
A., Stewart, J., Sardar Ali, S. and Tsanga, A. (eds.) Human Rights, Plural Legalities 
and Gendered Realities. Paths are Made by Walking. Harare: Southern and Eastern 
African Regional Centre for Women’s Law.
Hellum, A., Stewart, J., Sardar Ali, S. and Tsanga, A. (eds.) (2007) Human Rights, 
Plural Legalities and Gendered Realities. Paths are Made by Walking. Harare: Southern 
and Eastern African Regional Centre for Women’s Law.
Hinz, M. (2010) Justice for Justice and Justice for Peace: Legal Anthropological 
Observations on Traditional and Informal Justice Systems. In Hinz, M. and 
Mapaure,  C. (eds.) In Search of Justice and Peace. Traditional and Informal Justice 
Systems in Africa. Windhoek: Namibia Scientific Society.
ICHRP – International Council on Human Rights Policy (2009) When Legal Worlds 
Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law. Versoix: International Council on 
Human Rights Policy.
Kyed, H.M. (2009) The Politics of Legal Pluralism: State Policies on Legal Pluralism and 
their Local Dynamics in Mozambique, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
59, 87–121.
Lazarus-Black, M. and Hirsch, S. (eds.) (1994) Contested States: Law, Hegemony, and 
Resistance. New York: Routledge.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   159 21-4-2015   12:29:18
160 Intersentia
Giselle Corradi
2n
d  p
ro
of
Le Roy, E. (2004) Les Africains et l’Institution de la Justice. Entre Mimetisme et Metissages. 
Paris: Dalloz.
Le Roy, E. and Kuyu, C. (1997) La Politique Française de Coopération Judiciaire: Bilan et 
Perspectives. Observatoire de la Coopération Française, Rapport 1997, 36–65. Paris: 
Karthala.
Merry, S.E. (1988) Legal Pluralism, Law & Society Review, 22(5), 869–96.
Merry, S.E. (2003) Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And 
Anthropology Along the Way), Polar, 26(1), 55–76.
Merry, S.E. (2006a) Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law 
into Local Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merry, S.E. (2006b) Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the 
Middle, American Anthropologist, 108(1), 38–51.
Messer, E. (2009) Anthropology, Human Rights and Social Transformation. In 
Goodale, M. (ed.) Human Rights. An Anthropological Reader. Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Moore, S.F. (1973) Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an 
appropriate subject of study, Law & Society Review, 7/4, 719–746
Moore, S.F. (1978) Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Nyamu, C. (2000) How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, Harvard International 
Law Journal, 41(2), 381–418.
Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2002) Are Local Norms and Practices Fences or Pathways? The 
Example of Women’s Property Rights. In An-Na’im, A. (ed.) Cultural Transformation 
and Human Rights in Africa. London: Zed Books.
Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2005) Towards an Actor Oriented Perspective on Human Rights. In 
Kabeer, N. (ed.) Inclusive Citizenship, Meanings and Expressions. London/New York: 
Zed Books.
Oomen, B. (2005) Chiefs in South Africa, Law, Power & Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era. 
New York: Palgrave.
Santos, B. de Sousa (2002) Towards a New Legal Common Sense. Edinburgh: Butterworths 
Lexis Nexis.
Starr, J. and Collier, J. (eds.) (1989) History and Power in the Study of Law, New 
Directions in Legal Anthropology. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Swidler, A. (1986) Culture in action: symbols and strategies, American Sociological 
Review, 51(2), 273–286.
Tamanaha, B. (1993) The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism, 
Journal of Law and Society, 20(2), 263–323.
Tamanaha, B. (2000) A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, Journal of Law and 
Society, 27(2), 296–321.
Tsanga, A. (2007) Reconceptualising the Role of Legal Information Dissemination 
in the Context of Legal Pluralism in African Settings. In Hellum, A. et al. Human 
Rights, Plural Legalities and Gendered Realities, Paths are Made by Walking. Harare: 
Southern and Eastern African Regional Centre for Women’s Law.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   160 21-4-2015   12:29:18
Intersentia 161
Chapter 10.  Linking Socio-Legal Theory and Justice Sector Aid
2n
d  p
ro
of
Twining, W. (2003) A Post-Westphalian Conception of Law, Law & Society Review, 37(1), 
199–258.
Ubink, J. (2011) Stating the Customary: An Innovative Approach to the Locally 
Legitimate Recording of Customary Law in Namibia. In Ubink, J. (ed.) Customary 
Justice: Perspectives on Legal Empowerment. Rome: International Legal Development 
Organisation.
UN Women, UNICEF and UNDP (2012) Informal Justice Systems. Charting a Course for 
Human Rights Based Engagement [online] http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/
library/Democratic%20Governance/Access%20to%20Justice%20and%20Rule%20
of%20Law/Informal-Justice-Systems-Charting-a-Course-for-Human-Rights-Based-
Engagement.pdf (15/10/12).
Vachon, R. (1990) L’Etude du Pluralisme Juridique, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 29, 
163–173.
Vanderlinden, J. (1971) Le Pluralisme Juridique: Essai de Synthèse. In Gilissen, J. (ed.) Le 
Pluralisme Juridique. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Vanderlinden, J. (1989) Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 28, 149–157.
Von Benda-Beckmann, F. (2002) Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism, 47, 37–83.
Von Benda-Beckmann, K. (1981) Forum shopping and shopping forums – Dispute 
settlement in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 
19, 117–159.
Wilson, R. (1997) Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction. In Wilson, R. 
(ed.) Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives. London: 
Pluto Press.
Wilson, R. (2006) Afterword to ‘Anthropology and Human Rights in a New Key’: The 
Social Life of Human Rights, American Anthropologist, 108(1), 77–83.
Wolf, E. (1980) Facing Power, American Anthropologist, 92(3), 586–596.
Woodman, G. (1996) Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice, Journal of African Law, 
40(2), 152–167.
Woodman, G. (1998) Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about 
Legal Pluralism, Journal of Legal Pluralism, 42, 21–59.
Zwart, T. (2012) Using Local Culture to Further the Implementation of International 
Human Rights: The Receptor Approach, Human Rights Quarterly, 34(2), 546–569.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   161 21-4-2015   12:29:18
2n
d  p
ro
of
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   162 21-4-2015   12:29:18
Intersentia 163
2n
d  p
ro
of
CHAPTER 11
TRADITIONAL LAW THROUGH A STATE 
LENS: A CASE STUDY ON MALAWI
Lia Nijzink
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how international development actors providing aid to 
the justice sector in Malawi position themselves regarding legal pluralism and 
the promotion of human rights within traditional law. The chapter begins with 
an overview of the main colonial and post-colonial developments in the field of 
law and justice. After describing the main features of the justice landscapes of 
Malawi and their main challenges in terms of human rights, the chapter depicts 
how international development actors engage with these realities and provides 
a mapping of their interventions. The conclusion argues that because most 
interventions in the justice sector were aimed at the formal legal system, the way 
in which the state approaches the justice sector and the role of traditional law in 
it plays a crucial role in development actors’ position vis-à-vis legal pluralism and 
local legal orders.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Malawi’s traditional leaders have applied a system of traditional law since time 
immemorial. The customary law forums for settling disputes, also known as 
Pabwalo, date from long before 1891, when the British colonial rule over what was 
then known as Nyasaland began. The colonial period saw the establishment of the 
so-called Native Courts. In this system, formally introduced in 1933, traditional 
law was applied by the state, i.e. by the provincial commissioners assisted by 
traditional leaders, who acted as advisors or assessors. This system was an attempt 
by the colonial rulers to incorporate the unofficial system of traditional law into 
the formal legal system.
When Malawi gained independence in 1964, the Native Courts were replaced 
by the so-called Local Courts. The Local Courts Act determined their authority, 
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which allowed them to pass judgement on all issues of private and criminal law, 
with the exception of homicides and other criminal offences for which the death 
penalty or life imprisonment could be imposed. Another exception were those 
cases related to marriages that did not fall under customary law. In certain cases, 
the personal authority of the Local Courts also included non-African citizens.
In 1969, the local courts were renamed and transformed into so-called 
traditional courts. The authority of these courts was extended to cases for 
which the death penalty could be imposed. This took place after the infamous 
Chilobwe murders case, for which the suspects were acquitted by the Supreme 
Court. A year later, in 1970, the Traditional Court of Appeal became the highest 
appellate body for customary law cases, instead of the Supreme Court. This meant 
that the traditional legal system became in fact an official legal system operating 
separate from and parallel to the recognised Western legal system. This situation 
persisted throughout the period of Banda’s one-party regime in Malawi. During 
Banda’s dictatorship, the traditional legal system was abused to suppress political 
opponents and to prosecute dissidents and people advocating political change. 
Although the traditional leaders did not take part in the traditional courts, 
they did play an important role in selecting their members. This is how both 
the traditional leaders and the traditional courts gained the reputation of being 
collaborators working with Banda.1
After a multiparty democracy was introduced in Malawi in 1994, the two 
parallel legal systems were integrated in the sense that the Traditional Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the regional Traditional Appeal Courts were abolished and 
the Traditional Courts were absorbed in the judicial power. The chairs of the 
traditional courts and other staff became part of the courts of first instance that 
functioned under auspices of the Supreme Court. In practice, this meant that 
customary law was applied by that part of the judicial system, which up until 
then had not dealt with customary law cases. This led to a number of issues, such 
as a lack of expertise concerning customary law within the justice system, a lack 
of expertise concerning criminal law among the former chairs and the former 
staff of the traditional courts, confusion with regards to authority, especially in 
cases concerning traditional marriages and landed property in areas that fell 
under traditional authorities, arrears in settling conflicts, and a decline in access 
to the legal system – especially in rural areas. Scharf et al. (2002) and Manda 
(2012) offer an extensive analysis of the integration process and the problems that 
this entailed. Because of these problems, the Malawi Law Commission began a 
revision of the Traditional Courts Act and presented a report in September 2007 
that proposed far-reaching reforms (Malawi Law Commission, 2007). These 
reforms will be discussed below.
1 This description of the history of the Malawi traditional legal system is principally based on 
Cammack et al., 2009; Kanyongolo, 2006; and Malawi Law Commission, 2007.
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3. THE JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
In Malawi, traditional law enjoys constitutional recognition. The Constitution 
stipulates that traditional law is applied by the formal legal system, but only when 
it does not contradict justice. The problem, however, is that the majority of the 
population has no access to the formal legal system. An estimated 80% of the 
population takes recourse to other forms of conflict settlement. Although the 
traditional courts were absorbed by the formal legal system in 1994, traditional 
leaders – chiefs and village chiefs – continued to settle disputes based on 
traditional law, and village tribunals that are not recognised by the state are still 
operational (Scharf et al., 2002). Furthermore, there are a number of actors in 
communities that are involved in non-tradition-based dispute settlement. There 
are units for victims support in police stations throughout the country. Also, 
there are volunteer village mediators and legal aid workers active in many rural 
communities (Stapleton, 2009).
4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
PLURALISM
In its report of September 2007, the Malawi Law Commission suggested to 
reintroduce local courts into the legal system in order to allow ordinary Malawians 
access to a law that is affordable and that the people are used to (Malawi Law 
Commission, 2007). The most important motivation for this proposal was the 
objective to improve access to the law for all citizens. The Commission pointed 
out that access to the law is severely limited, especially for Malawians in rural 
areas, if all cases – including private law traditional cases – are handled by formal 
courts of first instance. Since their procedures and practices are based on Western 
law, there courts are ill equipped to treat customary law cases.
That is why the Commission decided to reintroduce local courts into the 
formal legal system. The Commission envisioned them applying traditional law 
and having the authority to handle private law in traditional cases and certain less 
serious criminal offences. Because several elements of traditional law contradict 
women and children’s rights, certain cases were excluded from the authority of the 
proposed local courts, such as cases concerning inheritance, parental authority 
over children, witchcraft, landed property and the division of marital goods. The 
establishment of local courts of appeal on a district level was another part of the 
Commission’s proposal. From the district level, the next step was supposed to 
be an appeal to the Supreme Court. In other words: there was no provision for 
a separate Traditional Court of Appeal. The Local Courts Act in which these 
reforms were included was approved by the Malawi Parliament in February 2011.
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Figure 1. The institutional framework for legal pluralism in Malawi before February 
2011
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Figure 2. Reforms to the institutional framework for legal pluralism in Malawi as 
approved in February 2011
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These figures are a graphical representation of the institutional framework for 
legal pluralism, as it existed in Malawi until recently, and the proposed reforms 
as approved by Parliament in February 2011. The dotted lines and light colour 
indicate traditional bodies and actors that are not officially recognised by the state 
and therefore are not part of state-recognised legal pluralism. However, both in 
the old and in the new situation, there is informal interaction between the formal 
and informal component of the legal system. As the second figure shows, it cannot 
be expected that the establishment of the new local courts for the application 
of traditional justice will cause the complete informal traditional law system 
to vanish. Actually, this is not the primary objective of the new system of local 
courts. The proposal for the establishment of local courts for the application of 
traditional law within the formal legal system is primarily based on the fact that 
the formal system was overburdened with less serious offences and traditional law 
cases for which it had neither the capacity nor the expertise. Moreover, in the new 
system there is a strong emphasis on separation of powers, especially between the 
judicial and executive powers. Therefore, in the new system the traditional leaders 
who join the local governing structures will be separated from the judiciary. They 
will not be part of the new local courts.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   166 21-4-2015   12:29:19
Intersentia 167
Chapter 11.  Traditional Law through a State Lens: A Case Study on Malawi
2n
d  p
ro
of
5. THE HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE
Although Malawi is still a strongly traditional society, the traditional leaders 
suffer from a poor reputation that originates in their role under Banda’s single-
party dictatorship. Moreover, the traditional leaders are heavily politicised in the 
current multiparty system. As a consequence, the role of traditional leaders as 
guardians of traditional law is weaker than one might expect, and the chiefs and 
village chiefs are not the most active participants in the current public debate 
on the tension between human rights and traditional norms and practices.2 The 
most important areas where this tension is part of the public debate in Malawi 
are inheritance law and women’s rights, arranged marriages/sexual relations with 
young girls, children’s rights and the parental authority over children, as well as 
cases regarding witchcraft (Malawi Law Commission, 2009). The current debate 
shows that there is no strong lobby in Malawi that rejects human rights on basis 
of tradition. In other words: there is a reasonably fertile climate for addressing 
the tensions between traditional law and human rights and one can find several 
initiatives with this objective, as the description of interventions concerning 
traditional law below will show.
6. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOCAL LEGAL 
ORDERS
When the research was conducted, three development actors were active in 
the Malawi legal sector: the European Union, the British organisation for 
development cooperation DFID, and the United Nations via its United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The majority of the activities and support 
that these actors provided to the sector was by far aimed at institutions and actors 
that are embedded in the formal legal system. Besides the programmes of the 
DFID, no particular attention was paid to traditional law and these development 
actors had not taken any specific policy position in the role of legal pluralism and 
local legal orders in the Malawi justice sector.
There was in fact a clear task division between these three organisations. 
The European Union executed the so-called Rule of Law programme. This 
programme was coordinated by the Malawi Ministry of Justice with the EU 
providing technical support through a unit that was specifically established in 
the Ministry for this purpose. The programme, which commenced in 2006, was 
exclusively aimed at the formal legal system and was not specifically concerned 
with traditional justice. Several organisations from the civil society were 
supported in the framework of the programme, such as the Malawi Human 
2 Personal interviews with traditional leaders and other stakeholders, Lilongwe (Malawi), 
August–September 2009.
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Rights Commission and the Initiative for Civic Education (NICE). In certain 
cases, the work these organisations did was indirectly related to traditional law 
and the role of traditional leaders in communities (see below). Nevertheless, the 
EU, as far as we could ascertain in our fieldwork, had not taken a specific policy 
position in this matter.
The UNDP had taken the initiative to introduce the so-called Sector-Wide 
Approach (SWAP, cf. Stone et al., 2005) into the Malawi justice system. This 
would basically lead to more and better coordination between the diverse donors 
and to a more significant role for the Malawi government in the implementation 
and evaluation of the donor programmes aimed at strengthening the justice 
sector (Malawi Ministry of Justice, 2009). A study tour to Uganda organised by 
the UNDP took place. Since Uganda was already working with a SWAP in the 
justice sector, the involved Malawi organisations were able to get a better idea 
of what a SWAP entails. It does seem, however, that such an approach would be 
somewhat premature in the Malawi context. Anyway, there are a large number 
of questions regarding the coordinating role and the capacity of the Ministry of 
Justice, and which organisations fall within or outside of the justice sector, and 
about the role of civil society organisations in a SWAP. Furthermore, there are 
questions surrounding the independence of the judiciary and the organisations 
such as the Malawi Human Rights Commission that are relevant should a SWAP 
be implemented. Our fieldwork showed that implementing a sector-wide approach 
would probably make developmental aid to the Malawi justice sector even more 
state-oriented than it already is. Unless the Malawi government makes haste 
with implementing the new local courts, it seems that a possible justice SWAP 
would leave too little room for traditional law or traditional law institutions. 
Nevertheless, the UNDP turned out to have no clear policy position concerning 
the role of traditional law in a sector-wide approach.3
The British organisation for development cooperation DFID had been active 
in the Malawi justice sector since 2000 through her MaSSAJ programme – 
Malawi Safety, Security and Access to Justice. This programme was designed as 
an ambitious long-term programme aimed at policy development for the entire 
justice sector, including unofficial traditional forums for dispute settlement 
(DFID, 2003). The programme was therefore aimed specifically at the traditional 
authorities not recognised by the state, to improve the access to and quality of 
traditional law and to align it with international human rights standards. The 
interventions regarding traditional law in the MaSSAJ programme proved not 
to be trouble-free and the DFID decided to focus its attention on so-called 
primary justice: an initiative for more collaboration between traditional and 
non-traditional organisations, including state institutions, to promote effective 
conflict settlement – whether or not by traditional norms and practices – in 
3 Personal interviews with representatives of international actors in development cooperation 
and other stakeholders, Lilongwe (Malawi), August–September 2009.
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communities. One of the DFID’s most recent interventions in this context was an 
educational programme organised by the judiciary for a group of layman judges 
without any specific legal training who were active in the formal legal system 
within courts of first instance.
DFID furthermore supported the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 
an organisation from the civil society that is specifically involved in traditional law 
and which organises education programmes for members of the unofficial village 
tribunals. The Commission was active in 28 districts in Malawi and provided 
training for both the chiefs and the village chiefs in the communities on human 
rights, gender issues and matters that pertain to ‘good governance’. The trainings 
were also aimed at clarifying and easing the authority of and the task division 
between the unofficial traditional legal system and the formal legal system. To 
improve the relationship between the unofficial traditional legal system and the 
formal legal system and to increase the trust in the much-applied traditional 
system, the Commission introduced a register to document cases in the village 
tribunals. The Commission also offered a successful programme to increase the 
number of female members in village tribunals.
Besides these interventions, which bear directly on traditional law, there 
were a number of interventions that were more indirectly related to traditional 
law. The above-mentioned organisation National Initiative for Civic Education 
(NICE) that received support from the European Union and stemmed from the 
civic society, aimed to support groups with a social-economic disadvantage. 
NICE worked with rural communities in a number of development projects 
and was specifically focused on mobilising communities to promote democracy 
and good governance. NICE organised awareness campaigns for human and 
women’s rights, and its work here indirectly touched upon the role of traditional 
leaders. The work of the Paralegal Advisory Service Institute (PASI) was aimed at 
legal awareness but also at alternative forms of dispute settlement. PASI trained 
so-called village mediators that act as legal aids in rural communities and handle 
both private law cases and criminal cases. In a sense, the village mediators furnish 
an alternative for the village tribunal and thereby touch indirectly upon the role 
of traditional forums for dispute settlement (Stapleton, 2009). Certain elements 
of the work of the Malawi Human Rights Commission also indirectly bear on 
traditional law. For example, the Commission investigated existing traditional 
practices and made an inventory of norms and practices that violate human 
rights. During our fieldwork, it did not become clear what had been done with the 
results of this study. The following table maps these interventions according to the 
typology developed in Chapter 8:
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Type of interventions At state level At local level
Law reform interventions Research-related activities 
(Malawi Human Rights 
Commission – EU); stimulating 
the community debate on 
procedural and substantial 
traditional law norms (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and 
Peace – DFID)
Institutional support and 
reform interventions
Proposal for the reintroduction 
of local courts (Malawi Law 
Commission – no involvement 
of development actors) 
Introducing a register for case 
documentation, revision of 
appointment procedures for 
members of village tribunals, 
reinforcing the relations 
with the formal legal system 
(Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace – DFID)
Strengthening the legal 
community (justice providers)
Human rights training, 
national legislation and 
several techniques for 
dispute settlement (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and 
Peace – DFID)
Empowering justice users Human rights education and awareness programmes (NICE 
– EU and Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace – DFID); 
Programmes aimed at legal assistance and alternative dispute 
settlement (PASI – several development actors)
The above table offers an overview of interventions regarding traditional justice as 
executed in Malawi at the time the research was conducted. The reform proposal 
for the introduction of local courts into the formal legal system has also been 
included in this table. It is interesting to see that the development actors who 
were active in the legal sector in Malawi were not involved in this proposal and 
had hardly engaged themselves with it. During our fieldwork they turned out to 
have practically no knowledge of the proposal’s details, and also that they had not 
taken a position vis-à-vis the proposals of the Malawi Law Commission.
7. CONCLUSION
The description of the situation in Malawi that was given above allows us to draw 
the following conclusions regarding the question how international actors that 
are active in the field of justice sector aid in Malawi handle legal pluralism and 
traditional law.
First of all, it is clear that some development actors in Malawi had no 
intention to concern themselves with legal pluralism and traditional law and they 
had therefore not developed a (policy) position in this field. They were exclusively 
engaged in the formal legal system and seem to take their lead from the Malawi 
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government for their position on traditional justice. The institutional framework 
for legal pluralism as it existed in Malawi up until recently apparently offered 
little reason to pay attention to traditional law in justice sector aid. Development 
actors were also hardly aware of existing proposals to adjust this legal framework.
This had led to a certain dichotomy in justice sector aid in Malawi. Interventions 
were either exclusively aimed at formal law or at unofficial traditional law. There 
were no interventions concerned with the customary law elements in the formal 
law. For example, development actors in Malawi had not concerned themselves 
with the lack of expertise regarding traditional norms and practices within the 
judiciary. Nor had they been active in relation to the institutional framework 
for legal pluralism or the proposals for the reintroduction of local courts in the 
judicial power. Development actors, therefore, seemed to have little awareness 
of legal pluralism approaches to law. In general, justice sector aid in Malawi 
seemed to pay too little attention to the existence of several legal orders that are 
interconnected and influence each other. Moreover, attention for traditional law 
was only paid by programmes concerned with unofficial forums for traditional 
law, but not by the more substantial support for formal law. The instalment of 
the new local courts may change this, if development actors were to support the 
establishment for these new courts for the practice of traditional law.
Secondly, it is clear that in cases where interventions by development 
actors were specifically related to traditional law, these were implemented by 
organisations of the civil society. These organisations seemed generally sensitive 
to the characteristics of traditional law and to also opt for an intercultural 
approach to promote human rights. The extent of these programmes, however, 
was limited and does not seem to result in more influence of the law users on 
policy issues within the justice sector.
This Malawi case study shows that, because most interventions in the justice 
sector were aimed at the formal legal system, it is crucial how the state approaches 
the justice sector and the role of traditional law. In Malawi, the state does not 
consider the development of the unofficial traditional justice sector to be a priority. 
Attention is paid to creating official local courts that apply traditional law and the 
role these local courts could have in easing the burden on the current formal 
legal system. This might create renewed interest in legal pluralism and traditional 
law, but this interest is still limited to a certain institutional interpretation and 
a certain concept of traditional law that are principally not concerned with the 
views, experiences and expectations of justice seekers. The implementation of 
the new system could in principle lead to a proper task division between the 
customary law and other parts of the formal legal system and thereby alleviate the 
tensions between traditional law and human rights. Considering the experiences 
in Zambia, however, there is reasonable doubt as to whether this will happen in 
practice (see Chapter 9).
Development actors in Malawi had not concerned themselves with these 
proposals but now that these have been accepted by Parliament this situation 
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could change. This might lead justice sector aid in Malawi to become even more 
focused on the formal legal system. It is, however, much too early to determine 
whether this development will translate into improved access to and quality of 
the law in Malawi.
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CHAPTER 12
POLYCENTRIC LEGAL LANDSCAPES: 
A CASE STUDY ON MOZAMBIQUE
Giselle Corradi
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how international development actors providing aid to 
the justice sector in Mozambique position themselves regarding legal pluralism 
and the promotion of human rights within local justice processes. The chapter 
begins with an overview of the main colonial and post-colonial developments 
that led to the highly polycentric configurations of justice provision that can be 
found throughout the country. After describing the main features of the justice 
landscapes of Mozambique and their main challenges in terms of human rights, 
the chapter depicts how international development actors engage with these 
realities and provides a mapping of their interventions. The concluding discussion 
analyses the latter in the light of the socio-legal insights presented in Chapter 10 
and argues that despite some efforts to incorporate informal justice within justice 
sector aid, most initiatives reflect a state centric perspective.
2. COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL 
BACKGROUND OF LEGAL PLURALISM
Portuguese colonial presence in Mozambique stretches from 1500 to 1975. 
However, until the 20th century, Portuguese influence was limited to trading 
settlements along the coast and rivers. It was only between 1929 and 1941 that the 
territory came under direct control of the Portuguese colonial government.1 This 
went hand in hand with the introduction of a dualistic system of local government 
called ‘Indigenato’, which divided the population into civilised (Europeans and 
1 For an extensive account of Mozambique’s history see Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique 
(London: Hurst & Co., 1995).
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assimilados) and natives.2 In line with this bifurcated system, the territory of 
Mozambique was organised into territorial units that were supervised by colonial 
officials, whereas sub-divisions of these structures fell under the administration of 
co-opted traditional authorities, who were also charged with the administration 
of local justice.3 In 1961, under pressure from ILO to stop forced labour, the 
Indigenato regime was revoked and all natives of the Portuguese colonies were 
granted Portuguese citizenship. That same year, the movement for independence 
began to organise in Mozambique with the formation of an anti-colonial political 
group called ‘Front for the Liberation of Mozambique’ (FRELIMO). Under the 
ideology of socialist revolution, FRELIMO carried out an armed campaign 
against Portugal from 1964 to 1974 (the Colonial War).4 Eventually, it negotiated 
independence with the government of Portugal in 1974 and constituted itself 
as the independent government of Mozambique in 1975.5 In contrast with the 
policy of continuity followed by several ex-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
FRELIMO sought to break away from the colonial structures it had inherited from 
Portugal. This included traditional authorities, who were seen as collaborators of 
the colonial regime and were therefore banned. The first National Constitution of 
1975 established a one party presidential regime based on socialist revolutionary 
ideology. FRELIMO sought to modernise rural areas by providing free education, 
health and basic services. At the level of local justice, a comprehensive reform 
took place with the abolition of customary courts and their replacement by 
‘popular courts’ that formed part of a unitary socialist legal system as the lowest 
tier in the court hierarchy.6 Popular courts were composed of lay judges who were 
elected by a local assembly and approved by the community. Their main task was 
to mediate and seek reconciliation rather than to apply formal or customary law. 
Procedures were informal and emphasised public participation (Sachs and Welch, 
1990). However, the spread of the new system proved difficult to implement, 
especially in the countryside where traditional authorities continued to exercise 
public authority. As FRELIMO’s failure in rural areas became more evident, the 
2 ‘Assimilados’ were African and mulatos who could gain this status if they proved that they 
could read and write Portuguese, that they had abandoned their customs, and were gainfully 
employed.
3 Those traditional authorities who refused to cooperate with the colonial regime were 
imprisoned and replaced (O’Laughlin, 2000).
4 See T.H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence 
1964–1974 (Westport, CT: Greewood, 1983).
5 FRELIMO’s ascension to power in 1975 was not legitimated by popular elections but was 
rationalised by its revolutionary nature. This changed with the National Constitution of 1990, 
the signature of the Peace Agreement in 1992 and the introduction of multi-party democracy 
with the elections of 1994.
6 At the socio-economic level, FRELIMO’s revolutionary programme was based on the promotion 
of ‘villagisation’ and collective production. According to this policy, rural populations would 
move into communal villages and would become either workers on state farms or members 
of cooperatives. This contradicted long established patterns of disperse rural settlement and 
family production. To a large extent, these policies eventually failed. (O’Laughlin, 2000: 27).
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party increasingly resorted to repression as a means to advance its programme 
(O’Laughlin, 2000).
From 1976 to 1992, Mozambique went through a bloody civil war. The Cold 
War and the ongoing liberation struggles in neighbouring countries provided 
for the backdrop where regional and international opposition to FRELIMO’s 
revolutionary programme would arise. By the late 1970s, a counter-revolutionary 
movement arose across the border in Rhodesia, RENAMO.7 Despite RENAMO’s 
brutal massacres and abductions of child soldiers, voluntary support, or at least 
neutrality for the movement, arose in central provinces, such as Manica, Sofala, 
Zambezia and Nampula, where the failure of FRELIMO’s programme grew with 
the years and where RENAMO found the support of excluded representatives 
of traditional society.8 Throughout the 1980s, war zones arose along the lines 
of FRELIMO and RENAMO strongholds. Civilians living in these areas were 
targeted by the opposing fraction, causing the death of thousands and the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands. By the late 1980s, internal conditions 
in Mozambique, such as droughts and famines and the changing international 
and regional political landscape facilitated that FRELIMO and RENAMO would 
move towards peace negotiations. In 1990, a second National Constitution based 
on multiparty democracy was adopted, paving the way for the General Peace 
Agreement, which was signed in Rome in 1992.9
As foreseen in the Constitution of 1990, the post-civil war period was 
marked by the transition towards multiparty democracy and the introduction 
of liberal market economy. The departure from the socialist model included 
the adoption of neoliberal measures, such as the liberalisation of prices, the 
privatisation of state companies and drastic cuts in public and social expenses 
(Hanlon and Smart 2008). At a political level, RENAMO got formal recognition 
as a legitimate political party and FRELIMO obtained formal recognition as the 
legitimate government of Mozambique, winning the first multiparty general 
elections in 1994. At a judicial level, Law 4/92 was passed making provision for 
the separation of the popular courts from the formal justice system, which from 
then onwards were renamed ‘community courts’ (Trindade, 2003). In practice, 
community courts were not that different from their predecessors, the local 
courts. In most cases the same courts, with the same lay judges and in the same 
localities continued to work under the new name, with the difference that they 
stopped receiving any governmental support. In addition, this period saw the 
introduction of decentralisation policies, including Decree 15/2000, which led to 
7 Initially, RENAMO was formed mainly by ex-black Portuguese troops in exile across the 
border in Rhodesia which were supported by white Rhodesian intelligence (Newitt, 2002: 209).
8 See C. Geffray, La Cause des Armes au Mozambique (Paris: Karthala, 1990).
9 The Peace Agreement made no provision for the implementation of any mechanism to review 
the crimes committed during the war. Law 15/92 provided for an amnesty for crimes committed 
during 1979 and 1992. According to Newitt, the UN and the international community gave 
great support to securing peace in Mozambique due to potentially destabilising effects that 
could otherwise affect the peace process in South Africa (2000).
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the formal recognition of traditional authorities. This decree delegates traditional 
authorities several state functions, including policing, taxation, population 
registration, enforcement of justice, land allocation, and rural development.10 
The third and current National Constitution of 2004 built further on the liberal 
principles established in 1990 and introduced a series of changes touching on 
the organisation of the judiciary. Amongst the most important ones, we find the 
formal recognition of legal pluralism in article 4.
3. THE JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
As a result of these processes, the provision of justice in Mozambique is highly 
polycentric and channelled through what in Mozambique is often called the 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ justice systems. Formal justice comprises the Supreme 
Court, the High Court of Appeal, the Provincial Courts and the District Courts. 
Access to these tribunals is limited for the majority of the population due to 
several factors, such as lack of knowledge, lack of physical access, lack of trust and 
the high costs involved.11 These institutions were inherited from the Portuguese 
colonial administration but were never fully deployed throughout the country 
due to a lack of financial and human resources. As a result, they are mainly used 
by middle classes and business people in urban centres (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 
37). These courts present major operational challenges, such as poor physical 
infrastructure, lack of access to legislation and jurisprudence and charges of 
corruption and political interference (OSISA, 2006). In addition, lack of capacity 
results in serious case backlogs and breaches of fair trial guarantees, such as 
exceedingly long pre-trial detention periods and lack of legal counsel (OSISA, 
2006). Overcrowded prisons lack minimal safety and health conditions (OSISA, 
2006). On top of this, the police are reported to handle a significant proportion 
of crimes out of court leading to many abuses (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 39) All of 
this contributes to a general distrust of formal state justice institutions, which are 
perceived as inefficient and illegitimate (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 39).
As in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, most people recur to a wide array 
of local justice providers, which are frequently grouped under the umbrella term 
‘informal justice’. According to a recent study, ‘customary law and the traditional 
authorities who administer it constitute the primary form of justice for the 
overwhelming majority of Mozambique’s population’ (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 
10 For an analysis of this process see L. Buur and H.M. Kyed, ‘Traditional Authority in 
Mozambique: The Legible Space between State and Community’, in L. Buur and H.M. 
Kyed (eds.) State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, A New Dawn for 
Traditional Authorities? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
11 According to the Organic Law on the Organization of the Tribunals, each district should have 
at least one district court, but this is not the case. See Open Society Initiative for South Africa 
(2006).
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24). This covers familial and marital disputes, adultery, petty theft, drunkenness 
and disorderly behaviour, land and resource disputes, cases of sorcery and 
physical aggression (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 26). Customary law processes are 
oral and their main objective is the restoration of community harmony taking 
account of corporate rather than individual interests. For this purpose, traditional 
authorities, assisted by elders, lead community discussions that seek to arrive 
at consensual decisions on how to settle disputes, provide compensation and, 
if possible, achieve reconciliation (Lubkemann et al., 2011: 24, 25). Depending 
on the locality, traditional authorities collaborate or compete with other justice 
providers, such as religious authorities, spirit mediums, community courts, local 
administrative authorities, the police, community policing councils and paralegal 
organisations (Santos, 2006; Meneses, 2007; Lubkemann et al., 2011). That some 
of these instances represent a state authority does not necessarily mean that they 
always apply state law. For example, local administrative authorities and the 
police perform dispute-processing functions where they combine state and non-
state normative orders (Araujo, 2010). Jacobs (2010: 132) documents how police 
officers in Gorongosa district accept spirit mediums’ accusations of crime as valid 
and punish perpetrators on the basis of it. Though not always associated with 
judicial functions, traditional healers and spirit mediums act both as a forum 
where the parties resort to for truth seeking and spirit problems and as expert 
witnesses within disputing processes officiated by other justice providers when 
a spiritual dimension is at stake (Jacobs, 2010: 122). Their intervention is often 
required in order to identify individuals who induce evil powers, mostly women. 
Christian and Muslim religious leaders also play a role as advisers and mediators 
within their faith group, particularly in the context of familial conflicts (Jacobs, 
2010; Casimiro and Fonseca, 2009).
Next to these justice forums, we find the community courts. According to 
the last national mapping, in total 1694 community courts exist in the country 
(GoM, 2008). As explained above, during the post-independence socialist period 
(1975–1994), FRELIMO followed a policy of abolition of traditional authority, 
which were considered collaborators of the Portuguese colonial regime, and 
installed the popular tribunals in order to replace them (Sachs and Welch, 1990). 
However, these tribunals were not evenly implemented throughout the territory 
and traditional authorities continued to have a de facto role in the administration 
of justice (O’Laughlin, 2000). At present, the community courts that replaced 
the popular tribunals are not part of the official legal system and their regional 
coverage and levels of popularity vary from region to region (Santos, 2006: 58). 
Though the law that created the community courts (Law 4/92) foresees that 
the provincial governments will remunerate community court judges and be 
responsible for these courts (arts. 11, 12), they receive no financial, material or 
human resource support from the government or the formal courts. Moreover, 
they are often suspected of political affiliation to the ruling party (OSISA, 2006; 
Santos, 2006).
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In recent years, legal plurality has been further compounded by the creation 
of Community Policing Councils (Meneses, 2007). Created by the Ministry of the 
Interior in 2000 to involve citizens in crime prevention, the Community Policing 
Councils were left to function by themselves and started to compete with the 
official police by solving cases on their own, including illegal recourse to the use 
of force (Meneses, 2007: 35). Finally, many NGOs and paralegal organisations not 
only offer legal advice but also settle disputes out of court, thereby performing 
quasi-judicial functions.
Overall, there is an enormous diversity in the legal landscapes of Mozambique, 
which is not only found in the different kinds of dispute resolution instances that 
are locally available, but also within one same type, e.g. some community courts 
operate in a building, others under a tree, some resort to procedural formalities 
and take registers, others do not, etc. Great variation also exists in the customs 
that are followed in different regions and the customary laws that traditional 
authorities rely on. In addition, there are important differences in the way in 
which these actors interact with one another. Depending on the locality, they may 
collaborate, compete or simply ignore each other (Santos, 2006). The following 
figure provides an overview of the justice providers that are recurrently found 
throughout this polycentric legal landscape:
Figure 3. Main justice providers in Mozambique
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Neighbourhood
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4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
PLURALISM
The current institutional framework for legal pluralism in Mozambique gives 
official status to a number of the above-mentioned informal justice providers 
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without defining how these relate to each other and to the formal courts. The 
National Constitution (2004) recognises ‘the various normative orders and 
mechanisms of dispute resolution that exist in the Mozambican society as long as 
they do not contravene the values and fundamental principles of the Constitution’ 
(art. 4). Additional legislation would render this provision operational (art. 212.3) 
but so far the existing laws on the topic are silent on many issues. Law 4/92 creates 
the community courts but does not foresee any form of articulation between 
them and the formal courts. The Organic Law of the Judicial Courts (Law 
24/2007) states that the judicial courts ‘may articulate with other existing conflict 
resolution instances’ without stipulating which ones or how (art. 6). Article 86, 
1-a, 2 states that the district courts will hear appeals from the community courts 
‘in accordance with the principles established by the legislation on community 
courts’, which is not specific. Decree 15/2000 defining the articulation between 
local state bodies and community authorities limits itself to recognising the role 
of village secretaries, traditional authorities and other local leaders (art. 1-1) in 
maintaining peace, justice and social harmony (art. 4-a), but it does not mention 
any concrete implementation plan. Regarding the status of customary laws, the 
Family Law (Law 10/2004) grants official status to traditional marriages that 
are registered (arts. 16, 17, 18, 25, 51) and the Land Law (Law 19/97) recognises 
land held according to customary forms of land tenure (arts. 12, 24). In other 
words, these customary laws are applicable in so far as they respect the National 
Constitution but there exists no legislation or jurisprudence indicating how 
conflicts between both should be assessed.
This means that in practice there is no official connection between the formal 
and informal spheres of justice. In this context, justice seekers have multiple 
options for navigating between different informal and formal forums. For 
example, a family dispute may first be mediated between the families, sometimes 
with the intervention of a third party, such as a women group’s leader or a local 
administrative authority. If no solution is reached at this point, the case may be 
taken to the traditional court, or to the community court, or first to one and then 
to the other if both are present in the same locality. At times, the intervention of a 
traditional healer can be requested if the case involves a supernatural dimension. 
If no solution is reached within the informal instances and the parties have 
enough means, they may recur to a district court.12 The parties may also decide 
to resort immediately to a district court without passing through any informal 
forum. However, some district courts require that ‘minor cases’ be first handled 
by a community court, meaning that in some cases, the lack of clarity in the 
12 Or when it is a ‘family case’, the parties may be advised to go to a special unit of the police, the 
‘unit for women and children’. These units were created to deal with domestic violence, but in 
practice they mediate in more general ‘family cases’. Personal interviews and observations, 
Maputo, Pemba, August–September 2009.
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institutional framework for legal pluralism leads to varying forms of de facto 
division of legal labour.13
There exist at present two law reform proposals that would modify the 
current institutional framework for legal pluralism. On the one hand, there is a 
draft law to replace Law 4/92 on the community courts. Next to its lack of clarity 
as regards articulation with the formal courts, different stakeholders consider it 
necessary to replace Law 4/92 since it is outdated and has never been regulated 
on several points.14 For example, the amounts that community court judges can 
request as penalties and taxes were never updated (art. 3.2 and art. 5) and the 
form of remuneration of community court judges was never specified (art. 11). 
Moreover, many community courts have seen no re-election of their judges 
since 1987 as the government still has to devise mechanisms to this end (art. 13). 
However, the existing draft has been retained at the Council of Ministers for 
several years and seems not to advance since certain issues remain controversial. 
For example, the budgetary impact of the law, the procedure for the re-election of 
judges and whether regulation of community courts will result in an unwanted 
formalisation of their practices.15 In addition, the Criminal Code and the Code 
of Criminal Proceedings are currently under revision. The draft that is up for 
legislative consideration contains a number of provisions that modify Law 4/92. 
For example, all criminal summary proceedings are foreseen to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the community courts. This includes corporal injuries that prevent 
a person from working up to 20 days, robbery up to 60,000 MZN (about USD 
2,000) and damages up to 60,000 MZN (about USD 2,000), except for traffic 
accidents (art. 115). In these cases, community courts are to administer alternative 
penalties short of imprisonment, such as community work and fines (art. 117). 
The Ministry of Justice launched this initiative as it is expected that it will relieve 
the formal courts from case backlogs and contribute to solving the problem of 
overcrowded prisons, while at the same time reflecting the Mozambican tradition 
of reconciliation.16
5. THE HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE
Mozambique has ratified most of the main international human rights 
instruments, and fundamental rights are guaranteed under the National 
Constitution, but in practice, both formal and informal instances present 
13 This does not mean that community courts deal only with minor cases. In spite of their limited 
jurisdiction, in practice they deal with more serious offenses such as rape, domestic violence, 
etc. Personal interviews, Mozambique 2009.
14 Personal interviews, Maputo, August–September 2009 and February–March 2012.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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challenges for their implementation.17 Human rights concerns at the level of 
formal justice relate mainly to poor access to formal courts and overcrowded 
detention facilities, as well as incidents of extra-legal executions and torture by 
police officers. Widespread poverty and limited resources to realise basic rights 
form the backdrop to these challenges.18 In addition, a pervasive patriarchal 
ethos tends to undermine the realisation of women’s rights. Even though official 
legislation conforms to international standards, in practice state officials do not 
always know or enforce this legislation (Arthur and Mejia, 2006). This is reflected 
in the frequent unequal treatment of men and women and the failure to protect 
women and girls from domestic violence.19
In the case of informal justice, these mechanisms enjoy considerable social 
legitimacy as they are embedded in the symbolic orders that inform life in the 
communities where they operate. As highlighted by several authors, there is an 
important connection between the different ontological orders co-existing in 
Mozambique and the way conflict is defined and resolved (Lubkemann et al., 
2011; Jacobs, 2010; West, 2005). Nevertheless, informal justice processes tend 
to reflect and reproduce social hierarchies and inequality. As in the case of the 
formal courts, this is remarkable in the area of gender. For example, women are 
often dispossessed of their property upon divorce, their inheritance rights are 
seriously curtailed and they are discriminated against in the areas of reproductive 
rights, education and public decision-making (Andrade et al., 2001). However, this 
varies depending on the forum. Some of them deny gender equality altogether, 
whereas other adopt a conciliatory stance, where traditional gender roles are not 
fully questioned, but they incorporate some elements of gender equality (Arthur 
and Mejia, 2006). Corporal punishments are also reported to be a problem within 
some informal forums, such as in the case of traditional healers, which may inflict 
severe physical violence on a supposed witch to make her confess or punish her 
(Meneses, 2007: 28; Jacobs, 2010: 129) as well as in the case of some customary 
and community courts.20
17 At the time of writing, Mozambique had not adhered to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Chapter 5 of the National Constitution (2004) provides 
for socio-economic and cultural rights.
18 See Danish Institute for Human Rights, Mozambique and Human Rights at http://www.
humanrights.dk/international/geographical+regions/africa/countries/mozambique/
mozambique+and+human+rights.
19 See Arthur and Mejia, 2006.
20 Personal interviews, Maputo, August–September 2009.
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6. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOCAL LEGAL 
ORDERS
In Mozambique, justice is amongst the national sectors receiving the smallest 
budgets.21 As analysts point out, the government of Mozambique resists reform 
in areas that are politically sensitive, though it maintains an appearance of 
cooperation (Di Renzio and Hanlon, 2007). For their part, donors are lenient 
on these issues as long as Mozambique remains politically and economically 
stable and displays satisfactory levels of spending on social indicators, such as 
health and education, which are more readily associated with poverty reduction, 
even if they remain aid dependant (De Tollenaere, 2006; Di Renzio and Hanlon, 
2007; Castel-Branco, 2008). In this context, most donors providing support 
for the justice sector concentrate on formal justice. Amongst the few donors 
who fund initiatives regarding informal justice we find the Danish bilateral 
cooperation, which at the moment the research was conducted, provided support 
for the community courts as part of its access to justice strategy. Aid was mainly 
channelled through the Ministry of Justice for mapping the existing community 
courts, building new ones and training their judges.22 This training consisted 
in providing community court judges with basic knowledge of statutory laws 
concerning areas they frequently deal with, such as family and criminal matters, 
including which cases fall under the jurisdiction of community courts and which 
ones do not.23 In addition, some support was given to civil society organisations 
for research on informal justice.
UNDP and the EU also provided some support for informal justice providers 
in the context of a project to improve access to state courts at the district level by 
building three ‘Citizen’s Forums of Justice’, i.e. district courts that house the main 
justice and public order actors in one same building (the police, investigating and 
judging magistrates, legal and paralegal defenders, prison officers, etc).24 These 
activities included a component on legal education for community leaders and 
community court judges, which consisted in two-day seminars on justice and 
human rights, preceding the inauguration of the ‘Citizens’ Forums for Justice’. 
During the seminars, community authorities were given information on how 
a district court functions, when cases should be referred to these courts and a 
general introduction to human rights.25 This project also included a component 
on human rights awareness raising in community theatres in a number of districts 
neighbouring the ‘Citizens’ Forums for Justice’. Drawing on examples of concrete 
daily practices and conflicts, the theatre pieces illustrated with humour how these 
21 Personal interviews, Maputo, 2009.
22 Interview with an official of the Danish bilateral cooperation, Maputo 13/08/09.
23 Personal interview with a trainer, Maputo, 17/08/09.
24 ‘Support to the Citizen in Access to Justice’ EU and UNDP (2005–2009).
25 Personal observations, Morrumbene, October 2009.
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situations could be approached in a way that respects human rights.26 Finally, the 
World Bank supported similar initiatives under its ‘Access to Justice sub-grants’ 
for civil society organisations to pilot activities, which raise awareness of citizens’ 
rights and disseminate legal and judicial information as part of a multi-donor 
programme ‘Public Sector Reform Project’ (2003–2009).
In addition, a number of international NGOs, such as Action Aid, HIVOS 
and Oxfam International, as well as some bilateral donors, such as the embassies 
of the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, provided support to civil society 
organisations working in the area of gender so that they disseminate simplified 
versions of the family law adopted in 2004 and of the law on domestic violence 
adopted in 2009.27 Most of these organisations did not have a specific focus on 
informal justice, but their activities interplayed with this domain. For example, 
according to a local representative of Action Aid, their work aimed at generating a 
demand for the protection of these rights so that changes are brought about ‘from 
within’, including at informal justice forums. As she explained, discussing the 
new legislation at community level opens the eyes of many women and gives them 
a tool to improve their situation so that when they seek justice, they know their 
rights, independently from the forum they resort to.28 Other organisations, such 
as MULEIDE, were supported to give free legal advice to women or to mediate 
in family-related conflicts, such as in the case of the Gabinete Juridico of Pemba. 
Finally, Oxfam UK launched research into the relationship between traditional 
culture and domestic violence. The aim of this research was to understand how 
the community courts can contribute to the elimination of domestic violence. It is 
the intention to employ this knowledge base in the elaboration of future projects 
in this area.29
Another area in which international actors indirectly engaged with legal 
pluralism is children’s rights. In 2008, a new children’s law was adopted and 
UNICEF supported the distribution of simplified versions of this piece of 
legislation at grassroots level. The rationale for this was that by knowing the law, 
people would modify certain practices that are at odds with children’s rights, 
such as early marriages and physical punishments.30 However, these activities 
were carried out without engaging in a dialogue on how the law relates to 
local practices and ideas. As a local school authority explained, ‘these laws are 
perceived to weaken adults’ authority to discipline children’.31 Acknowledging 
this tension, a member of Save the Children reported that they were still looking 
26 In the case of the project in the province of Inhambane, the topics dealt with included 
domestic violence, land conflicts, family conflicts, early marriages and noise pollution. 
Personal interviews with activists of the local organisation AJUDINHA and observations, 
Morrumbene and Massinga, August–September 2009.
27 Personal interviews, Maputo, October 2009.
28 Personal interview with a representative of Action Aid, Maputo, 20/08/09.
29 Telephone interview with a representative of Oxfam UK, October 2009.
30 Personal interview with a representative of UNICEF, 19/08/09.
31 Personal interview with a local school authority at Malaia, 01/09/09.
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for the right strategies to deal with the uneasy relationship between the principles 
and ideas enshrined in international children’s rights and national laws and local 
practices and ideas about children and childhood, being the gradual persuasion 
and collaboration with local leaders the path that so far gave them best results.32
Finally, customary land tenure was another area where international actors 
engaged with legal pluralism and informal justice. The Land Law of 1997 
recognises customary land rights and gives them full equivalence to state issued 
land rights. In this context, FAO in partnership with the national Legal and 
Judicial Training Centre (CFJJ) gave support for policy development, awareness 
raising of the new law, capacity building to the formal judiciary for oversight tasks 
and legal empowerment of local communities through a paralegal programme. 
The Embassy of Norway funded the FAO and the CFJJ in a similar paralegal 
project focusing specifically on women’s customary land rights (2009–2011). The 
following table maps these interventions according to the typology developed in 
Chapter 8:
Type of interventions At state level At local level
Law reform interventions – Adoption of the land law 
recognising customary land 
tenure (supported by FAO)
– Dialogue with local leaders 
about children’s rights and 
local customs (Save the 
Children)
Institutional support and 
reform interventions
– Mapping community courts 
(DANIDA)
– Building new community 
courts (DANIDA)
– Draft law on the regulation 
of community courts 
(government initiative, no 
involvement of international 
actors)
Strengthening of the legal 
community (justice providers)
– Training formal judges on 
their oversight functions 
regarding customary land 
tenure (FAO)
– Training community court 
judges on statutory laws 
(DANIDA)
– Legal education seminaries 
for community authorities 
(UNDP/EU)
Empowering justice users – Community theatre regarding human rights (UNDP/EU)
– Human rights awareness raising (the World Bank)
– Dissemination of simplified versions of the family law, the law 
on domestic violence, the law on children and the land law 
(Embassy of the Netherlands, Embassy of Norway, Embassy of 
Sweden, Action Aid, HIVOS, Oxfam, UNICEF, FAO)
– Provision of paralegal services with a focus on gender 
(Embassy of the Netherlands, HIVOS, Oxfam)
– Provision of paralegal services with a focus on land issues 
(FAO)/land issues with a focus on gender (FAO/Embassy of 
Norway)
32 Personal interview with a representative of Save the Children, 24/08/09.
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7. CONCLUSION
When analysing these interventions in the light of the socio-legal insights 
presented in Chapter 10, we find considerable variation depending on the type of 
organisation providing aid and the kind of actor they partner up with at national 
and grassroots level. As mentioned earlier, most multilateral and bilateral donors 
active in the justice sector adopted a state centric approach to justice sector 
aid.33 For its part, the government, their main partner, had no policy on how to 
implement the principle of legal pluralism enshrined in the National Constitution 
with regard to other informal justice providers apart from the community courts. 
In this context, the Danish bilateral cooperation, the only donor that provided 
support for informal justice, concentrated exclusively on the community courts, 
while the vast array of other local justice providers remained invisible.
While there is nothing wrong in supporting state justice institutions, a 
legally plural approach implies that the relationship of state institutions and other 
regulatory forces present in a certain locality is empirically studied and taken as 
the point of departure for devising interventions. In this regard, the problem is 
not so much a lack of studies, but rather that little is done with them. An example 
of this is the project financed by the EU and UNDP for improving access to justice 
at local level by building district courts that house all state justice actors. These 
‘Citizen’s Forums of Justice’ were built in three pilot districts and informal justice 
providers were instructed in seminaries when to transfer cases to these courts, 
assuming that they will automatically do so and that local justice seekers have 
nothing to say in this. Socio-legal studies demonstrate that the provision of justice 
is highly influenced by political stakes leading forums to ‘shop’ for disputes and 
justice seekers to ‘shop’ for forums (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981). Existing studies 
show clearly that this applies to Mozambique (Kyed, 2009; Lubkemann et al., 
2011). This project could have incorporated a component on research about local 
justice provision in the districts were these courts were built in order to assess 
informal justice providers’ and justice seekers’ expectations and stakes. This kind 
of knowledge could have served as the basis for the organisation of discussions 
between locally available justice providers, formal and informal on equal footing, 
in collaboration with NGOs and other local stakeholders, about existing views on 
how to improve access to justice and how to negotiate competing interests in this 
domain. Moreover, it is not only informal justice providers who need training 
about formal justice. State court judges could also benefit from trainings about 
informal justice and legal pluralism. With the exception of the CFJJ/FAO, who 
train formal judges on their oversight function in cases of customary land tenure, 
no international actor provided support for capacity building of formal justice 
providers in the area of legal pluralism or for exchange and dialogue between 
33 Personal interviews with donors providing aid to the justice sector, Maputo, August–
September 2009.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   185 21-4-2015   12:29:20
186 Intersentia
Giselle Corradi
2n
d  p
ro
of
formal and informal justice providers. In other words, interventions should 
acknowledge that state law is not hegemonic and that it is more in tune with reality 
to generate legitimate spaces for building trust and addressing contested issues 
(Sage et al., 2010). Mozambique has already experienced such a participatory 
process at a much broader scale when it adopted the Land Law in the mid-1990s, 
with the support of the FAO (Tanner, 2002). This experience could serve as an 
example of how donors can promote inclusive negotiations in politically sensitive 
arenas.
In a similar vein, the initiatives financed by DANIDA in the area of community 
courts do not reflect an engagement with empirical realities of legal pluralism, 
but rather with legal pluralism as it is defined by state laws and policies. Though 
there is no doubt that community courts need support, what is questioned here 
is the exclusive focus on these forums, whereas the reality on the ground shows 
that local justice provision is much more polycentric. This is surprising since 
DANIDA has financed important research projects that document this.34 But 
even in the case of the community courts engagement seems to be weak, as it is 
evidenced by the lack of interest donors show on existing law reform proposals to 
regulate the community courts.
At the level of international NGOs and their domestic partners, most 
organisations consulted for this research seemed to adopt a more empirical 
approach to legal pluralism and collaborate with a broader range of informal 
justice providers, or even create new layers of local justice provision as it is the 
case of paralegal organisations. However, such activities were undertaken with a 
focus on specific ‘themes’, such as the promotion of women’s and children’s rights 
and access to land, rather than from the perspective of how multiple forms of 
justice provision co-exist at local level and the impact thereof.
In terms of the strategies supported for the promotion of human rights 
within local justice processes, here again we find a tendency towards more state 
centric approaches supported by donors in partnership with the government, 
as compared to the kind of initiatives supported and implemented by NGOs. 
As the previous section shows, most of the interventions to promote human 
rights entailed education for informal justice providers about state law and the 
dissemination of national laws at grassroots level. While community authorities 
may welcome any form of capacity building, a legally plural approach would 
incorporate a discussion on how state laws relate to local norms and practices, 
and would open spaces for dialogue and inputs ‘from below’ on the extent to 
which this legislation responds to local realities. Similarly, the dissemination of 
national laws at grassroots level without reference to local experiences implies that 
local actors are left alone in the task of ‘mediating’ between competing normative 
repertoires. As exemplified by the comments of the teacher who considered that 
34 B. de Sousa Santos and C. Trindade, Conflito e Transformação Social: Uma Paisagem das 
Justiças em Moçambique, 2003.
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children’s rights undermine the authority of adults, not taking seriously these 
local perspectives implies a risk that human rights are seen as illegitimate and 
are therefore not respected. Dialogic approaches hold better promise as they take 
such concerns seriously and engage in a process of arriving together at solutions 
that combine local and transnational forms of knowledge.
Finally, the provision of paralegal services adds a new layer of justice provision 
to an already highly populated justice landscape. The fact that these initiatives 
often adopt a gender perspective means that they can potentially empower 
disadvantaged groups, such as women, by making available knowledge and 
mediating capacities that resonate with their stakes. However, this entails a shift 
in power relations that is likely to meet resistance. Therefore, though in principle 
these initiatives have the potential to promote women’s rights, it is necessary 
to monitor the extent to which their promise is realised and to understand the 
factors that interplay with their results.
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CHAPTER 13
BEYOND DICHOTOMIES: 
A CASE STUDY ON SIERRA LEONE
Giselle Corradi
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how international development actors providing aid to the 
justice sector in Sierra Leone position themselves in view of legal pluralism and 
the promotion of human rights in local justice processes. The chapter begins with 
an overview of the main colonial and post-colonial developments that led to the 
current justice landscape and institutional framework for legal pluralism. After 
describing the main features of the latter and their main challenges in terms of 
human rights, the chapter depicts how international development actors engage 
with these realities and maps their interventions. The concluding discussion 
analyses the latter in the light of the socio-legal insights presented in Chapter 10 
and argues that these interventions tend to reflect a dichotomous view of legal 
pluralism, in terms of the dual system that is established by law, in contrast to 
a legally plural perspective that considers the interaction amongst multiple 
co-existing legal actors and normative orders.
2. COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL 
BACKGROUND OF LEGAL PLURALISM
As described in Chapter 4, Sierra Leone gained independency from the British in 
1961. Before then, the territory of modern Freetown and the Western peninsula 
became a British Crown Colony in 1808 and was governed by English law. In 1896, 
a Protectorate was further established to govern the provincial areas by indirect 
rule (Alie, 1990: 112–164). Under this system, the British colonial administration 
ruled over rural Sierra Leone by co-opting and subordinating traditional 
authorities to their power, while at the same time enhancing these authorities’ 
power over their populations (Maru, 2006; Alie, 1990). As a result, chiefdoms 
were created as administrative units, paramount chiefs were designated as their 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   189 21-4-2015   12:29:20
190 Intersentia
Giselle Corradi
2n
d  p
ro
of
rulers and the Native Courts Act was passed, giving chiefs authority to adjudicate 
customary law in their chiefdoms (Maru, 2005: 18, 19; Alie, 1990: 134–135, 
152–153). After independence in 1961, the Local Courts Act was passed (1963), 
replacing native courts by local courts and the power of chiefs to administer 
justice was passed onto local court chairmen. In this way, a recognised version of 
customary law continued to be part of the formal legal system of Sierra Leone to 
date, albeit with the many changes introduced during colonial and post colonial 
administrations.1
With the end of the civil war in 2002, new opportunities opened up for 
reviewing the organisation of justice in Sierra Leone.2 In part, this results from the 
fact that the weaknesses found in the administration of justice after the conflict 
were not only associated to the legacy of the war itself, but went back to pre-
war times (Thompson, 2002: 5). During the conflict, the judiciary was severely 
affected at all levels (Keen, 2003: 74). State institutions, including magistrate 
courts, were systematically targeted, bringing the activities of formal courts in 
the provinces to almost a complete halt (Thompson, 2002: 10). In those regions 
where local courts were not attacked, they continued to function but without 
any government support, the – often arbitrary – fines being their only source of 
income (Thompson, 2002: 11). The role of chiefs in the administration of justice 
was also affected during wartime, since they were specifically targeted during the 
conflict (Archibald and Richards, 2002: 344). All these processes led to a complex 
justice landscape, which is described in the next section.
3. THE JUSTICE LANDSCAPE AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR LEGAL PLURALISM
Sierra Leone has a dual legal system, where two types of official law operate 
concurrently. On the one hand there is general law, which is often called ‘the formal 
system’, including the Constitution, laws made by Parliament and common law. 
On the other hand there is an institutionalised customary law system, often called 
‘semi-formal’, which is recognised by the Constitution as part of common law and 
which is defined as ‘the rules of law’, which by custom are applicable to particular 
communities in Sierra Leone.3 The formal legal system comprises the Supreme 
Court, the appeals courts, the high courts and the magistrate courts.4 These 
1 For a discussion of the changes brought about in customary law by the colonial rule see Kent, 
2007; Manning, 2008a: footnote 27; Archibald and Richards, 2002: 343.
2 For a description of the causes and development of the civil war in Sierra Leone, as well as the 
transitional justice process see chapter.
3 The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, Section 170.
4 Magistrate courts are courts of first instance for civil disputes below Le 250,000 (about USD 
68) or criminal offences where the punishment is a prison sentence of less than three years, 
or up to seven years if the accused consents. A magistrate court can also be constituted by 
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courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate serious crimes, civil claims in Freetown 
and some civil and claims throughout the provinces.5 However, different studies 
on the legal systems in Sierra Leone point to the fact that the formal system is 
not the dominant mode of dispute resolution for the larger majority of Sierra 
Leoneans (Manning, 2008a; Dale, 2008, 2007; Baker, 2005; Alterman et al., 
2002). One of the reasons for this is the inaccessibility of these courts in terms of 
distance, costs – including direct costs for filing a case – any possible fines, time 
and transportation (Dale, 2007: 1–2). Moreover, there exist a number of social and 
cultural barriers, such as language, formality, lack of information and lack of trust 
(Dale, 2007: 1–2). ‘Local courts’ are formally and legally empowered to hear and 
determine cases of customary law issues in the provinces.6 They have jurisdiction 
within their chiefdom over all civil cases governed by customary law, all civil 
cases governed by general law where the claim does not exceed 250,000 Leones, 
and all criminal cases, where the sentence does not exceed six months or the fine 
does not exceed 50,000 Leones, though in practice these limits are not always 
respected (Kent, 2007: 523).7 This customary system is linked to the formal one by 
means of an appeal procedure that places the former below the hierarchy of the 
latter. In theory, a party unsatisfied with the decision of a local court can appeal 
to the districts appeal courts, which consists of a district magistrate sitting with 
two assessors who are experts in customary law. Appeals to this court are to the 
local appeals division of the high court, which is constituted by a high court judge 
sitting with two assessors. Appeals from decisions of the high court lie to the 
court of appeal and finally to the Supreme Court. In practice though, the appeals 
procedure is rarely used.8 In addition, the law foresees regional customary law 
officers, who are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and whose functions are to 
advice on matters related to customary law and revise local courts’ decisions, but 
there are only three officers for the whole country.9
two ‘justices of the peace’ or lay magistrates. High courts have original jurisdiction for cases 
exceeding that.
5 Sierra Leone is divided into three provincial areas: Southern province, Eastern province 
and Northern province and the Western area, which comprises Freetown, the capital. Each 
province is divided into districts (12 in total), which are further divided into Chiefdoms (149 
in total) and these are divided into sections. Magistrate courts can be found in the provinces 
up to the district level.
6 According to Sierra Leone’s senior customary law officer, there are 300 local courts spread 
evenly in the country at chiefdom level, except for the Western area. Personal interview, Bo, 
14/04/09.
7 Criminal cases, such as murder or armed robbery are mainly reported to the Sierra Leonean 
police, personal interviews, Bo, April 2009; See also Archibald and Richards, 2002: 343.
8 Personal interviews, Freetown, April 2009; See also Manning, 2008a: 5.
9 Interview with customary law officer, Bo, 14/04/09.
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This dual system can be illustrated with the following graphic:
Figure 4. The institutional framework for legal pluralism in Sierra Leone
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Alongside these official legal actors, there operate a range of traditional justice 
instances and authorities, such as paramount chiefs’, section chiefs’ and village 
chiefs’ courts, religious leaders, professional circle leaders, gender and youth 
leaders, village elders and family heads, secret societies, and sorcerers (Sawyer, 
2008; Manning, 2008a; Manning et al., 2006; Baker, 2005; Kane et al., 2005; 
Alterman et al., 2002; Archibald and Richards, 2002). Chiefs are present in each 
human settlement in Sierra Leone and they are legally empowered to mediate 
or arbitrate but not to adjudicate, though in practice they often do (Manning, 
2008a: 6; Manning et al., 2006: 13). They play an important role in solving 
disputes and providing more affordable and speedy solutions to conflicts (Sawyer, 
2008), but their popularity varies from chiefdom to chiefdom (Manning et al., 
2006). Religious leaders also play a role in mediation, as do women, youth and 
professional circle leaders regarding intra group disputes (Alterman, et al., 2002: 
30–31; Manning, 2008a: 7).10 In addition, paralegals and peace monitors are 
often approached for advice and mediation, where modern and traditional laws 
and views of justice are combined in the treatment of cases with high rates of 
satisfaction (Sawyer, 2008; Maru, 2006: 427–476; Baker, 2005: 381). Sorcerers and 
supernatural forces are part of the informal legal landscape too (Manning, 2008a; 
Sawyer, 2008; Alie, 2008; Fanthorpe, 2007; Kane et al., 2005; Alterman et al., 2002). 
Belief in the supernatural seems to be quite strong in some communities and 
infractions of certain rules are feared to bring illness and misfortune, not only to 
the person in question but also to the community (Alie, 2008: 136). Diviners are 
often relied upon for the identification of culprits or for planting curses (Sawyer, 
2008; Kane, 2005: 15; Alterman et al., 2002: 33). In addition, certain matters are 
10 According to the 2004 National Census, 77% of Sierra Leoneans are Muslim, 21% are Christian 
and 2% follow no religion, but the majority combine the latter with traditional beliefs 
(Manning, 2008a: footnote 43).
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handled by sodality groups called secret societies (Fanthorpe, 2007: 4; Kane, 2005: 
15; Alterman et al., 2002: 31–32). These are single sex communities, the purpose 
of which is to regulate sexual identity and social conduct, while canalising and 
controlling powers of the spirit world (Fanthorpe, 2007: ii, 1). They prepare men 
and women for adult life by means of initiation ceremonies, forming solidarity 
networks amongst age groups who are initiated in the same event (Fanthorpe, 
2007).11 Their activities include meetings that are only open to society members 
and where decisions are taken affecting many aspects of open communal life. 
These institutions are deeply rooted in Sierra Leonean culture (Fanthorpe, 
2007), though according to some reports their importance is in decline in some 
communities (Manning, 2008a: 7). However, because of their very nature, their 
actual role and functioning in terms of justice administration remains difficult 
for outsiders to assess.
4. THE HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE
Several aspects of the social organisation in Sierra Leone have been identified 
as marginalising and unfair. In human rights terms, this comes down to the 
exclusion of many Sierra Leoneans, and in particular certain categories of persons, 
such as women, children, ‘youth’ and ‘strangers’, from civil and political rights, 
as well as social and economic rights.12 In varying degrees, this is reflected at all 
layers of the administration of justice, and it would be inaccurate to regard this 
problem as one of customary justice. At a formal level, Sierra Leone is signatory to 
the main international and regional human rights conventions. Treaty provisions 
have to be domesticated into national laws, which according to the Sierra Leonean 
Human Rights Commission, has not been satisfactorily done.13 For example, the 
National Constitution is contradictory in that some sections grant the protection 
of the rights of women and discourage discrimination – section 6(2), whereas 
other sections allow discrimination under laws of adoption, marriage, divorce, 
burial, property and aspects of personal law – section 27. In 2007, the government 
of Sierra Leone enacted the Gender Acts, i.e. the Domestic Violence Act, the 
Devolution of Estates Act and the Registration of Customary Marriage Act, as 
well as the Child Act in order to domesticate the Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. This legislation represents an advancement in the protection of 
11 In rural Sierra Leone, initiation is a requisite for full integration of the individual as a 
community member. In the case of women, this includes circumcision (Fanthorpe, 2007).
12 The term ‘stranger’ refers to a migrant from another region of the country, whereas ‘youth’ is 
not necessarily defined by age, but rather socially as a person that is unmarried, landless and 
without economic and political power (Manning, 2008b: 2).
13 Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, The State of Human Rights in Sierra Leone 2007, 
p. ix.
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women’s and children’s rights, though certain areas still fall short of international 
standards, such as the silence regarding the prohibition of female circumcision 
(Mannah, 2007).
The discrimination of women in customary law and justice is one of the most 
problematic human rights issues throughout the entire country (Human Rights 
Commission of Sierra Leone, 2007: 22; CEDAW Report Sierra Leone, 2006; 
Amnesty International, 2006). At present, customary justice in its various forms 
tends to be male-dominated and patriarchal, which is reflected in traditional 
laws related to land tenure and inheritance, where women are not allowed to own 
or inherit property, in customary marriages, where women fulfil a subservient 
role towards their partners, in the husband’s right to punish his wife, and in the 
exclusion of women from participation in many spheres of political life, amongst 
other issues. These discriminatory customs result in widespread violations of 
women’s most basic human rights, including lack of access to a fair hearing, 
unlawful imprisonments and punishments, a lack of respect for their physical 
integrity, disrespect for their property rights, as in the case of forceful evictions 
from their homes and land, as well as high levels of domestic and sexual violence, 
which represents a significant obstacle to reducing poverty.14
Children are also subject to discrimination, particularly in the case of the 
girls. Clear examples of discriminatory practices are the forced betrothal of girls 
and early marriage, which are often related to dowry transactions. Moreover, only 
local ‘citizens’ have access to local courts, whereas ‘strangers’ can only access a 
local court through a local citizen protector (Archibald and Richards, 2002: 344).15 
Another salient feature of customary law is its oral character, which in many cases 
has resulted in manipulation, abusive fines and arbitrary trials (Archibald and 
Richards, 2002). Corporal punishments were reported to be in decline, though 
this is probably the case at local courts and adjudication by chiefs, whereas it 
remains unclear if it is also the case within secret societies.16
5. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOCAL LEGAL 
ORDERS
The interviewed development actors reported not to follow a specific or official 
policy regarding legal pluralism as such. Concerning the institutions associated 
with customary justice and traditional authority in particular, most international 
14 For instance, according to the testimony of a woman from Kenema town, local court officials 
put her in a box in public all day to humiliate her as a punishment for not signing divorce papers 
that would deprive her and her children of any maintenance rights (Amnesty International, 
2006: 5, 6).
15 ‘Local citizens’ are persons from the town, whereas ‘strangers’ are migrants from other regions 
of the country.
16 Personal interviews, April 2009. According to some authors, human sacrifices are carried out 
within the secret societies in order to assuage the spirits. Bellman, 1975, in Fanthorpe, 2007.
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development actors acknowledged the need to engage with these structures. 
In most cases, the main rationale was access to justice, i.e. in the absence of state 
justice these institutions perform an important role (DFID, UNDP, UNIPSIL), 
but some actors also emphasised the intrinsic value of these institutions, in the 
sense that they are less adversarial and contain a dimension related to social 
harmony and cohesion that is missing within state justice (UNDP, UNIPSIL, 
UNFPA). In addition, there was a general perception that it was necessary to 
make traditional authorities and local level justice institutions more downwardly 
accountable in order to avoid a repetition of the circumstances that led to the 
violence. In this regard, a recurrent discourse amongst development actors was 
that it is necessary to do away with the negative features of customary justice, 
while preserving the good ones. Amongst the negative features that development 
actors associated with customary justice we found are its unwritten character, 
which would result in legal uncertainty and abusive practices, and the fact that 
customary justice is male-dominated, resulting in discrimination of the basis of 
gender. Other challenges included the local character of customary law, i.e. that it 
varies from community to community.
Regarding the kind of interventions that development actors supported in 
order to address these challenges, we found four main strategies, each dealing 
with customary justice at a different level: first, the enactment of legislation 
at a national level regulating problematic aspects of customary law; second, 
interventions at the level of local courts, such as the restatement of customary law 
and capacity building, including human rights education for local court personnel; 
third, sensitisation and human rights training for traditional authorities, and 
fourth, human rights awareness raising activities at grassroots level. In addition, 
we found a series of initiatives, the main objective of which was not to address 
the tension between customary justice and human rights as such, but which in 
practice deliver a significant contribution to this end. This is the case of paralegal 
services and peace monitoring schemes, which create new local layers of justice.
At a national level, the above-mentioned Gender and Child Acts were 
adopted in 2007 with the support of UNIFEM. This legislation introduced a new 
framework for the regulation of several aspects of customary law. The Registration 
of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act provides for the registration of customary 
marriages and divorces so that marital status can be proved. In addition, it forbids 
marriage below the age of 18 and it requires the consent of both parties. It also 
confers on women the right to acquire and dispose of property in their own 
right, and it abolishes the return of dowry in case of divorce or separation. The 
Devolution of Estates Act modifies customary law by introducing a principle that 
both husband and wife have the right to inherit property from each other. In 
addition, male and female children are given the same inheritance rights. Further, 
it prohibits involuntary wife inheritance. Finally, the Domestic Violence Act 
introduced a new offence of domestic violence, which should modify the stance 
of customary justice towards condoning certain forms of conduct, such as wife 
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battering. The Child Act refers to the prohibition of forced marriage and dowry 
transactions and it provides for the right to inherit from parents, whether or not a 
child was born in wedlock. However, these steps are seriously undermined by the 
fact that section 27(4)(d) of the Constitution, which takes precedence over these 
laws, tolerates discrimination with respect to ‘adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, 
devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law’ (Kamara, 2008).
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs (MSWGCA) 
was the lead agency in the implementation of this legislation through a three year 
(2009–2011) ‘Strategic Roll Out Plan’, which included a series of initiatives related 
to primary justice (MSWGCA, n.d.). This plan was developed with the technical 
support of the Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone, the International 
Rescue Committee, UNIOSIL and Action Aid, and with the financial support of 
UNIFEM and Irish Aid. However, the implementation of this plan was seriously 
undermined by a lack of funding and capacity. The MSWGCA had one of the 
smallest budgets, with current government priorities lying elsewhere. As a result, 
by the time of our visit to Sierra Leone, the Ministry had not been able to attract 
the necessary funding and these activities could not yet be properly undertaken.17
In addition, a ‘Local Courts Bill’ was in the process of being drafted with 
the support of the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP).18 This law 
reform aimed at depoliticising the local courts and reviewing aspects of their 
functioning that interfere with the right to a fair trial, such as the appointment of 
local court chairmen on the recommendation of chiefs. In the proposed Bill such 
appointments are transferred to the Chief Justice, on the recommendation of a 
‘local court service committee’.19
Local courts were targeted by different initiatives, the ‘restatement’ of 
customary law and human rights education being amongst the main ones. Under 
a pilot project of JSDP in Moyamba district, a ‘restatement’ of the customary law 
of the local courts of the 14 chiefdoms of the district was completed. The exercise 
was carried out by the senior customary law officer of Sierra Leone assisted by 
local court clerks, who by means of consultation with the communities and 
traditional authorities arrived at a first written version in English of the customary 
laws in place. The purpose of this intervention was to register the customary laws 
at the level of local courts in order to identify the areas that contravene human 
rights and modify them. Once approved by the Ministry of Justice and the local 
traditional authorities, this would serve as a model to be scaled up to eventually 
17 Interview with an official from the MSWGCA, Freetown, 17/04/09.
18 JSDP was a five-year programme (2005–2010) of the Government of Sierra Leone for the 
justice sector funded by the UK Department for International Development and managed by 
the British Council. This programme was followed by the programme ‘Improved Access to 
Security and Justice Programme in Sierra Leone’ (IASJP, 2010–2013).
19 Paramount chiefs would continue to form part of these committees, but their influence would 
be limited by the presence of other members. Interview at Court Monitoring Programme, 
07/04/09; Interview at JSDP, 09/04/09.
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   196 21-4-2015   12:29:21
Intersentia 197
Chapter 13.  Beyond Dichotomies: A Case Study on Sierra Leone
2n
d  p
ro
of
arrive at a national codification of customary laws.20 Even though codification has 
been generally rejected by most scholars on the basis that it ‘freezes’ tradition, in 
Sierra Leone the dominant view amongst most national and international actors 
was that the unwritten character of customary law led to uncertainty and abuse, 
which can be remedied by writing it down and making it publicly known.21 In 
this sense, it is worth noticing that the customary law that would be registered 
is the one used at the level of the local courts, leaving aside the norms that guide 
disputing processes within the many other local forums that exist in Sierra Leone.
In addition, research on the functioning of local courts led JSDP to conclude 
that there was a need for capacity building, so a training manual was developed 
for this purpose, including a module on procedures and jurisdiction of the local 
courts, a module on human rights, and a module on records management, which 
was used to train the local courts’ staff. Support to the capacity of local courts 
extended to infrastructure as well, with the provision of material for record 
keeping, which would be used in case of appeals. Further, the United Nations 
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and UNDP supported 
human rights monitoring and training at local courts in collaboration with the 
customary law officer.22
Chiefs and traditional authorities were mainly targeted for sensitisation 
about human rights. Such was the case of UNICEF’s initiative ‘Chiefs Champions 
for Children’, which aimed at getting traditional chiefs to promote girl child 
education, and denounce early marriages and female circumcision, amongst 
other acts.23 The United Nations Population Fund supported the formation of 
community leaders’ networks, with the purpose of reinforcing their capacity to 
promote human rights and the Pilot Project of JSDP in Moyamba district has also 
involved traditional authorities in their ‘task force’, including a paramount chief 
who is a member of the human rights committee.24 All these initiatives aimed at 
generating the collaboration of traditional authorities in the promotion of human 
rights, which would eventually be reflected in the incorporation of human rights 
ideas in the way they deal with conflict resolution.
At the same time, chiefs were sensitised to devolve adjudication to the local 
courts, which would result in fairer trials.25 The World Bank’s ‘Justice for the Poor’ 
programme in Sierra Leone conducted research on processes of justice delivery 
20 Interview with an official from the JSDP, Freetown, 09/04/09; Interview with Customary Law 
Officer, Bo, 14/04/09; Interview with an official from the JSDP, Moyamba, 15/04/09.
21 Personal interviews, April 2009. See also Kane et al., 2005: 24, 25.
22 Interview with an official from UNIPSIL, Freetown, 08/04/09. See also UNDP, 2009.
23 Interview with an official from UNICEF local office, Freetown, 08/04/09.
24 Interview with officials from United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) local office, Freetown, 
06/04/09 and Interview with Paramount Chief Joseph Ali-Kavura Kongomah II, Fakunya 
Chiefdom, 15/04/09.
25 All national and international organisations that were interviewed coincided in agreeing that 
the role of chiefs should be to mediate or arbitrate but not to adjudicate. Personal interviews, 
April 2009.
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and decision-making at grassroots level and concluded that chiefs should be 
empowered to mediate and arbitrate on disputes, but not to adjudicate, as a means 
to assure their social legitimacy and downwards accountability. This was taken 
up by the JSDP, which foresaw the sensitisation of chiefs so that they would focus 
on mediation and derive cases that need to be adjudicated to the local courts.26 
This was complemented by informing communities about the official role of the 
chiefs in the justice sector and by encouraging people to reconcile rather than 
resorting to chiefs’ courts for adjudication.
In addition, different awareness raising campaigns were organised with 
the goal of promoting a better understanding of the justice sector and an 
internalisation of human rights at the grassroots. For example, JSDP and the 
Lawyers Centre for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA) supported the dissemination 
of the Gender and Child Acts at community level and UNICEF supported the 
incorporation of new curricula at schools, where children learn about their rights 
and more progressive gender roles.27 In addition, illiterate people were targeted 
by radio programmes, community drama and storytelling, community cinema 
projections and music. The use of theatre, social drama, storytelling and songs for 
the promotion of community discussions on traditional values and human rights 
were reported to be popular techniques for opening up discussions on human 
rights issues by building on the African oral tradition.28 In doing this, some actors 
tried to identify local practices and ideas that reinforced those values that can be 
found in human rights, so that the concept would not be perceived as strange or 
as coming from outside.29
Finally, paralegals and ‘peace monitors’ were also expected to raise human 
rights awareness at the grassroots. These organisations did not address the 
tension between customary justice and human rights directly, but they provided 
different services at community level, such as mediation, education, advocacy and 
free legal services, thereby constituting an alternative to other local channels to 
seek justice.30 Working with local respected people facilitated the acceptance of 
these schemes that, in principle, constitute some form of ‘competition’ with local 
traditional authorities. This was mitigated by a search for cooperation and mutual 
involvement, and by seeking to reinterpret local customs in line with human 
rights, rather than challenging them altogether. Amongst the main paralegal 
organisations engaging in these activities we found Timap for Justice, who was 
supported by OSISA. In addition, the British NGO ‘Conciliation Resources’ 
provided support for community mediation schemes and ‘peace monitors’, which 
26 Interview with an officer of J4P, Freetown, 09/04/09.
27 Interview with an official from UNICEF local office, Freetown, 08/04/09.
28 Interview with an activist from ‘Community Organization for Mobilization and Empower-
ment’ (COME) Sierra Leone, Bo, 14/04/09. These activities have been financed by JSDP. See 
also Jalloh and Braima, 2008.
29 Interview with officials from UNFPA local office, Freetown, 06/04/09.
30 Interview with a member of ‘Timap for Justice’, Freetown 09/04/09, Interview with a member 
of ‘Timap for Justice’, Bo 14/04/09.
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are respected individuals in their communities, including sometimes the chiefs. 
The peace monitors received training on conflict management techniques and 
human rights, which was linked to local traditional methods of compromise 
and conflict settlement. The aim of this project was that during meetings and 
dialogues, the peace facilitators, the conflicting parties and community members 
analyse the causes, consequences and solutions to their problems.31 The following 
chart presents a mapping of these interventions according to the typology 
developed in Chapter 8:
Type of interventions At state level At customary level
Law reform interventions – Enactment of legislation 
regulating the content of 
customary law (the ‘Gender 
Laws’ and the ‘Child Act’ of 
2005) (UNIFEM)
– Ascertainment of customary 
laws applied by local courts 
(DFID)
– Theatre, storytelling and 
songs for the promotion of 
community discussions on 
traditional values and human 
rights (DFID)
Institutional support/reform 
interventions 
– Modification of appointment 
procedures for local court 
chairmen (DFID)
– Infrastructural support for 
local court buildings (DFID)
– Provision of record keeping 
material for local courts 
(DFID)
– Ad hoc monitoring of local 
courts (UNIPSIL)
Strengthening of the legal 
community (justice providers)
– Training on human rights for 
local court personnel (DFID)
– Training on record keeping 
(DFID)
– Sensitisation on human 
rights for chiefs (UNICEF, 
UNFPA, DFID)
Empowering justice users – Provision of paralegals and community mediation schemes 
(Open Society Justice Initiative; Conciliation Resources)
– Awareness raising on human rights (DFID) and Education on 
national laws (LAWCLA)
– Incorporation of new curricula at school where children learn 
about human rights (UNICEF, UNFPA)
31 Interview with a member of ‘Conciliation Resources’, Freetown, 08/04/09; interview with 
members of ‘Conciliation Resources’ Bo, 14/04/09; interview with members of ‘Peace and 
Reconciliation Movement’, Bo, 14/04/09.
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6. CONCLUSION
Even though in Sierra Leone the bulk of aid remains channelled towards state 
justice institutions, we see a relatively high awareness of the importance of 
customary justice amongst the discourses of most development actors active in 
the justice sector.32 In practice, we see that the majority of interventions targeting 
customary justice in the context of justice sector aid focused on the local courts, 
whereas other customary justice forums, such as chiefs, elders, group leaders, 
etc. occupied a less prominent place.33 This reflects a dichotomous view of legal 
pluralism that mirrors the way in which legal pluralism is established by law, 
i.e. ‘formal courts’ vs. ‘local courts’, in contrast to more empirical perspectives 
on legal pluralism, based on how justice seekers relate to the vast array of local 
justice providers that co-exist at local level. The Justice for the Poor programme 
of the World Bank seemed to adopt a more empirical perspective by exploring 
how disputes are handled locally and how grassroots actors experience justice. 
This programme, which mainly consisted in research, has the potential to deliver 
critical insights for the design of future justice sector interventions.
As described above, the local courts were the target of most initiatives 
addressing customary justice, such as the restatement of customary laws, 
infrastructural support, and training on record keeping and human rights. 
Chiefs on the other hand were targeted more marginally as justice actors, the 
main initiative being their sensitisation so that they would only mediate but not 
adjudicate disputes and so that they would respect and promote human rights. 
Given the political nature of justice provision (Von Benda Beckmann, 1981; 
Kyed, 2009), the power of chiefs in rural areas in Sierra Leone (Jackson, 2011), 
the problematic way in which local courts operate in terms of delivering equitable 
justice (Castillejo, 2009), and the limited power of formal courts and state 
authorities to regulate the conduct of chiefs (Albrecht, 2010), it is questionable 
whether this strategy is realistic and likely to deliver any improvement in terms 
of access to justice and human rights for marginalised groups. The ‘Local Courts 
Bill’ could counterbalance this situation since the procedures for the appointment 
of local court chairmen would be modified by increasing the number of local 
stakeholders that are involved in the selection, making it more transparent.
As regards the strategies supported for the promotion of human rights within 
local justice processes, we see that efforts were made to ‘localise’ international 
standards. This is exemplified by those initiatives that sought to build alliances 
with internal actors of change, such as progressive chiefs and local leaders, and 
by those initiatives that tried to find local equivalents to the values found in 
32 According to Albrecht, the ‘Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme (IASJP) 
that was designed in 2010 to follow up the JSDP pays more attention to ‘non-state justice and 
security actors’ (Albrecht, 2010).
33 This contrasts with the prominent role that chiefs occupied within post-war interventions that 
aimed at restoring governance and security structures in the countryside (Jackson et al., 2011).
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human rights so that the latter are not perceived as alien, what Merry calls the 
‘vernacularisation’ or ‘indigenisation’ of human rights (Merry, 2006). Moreover, 
the initiatives that incorporated storytelling and drama as a means to promote 
community debates seemed to reflect a dynamic view of culture and customary 
justice. Attention for the role of education on progressive gender roles at school 
also reflected a holistic view of how to achieve results in this area by generating 
broader processes of social change, rather than focusing on ‘fixing a justice system 
in isolation’ (Isser and Chopra, 2010). However, these interventions were seldom 
linked to an analysis of how power and resources are distributed at local level 
and how these issues affect access to human rights. Similarly, the pilot initiative 
to restate the customary laws in Moyamba district, which would eventually 
bring customary laws in line with human rights, shows little consideration for 
the ‘negotiated’ characteristics of customary justice provision, in which power 
relations are central, and overemphasises the role of ‘rules’ in determining the 
outcome of disputes.
The provision of paralegal services and mediation schemes at grassroots level, 
which create a new ‘layer’ of locally available justice, did reflect a more ‘power 
informed’ perspective as these actors constitute an alternative for marginalised 
justice seekers that may counterbalance the power of other local justice providers. 
However, the extent to which these actors are actually contributing to a 
redistribution of resources and more equitable power relations at local level is 
something that deserves more study.
All in all, we can conclude that in Sierra Leone there seems to be a considerable 
degree of awareness amongst development actors of the importance of considering 
changing local level justice processes into policies and interventions in the justice 
sector. During interviews and focus group discussions, donor representatives 
pointed out that one of the crucial factors in this regard was the openness of the 
government of Sierra Leone to discuss these issues. The recommendation of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to revise oppressive features 
of customary structures in order to avoid a repetition of violence seems to play an 
important role in this. However, the interventions examined in this chapter show 
that this concern with ‘justice at a local level’ does not always imply a concern 
with ‘legal pluralism’ and the way in which different justice providers interact and 
influence each other. Future interventions could benefit from incorporating such 
a perspective as this impacts on access to justice and human rights.
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CHAPTER 14
TRADITIONAL LAW THROUGH A STATE 
LENS: A CASE STUDY ON ZAMBIA
Lia Nijzink
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how international development actors providing aid to 
the justice sector in Zambia position themselves regarding legal pluralism and 
the promotion of human rights within traditional law. The chapter begins with 
an overview of the main colonial and post-colonial developments in the field of 
law and justice. After describing the main features of the justice landscapes of 
Zambia and their main challenges in terms of human rights, the chapter depicts 
how international development actors engage with these realities and provides 
a mapping of their interventions. As in the case of Malawi (see Chapter 9), the 
conclusion shows that because most interventions in the justice sector were aimed 
at the formal legal system, the way in which the state approaches the justice sector 
and the role of traditional law in it plays a crucial role in development actors’ 
position vis-à-vis legal pluralism and local legal orders.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Northern Rhodesia, now known as Zambia, came under British colonial rule in 
1899. The British colonial government introduced common law and a Western 
legal system, while at the same time recognising customary law and traditional 
forms of dispute settlement, especially in private law matters. This created a 
bifurcated or dual legal system in which certain courts mainly applied imported 
Western law, while other courts applied traditional law (Chanock, 1985).
Traditional leaders took seat in the so-called Native Courts and paramount 
chiefs took part in the Native Courts of Appeal. The district and provincial 
commissioners functioned as appellate courts for these traditional courts. 
Members of the Native Courts were appointed by the Governor, who also decided 
which private and criminal cases fell under their authority. It was the task of the 
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Native Courts to apply customary law as long as this did not conflict with morality 
and natural law. There was a clerk in every Native Court, meaning that cases 
were documented and presented to the district commissioner for revisions. The 
commissioner could, if he deemed it necessary, revise the ruling or the penalty, 
refer the case back to the Native Court or take on the case again himself.
When Zambia became independent in 1964, the two justice systems were 
integrated: the Native Courts were incorporated in the judiciary and obtained, 
with certain limitation, jurisdiction both over cases that fell under Western law 
and customary law cases. Their authority no longer depended on the ethnicity 
of the law user, which is why the Native Courts were replaced by the so-called 
local courts through the Local Courts Act in 1966. To realise a separation of 
judicial and executive powers, traditional leaders were not allowed to be part of 
these new courts. This element may have been inspired by complaints concerning 
corruption among traditional leaders and dissatisfaction about the functioning 
of traditional leaders within the Native Courts. The new local courts were 
intended to have a national character, as opposed to the geographically limited 
authority of the Native Courts. This development can be seen as a first attempt to 
promote the uniformity of customary law of the diverse ethnic groups. Another 
important step towards that goal was taken in 1989, when legislation, which 
introduced a uniform customary law system of succession, took effect (Zambia 
Law Development Commission, 2006).
At the moment there seems to be a general conviction, reflected by a report from 
the Zambia Law Development Commission (2006), which states the integration as 
aimed at in 1966 did not have the intended effect. Traditional forums for dispute 
settlement are still operational, meaning that they have not been replaced by the 
local courts, as the plan originally was. Instead there are presently two parallel 
systems for the application of traditional law – the traditional and the local courts 
– which leads to friction and quarrels over authority. An additional problem is 
that appeals for customary law cases treated by the local courts are hardly treated 
by the higher courts. These courts’ legal experts are poorly equipped to apply 
traditional law.
There are furthermore several problems specifically related to the functioning 
of local courts. Since they were established little attention has been paid to the 
quality of justice and the staff, or the physical infrastructure of the local courts. 
Although 80% of the population depends on the local courts for the settlements of 
their customary law conflicts, these courts are marginalised within the judiciary. 
At the same time there are complaints which describe the state of affairs within 
the local courts as chaotic, threatening and insensitive to gender and human 
rights.
The Zambia Law Development Commission has consequently proposed 
several quite extensive recommendations, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.
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3. THE JUSTICE LANDSCAPE
Traditional law is constitutionally recognised in Zambia. The Constitution 
determines that traditional law is applied by the local courts that are part of the 
formal legal system. The local courts have jurisdiction over private law cases that 
fall under traditional law and over certain criminal offenses. They are connected 
to the rest of the formal legal system through a system of appeals (Coldham, 1990; 
Himonga, 2008). However, daily practice shows that this appeal system and the 
so-called repugnancy clause function poorly.
Appealing to a higher court is a rare occurrence in customary law cases. 
Moreover, the parallel system of no-longer-recognised traditional law forums is 
still operational. In practice it seems that large parts of the population even prefer 
these unofficial forums for dispute settlement (ISS, 2009). There is, therefore, 
a large gap in the legal framework when it comes to the functioning of these 
traditional courts and their relation to the officially recognised local courts.
4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
PLURALISM AND PROPOSED REFORMS
The Zambia Law Development Commission (2006) developed a proposal for 
reforming the current legal framework for legal pluralism in Zambia. This proposal 
consists of several elements. Firstly, the Commission suggests the constitutional 
recognition of customary law, making it subject to human rights as included in the 
Constitution. This would make the so-called repugnancy clause void. The second 
element is the proposal to recognise the current unofficial forums of dispute 
settlement and to grant them exclusive authority in the application of traditional 
law. This would also entail the establishment of traditional appeal bodies, such as 
the House of Chiefs, although the Supreme Court is in this proposal still identified 
as the highest court of appeal for customary law cases. The proposal to recognise 
traditional law forums would mean that the current local courts would merge in 
the so-called magistrates’ courts and would no longer have any jurisdiction over 
customary law cases.
According to the Zambia Law Development Commission, this proposal aims 
to introduce a modern and flexible system of traditional law. The Commission’s 
study preceding the proposal brought several complaints about the local courts 
system to light. The fact that many women prefer unofficial traditional forums 
for dispute settlement over the local courts indicates, the Commission says, 
that the people experience the unofficial traditional forums to be more sensitive 
to gender issues and human rights. The study shows that in some cases the 
unofficial traditional forums have displayed more flexibility in accepting modern 
approaches and changes in traditional values and practices. It still remains to 
be seen whether state recognition of the informal system as proposed by the 
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Commission will reinforce these advantages, or whether the system of traditional 
law is more flexible and appeals more to the expectations of the law user precisely 
because it lacks state recognition or support.
Figure 5. The current legal framework for legal pluralism in Zambia
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Figure 6. Proposed reforms in Zambia
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These figures are a graphical representation of the institutional framework for 
legal pluralism as exists in Zambia at the moment and of the reforms proposed 
by the Zambia Law Development Commission. The dotted lines and the lighter 
colour indicate traditional bodies and actors who are not officially recognised by 
the state and therefore are not part of state-recognised legal pluralism.
5. THE HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE
In Zambia, traditional norms and practices are widespread and despite the 
existence of local courts, the traditional leaders still play an important role as 
guardians of traditional law. In some cases, chiefs and village chiefs even take the 
lead in the public debate on the tensions between human rights and traditional 
norms and practices. The most important areas in which such tensions are part 
of the public debate in Zambia are inheritance law, the problem of ‘property 
grabbing’ (the unlawful appropriation of someone else’s property), women’s 
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rights, children’s rights and the issues with arranged marriages and sexual 
relations with young girls.
The current debate shows that there is no strong lobby in Zambia that rejects 
human rights on grounds of tradition. There are, in fact, interesting examples of 
traditional leaders actively trying to accomplish a change in traditional values and 
practices. The sexual cleansing of widows, for example, is a traditional practice, 
which is heavily criticised because it unnecessarily exposes people to the dangers 
of infection with HIV/AIDS. Traditional leaders are closely involved in attempts 
to abolish these practises or to change them to such an extent that they no longer 
pose a health risk to the involved parties. Another example is adultery, which 
according to traditional law can only be committed by women. Under pressure 
from women, women’s organisations and communities some traditional leaders 
have started to treat cases, under the name of marriage interference, in which 
men have committed adultery.1
6. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOCAL LEGAL 
ORDERS
At the moment the research was conducted, DANIDA was the most important 
development actor active in the Zambia justice sector because of its Access to 
Justice programme (DANIDA, 2009). This programme intended to take the shape 
of a so-called ‘basket fund’ in which support from DANIDA, the EU and the 
German GTZ was assembled. The Access to Justice programme was coordinated by 
the Zambia Ministry of Justice and DANIDA provided technical support through 
a unit, which was installed in the judiciary for this purpose. The programme was 
exclusively aimed at the formal legal system and collaborates with a large number 
of actors in the justice sector. Within the programme there was little special 
attention for traditional law other than the immediate support to the judiciary for 
the improvement of local courts, both for the physical infrastructure and for the 
education of judges and staff.
DANIDA’s Access to Justice programme had a study carried out to investigate 
the access to justice in Zambia, so that they would be better able to oversee and 
evaluate their programme. It is still too early to assess whether this study will have 
an effect on the place traditional law has in the justice sector. For now, DANIDA’s 
involvement in traditional law seems limited to the support for local courts, and 
they oppose the proposal to abolish these and recognise the unofficial traditional 
law forums.
UNICEF had a programme aimed at improving the access to justice for 
children and to guarantee the rights of children in the criminal law process. The 
programme was coordinated by the co-called Child Justice Forum, which was 
1 Personal interviews with stakeholders, Lusaka (Zambia), November–December 2009.
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established within the judiciary. Components of the programme were education 
for judges of local courts and general awareness campaigns concerning children’s 
rights (Muntingh, 2005).
Women for Change (see www.wfc.org.zm) is an organisation from the civil 
society which receives support from several donors and international organisations 
and performs gender-related development work in Zambia’s rural areas, where 
they work with women, men and children in the communities. Its programmes 
are awareness programmes, which strive to increase knowledge concerning 
human rights and good governance, and to boost citizens’ participation in local, 
regional and national governance issues. An important part of the work, however, 
is aimed at the economic empowerment of communities in a gender-sensitive 
way, by developing practical skills and facilitating cooperations for trade, keeping 
livestock and commercial ways of growing crops.
Women for Change also carried out a programme for Zambia’s traditional 
leaders, both on a district and on a national level. These leaders received education 
about gender analysis and awareness, matters regarding HIV/AIDS and human 
and children’s rights. One of the goals of this work with traditional leaders was 
to engage them in the battle against HIV/AIDS, for example by ensuring that 
traditional practices that entail a contamination risk, such as the sexual cleansing 
of women after their husbands’ death, are abolished or changed. Finally, Women 
for Change brought traditional leaders of the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) together for education and workshops.2 The following 
mapping provides an overview of these interventions according to the typology 
presented in Chapter 8:
Type of interventions At state level At customary level
Law reform interventions – Research-related activities; 
proposal to abolish repugnancy 
clause and to make traditional 
law subject to human rights as 
recorded in the Constitution 
(Zambia Law Development 
Commission – no involvement 
of development actors)
– Research and so-called 
restatement of customary law 
norms regarding marriage 
with codification as long-
term objective (Zambia Law 
Development Commission 
– no involvement of 
development actors)
– Stimulating the debate 
in communities about 
procedural and substantial 
traditional law norms 
(Women for Change – several 
development actors)
2 Personal interviews with representatives of van Women for Change, Lusaka (Zambia), 
November–December 2009.
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Type of interventions At state level At customary level
Institutional support and 
reform interventions
– Infrastructural and 
organisational support 
for local courts; revision 
of procedures for the 
appointment of members of 
local courts; improving case 
documentation in local courts 
(Judiciary/Ministry of Justice – 
DANIDA/EU) 
– Proposal to recognise tradi-
tional justice forums (Zambia 
Law Development Commis-
sion – no involvement of 
development actors)
Strengthening of the 
legal community (justice 
providers)
– Education for judges and 
staff of local courts regarding 
justice, documentation 
and procedures (Judiciary/ 
Ministry of Justice – DANIDA/
EU) and regarding children’s 
rights (UNICEF – several 
development actors) 
– Education for traditional 
leaders regarding human 
rights and national legislation 
(Women for Change – several 
development actors)
Empowering justice users – Human rights education and awareness programmes (several 
civil society organisations – several development actors)
– Awareness programmes aimed at children (UNICEF – several 
development actors)
The above table is an overview of interventions regarding traditional justice 
as these were executed in Zambia. The table follows the division into kinds of 
interventions as presented in section 3.1.3.3. of this book. The table also includes 
several interventions of the Zambia Law Development Commission: first of all 
the proposal to abolish the so-called repugnancy clause and to make traditional 
law subject to human rights as recorded in the Constitution. Secondly, the study 
that was performed for the Commission and that investigated the customary law 
norms and practices regarding marriage and the proposals resulting from this 
study for a restatement and, in the long term, codification of traditional marriage 
law. This is aimed at increasing uniformity and alleviating the tensions with 
human rights. Thirdly, the Commission’s proposal for the abolishment of the 
local courts and the recognition of the unofficial traditional law forums. In is 
noteworthy that, as far as we could tell, the development actors working in the 
Zambia justice sector have not been involved in the creation of these proposals 
and have hardly involved themselves in this process either. During our field study, 
we found that these actors were barely aware of the details of said proposals and 
that they especially rejected the abolishment of the local courts.
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7. CONCLUSION
The description of the situation in Zambia that was offered above allows us to 
draw the following conclusions regarding the question how international actors 
that are active in the field of development aid to the Zambian justice sector handle 
traditional law and legal pluralism.
Firstly, it is clear that the development actors in Zambia were exclusively 
aimed at the formal legal system and that they take their lead from the Zambian 
government regarding their position vis-à-vis traditional law. The legal framework 
for legal pluralism as it existed in Zambia led development actors to focus any 
attention for traditional law on the officially recognised local courts. Development 
actors were also hardly aware of existing proposals to adjust this legal framework.
Secondly, it is clear that in cases where interventions of development actors 
did specifically relate to unofficial traditional law, these interventions were 
executed by organisations from the civil society. These organisations were 
generally sensitive to the local contexts where traditional law applies and opted 
for an intercultural approach to the advancement of human rights. The extent 
of these programmes, however, was limited and did not seem to result in more 
influence for justice users in determining policy within the justice sector.
Development actors therefore hardly seem to be aware of legal pluralism 
approaches to justice. Development aid to the Zambia justice sector seemed to 
pay little attention to the existence of several legal orders that are interrelated and 
influence each other. Where there was any attention for legal pluralism, it was 
aimed at reforms to the institutional framework for legal pluralism, and this by 
national actors.
As it was the case in the case study on Malawi, the case study on Zambia 
shows that, since most interventions in the justice sector were aimed at the formal 
legal system, the way that the state approaches the justice sector and the role of 
traditional law is of the utmost importance. As yet, the Zambian state does not 
consider the development of the unofficial traditional justice sector a priority. 
It is unclear how much support the proposal of the Zambian Law Development 
Commission can count on. The attention of both the state and the development 
partners is concentrated on strengthening the official local courts and their role 
in the current formal legal system. This reflects a certain conception of traditional 
law that does not primarily take the views, experiences and expectations of the 
law users into account. This may change if the proposal to abolish the local courts 
and to recognise the traditional law forums gains momentum. The introduction 
of the new system could in principle lead to a proper division of tasks between the 
customary law and the formal law system, and to relieving the tension between 
traditional law and human rights. However, it remains to be seen whether this 
will actually happen in practice.
Development actors in Zambia have not concerned themselves with the 
proposal to recognise the traditional law forums, which are still unofficial. This 
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could change in the future. Much will depend on the position the Zambian 
government takes regarding the reform proposals. If the proposal to abolish 
local courts and to recognise traditional law forums gains momentum, this 
could generate renewed interest in legal pluralism and traditional justice in the 
development aid to the Zambian justice sector. It is, however, far too early to be 
able to determine whether this will also result in improved access to and better 
quality of justice in Zambia.
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CHAPTER 15
FROM ADDRESSING LOCAL LEGAL 
ORDERS TO EMBRACING LEGAL 
PLURALISM
Giselle Corradi and Lia Nijzink
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 8, four types of possible interventions dealing with local legal orders 
and legal pluralism were identified: legislative reforms, institutional support 
and reforms, capacity building for justice providers and empowerment of justice 
seekers. In addition, Chapter 8 provided examples of how the first three can 
be deployed at the level of state justice and/or at the level of local legal orders. 
Based on the case studies presented in Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14 on Malawi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia respectively, this chapter pinpoints 
salient trends regarding the sort of interventions that international development 
actors are supporting in this domain. Subsequently, it analyses how these trends 
relate to the socio-legal theories sketched out in Chapter 10 and explores how 
current strategies can be improved by incorporating these insights. The chapter 
argues that the emerging will amongst some development actors to address local 
legal orders is a step in the right direction, but in most cases strategies remain 
state centred instead of embracing a legally plural perspective.
2. THE CONTEXT OF INTERVENTIONS
Despite the growing international attention for local legal orders, as reflected 
in various guidelines issued by development agencies, this topic was not yet 
systematically considered within justice sector aid in the countries included in this 
study. Most interventions in the justice sector were directed at formal state justice 
and tended to ignore other legal orders and how the state relates to them. The 
emerging interest in local legal orders seems to be counter-balanced by a number 
of factors that contribute to the perpetuation of a narrow focus on state law and 
justice. Current aid modalities, such as direct budget support and sector-wide 
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approaches (SWAPS), are crafted upon a template in which international 
development actors’ main partner is the recipient state, thus working according to 
a logic that reinforces the lack of attention to other sources of authority and justice 
provision. The research in Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia clearly 
showed that state driven interventions tended to privilege state justice. When 
they were directed at local legal orders, this was limited to officially recognised 
local legal orders that in some cases were created by the state itself, such as the 
community courts in Mozambique. Interventions directed at unofficial local 
legal orders were mainly supported by NGOs. At the same time, there was little 
consideration for legal pluralism as such, i.e. how to deal with the co-existence 
between different legal orders and sources of justice provision in a same socio-
political space, how non-state normative fields interplay with state law and vice 
versa.
Given this context, it is not surprising that most interventions that targeted 
local legal orders took the form of capacity building for local justice providers 
and justice seekers regarding state law. As the case studies show, international 
development actors tend to support the provision of trainings for local justice 
providers and justice seekers on human rights principles, national legislation 
embodying human rights and civic education in general. In a few cases, 
interventions were aimed at providing information about the jurisdictional 
boundaries between state and local legal orders as established by state law. 
This demonstrates that engagement with local legal orders does not necessarily 
imply engagement with legal pluralism. These interventions remained centred 
on state law without questioning the extent to which the state is actually in a 
position to implement and enforce this legislation. In some cases, support for the 
provision of paralegal and mediation services at grassroots level constituted an 
exception to this trend. On the one hand, some paralegal organisations combined 
state and non-state norms when giving advice and mediating disputes, rather 
than relying on state law exclusively. On the other hand, these organisations 
constituted another layer of justice provision, contributing to the existence of 
legal pluralism. However, we did not come across any independent evaluation 
considering how this has an impact on access to justice and human rights.1 
Finally, the participation of local justice providers within policy development in 
the justice sector was quite limited in the cases that were studied. Even if this 
involves considerable challenges in the countries considered, international actors 
were seldom proactive in facilitating the views of local justice providers and the 
experiences of justice seekers with local legal orders and legal pluralism to be 
represented in decision-making processes.
1 For example, the Sierra Leonean Paralegal Organisations ‘Timap for Justice’ produced a 
number of positive narratives about their work, but we did not find any systematic and 
independent evaluation about the impact of ‘vernacularisation’ initiatives (Merry, 2006) by 
paralegal organisations in the countries considered for this study. 
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3. TRENDS IN THE TYPE OF INTERVENTIONS 
SUPPORTED
3.1. LAW R EFOR M
Law reform initiatives addressing local legal orders were mostly executed at 
the level of state law, i.e. legislation was adopted at state level modifying local 
legal orders. These processes were often supported by international development 
actors who seemed to expect that the adopting such legislation would facilitate 
modification of local practices in order to comply with human rights standards. 
These reforms tended to focus on specific topics or practices, rather than on the 
mechanisms available to demand compliance with human rights in legally plural 
contexts. For example, in Sierra Leone, UNIFEM supported the adoption of the 
‘Gender Laws’ (2007) and the ‘Child Act’ (2007), which domesticated CEDAW and 
CRC. This legislation modified customary practices that discriminate on the basis 
of gender. However, there was no attention for the fact that there are only three 
customary law officers in the entire country to monitor whether this legislation 
was implemented by the local courts, let alone other local forums. Another 
example can be found in Zambia, where international actors were involved in the 
process of legislative reform regarding the minimum age of marriage, while they 
showed no interest in the Law Commission’s proposal to replace the repugnancy 
clause with a model of compliance with the Bill of Rights.
Regarding interventions that aimed at modifying local norms and practices 
directly, i.e. not by means of state laws regulating them, three types of interventions 
were supported. First, international development actors gave support to civil 
society organisations to promote discussions within communities on the content 
of local norms and practices, and their relationship with human rights. Second, 
international development actors financed research on local norms and practices 
and the extent to which these respect human rights. For example, the research 
projects conducted by the ‘Justice for the Poor’ programme in Sierra Leone and 
the Malawi Human Rights Commission. Finally, international development 
actors gave support for writing down customary laws and modifying them if they 
contradicted human rights, i.e. the pilot project for ascertaining the customary 
laws of Sierra Leone in Moyamba district.
3.2 . INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND R EFOR M
The institutional framework for legal pluralism, i.e. how state law accommodates 
and regulates local legal orders is a topic of much study, debate and concrete 
reform proposals. However, international development actors generally do not to 
take a position or intervene regarding these proposals. For example, in Zambia 
international actors showed little interest in a proposal by the Law Commission 
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to recognise the currently unofficial traditional courts, while a proposal by the 
Malawi Law Commission to reintroduce a system of local courts has so far also 
attracted little attention. Similarly, international actors in Mozambique were 
positive about the intention to introduce legislation to regulate the community 
courts but adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach with regards to the two reform 
proposals that were on the table. International actors seemed to be more active 
in interventions involving institutional support or reform of local legal orders, 
such as providing infrastructural support and promoting more female inclusion 
within local forums, although most of these initiatives related only to officially 
recognised local legal orders. For example, in Mozambique, the Danish bilateral 
cooperation supported the creation of new community courts. In Sierra Leone, the 
British bilateral cooperation provided training for local court functionaries, while 
in Zambia, the Danish bilateral cooperation and the EU-supported institutional 
reform and infrastructural support for the local courts. Malawi seemed to be the 
exception with the British bilateral cooperation supporting the Commission for 
Justice and Peace to assist the unofficial traditional justice system with training 
on record keeping and other means to strengthen its procedures.
3.3. STR ENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF JUSTICE 
PROVIDERS
Most interventions aiming at strengthening the capacity of justice providers 
targeted local legal orders. On the one hand, state bodies were supported to 
provide training to local justice providers that are officially recognised by state 
law. For example, in Mozambique and Zambia international actors supported the 
Ministry of Justice to provide training for community courts and local courts 
respectively. These training programmes adopted a state-centred approach, their 
main goal being that local justice providers know better how to respect state law. 
On the other hand, international development actors supported a number of civil 
society organisations that worked with unofficial local justice providers. These 
tended to take a more participatory approach in their training activities. A case 
in point is the organisation Women for Change in Zambia, which directly worked 
with communities and traditional leaders to support ongoing local processes of 
change in the area of gender relations. Another example is Save the Children in 
Mozambique, which cooperated with traditional authorities in devising solutions 
for the social exclusion faced by orphan children.
In contrast we found virtually no training for formal justice providers in 
matters related to local legal orders and legal pluralism. With the exception of 
Mozambique, where the Danish bilateral cooperation gave support to the Centre 
for Legal and Juridical Training to provide courses on legal pluralism to state 
court judges, international actors paid no attention to the need to strengthen the 
awareness of legal pluralism within formal justice institutions.
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3.4. EMPOWERING JUSTICE SEEKERS
Most interventions targeting justice seekers consisted in civic education 
and awareness raising campaigns on human rights, where information was 
disseminated about mainly civil and political rights, as well as specific legislation 
in the area of gender, e.g. the family law, legislation pertaining to children and 
laws on domestic violence. In addition, development actors supported paralegal 
and mediation services provided by NGOs and civil society organisations. In 
a few cases, international actors also assisted the state in providing free legal 
assistance, e.g. in Mozambique. All these interventions were conducted with the 
aim of improving access to justice for the poor. However, besides supporting some 
research, international actors were not active in empowering justice seekers to 
participate in public debates on legal pluralism and the justice sector in general. 
Nor did they support the participation of local justice providers in decision-
making processes within the justice sector, despite the move towards a sector-
wide approach and the emphasis on ownership.
4. ANALYSING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIES
Overall, the fact that in Sub-Saharan Africa development actors at various levels 
start to show a will to look beyond state justice and consider local legal orders 
constitutes a window of opportunity to engage with important realities that have 
often been neglected. However, the empirical findings presented in Part III of this 
book support the critique previously articulated by other authors working on this 
topic: several interventions tend to deal with the issues in a superficial way.2 The 
next paragraphs pinpoint four areas where this is the case, i.e. the kind of actors 
targeted by interventions, the way in which human rights are promoted within 
forums that rely on mediation, the minimal engagement with local knowledge 
and the rare critical approach to human rights’ cross-contextual implementation. 
In addition, this chapter argues that development actors’ engagement with local 
legal orders needs to move beyond a state-centric approach and embrace a legally 
plural perspective.
4.1. ADDR ESSING THE ACTORS ‘AT THE TIP 
OF THE ICEBERG’
The tendency to address local legal orders superficially is visible at the level of 
the actors that most interventions target. Chapters 11 to 14 demonstrate that 
interventions tend to deal with ‘official’ legal actors mainly, which only constitute 
2 Introduction, pp. 10, 11.
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the tip of the iceberg as compared to the multiplicity of actors that are actually 
implicated in local justice processes. While a number of non-governmental 
organisations go beyond this top-down approach to legal pluralism and identify 
and collaborate with ‘less visible’ local actors, such as traditional healers and 
spirit mediums, these organisations tend to work around specific topics, often 
related to human rights, such as domestic violence and widow’s inheritance 
rights, but they are not in a position to articulate an integrated ‘legal pluralism 
and human rights’ strategy. A hypothesis that deserves further exploration is that 
this tendency arises from the paradoxical situation in which, on the one hand, 
international aid has become more focused on the state due to new aid modalities 
such as budget support, while on the other hand, international development actors 
seek to improve access to justice by supporting local legal orders which tend to 
be either overlooked by the state or only partially recognised in state managed 
development programmes. In other words, the emphasis currently placed by the 
international aid architecture on country ownership may result in the official 
framework for legal pluralism and the recipient government’s priorities in this 
regard becoming central to the way in which justice sector aid engages local legal 
orders. This is problematic for several reasons. For one, it only considers legal 
pluralism from a normative standpoint while ignoring it empirically and from the 
perspective of the justice seekers whose capacity to access justice is supposed to 
improve as a result of interventions. Moreover, this approach fails to identify local 
actors that, despite not displaying typically legal characteristics, may nevertheless 
play a vital role in the regulation of behaviour and the protection of human rights 
within local justice processes.
4 .2 . HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN DIFFER ENT MODES 
OF DISPUTE PROCESSING
Another area in which some development actors have tended to understand local 
legal orders superficially in the reviewed case studies involves the implications of 
different modes of dispute processing for the implementation of human rights. As 
explained in Chapter 2, this is crucial in various regards. On the one hand, norms 
play a relative role in defining the outcome of disputes that are processed within 
forums that rely on mediation, which is often the case of local justice forums in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, enforcement of decisions made by these 
forums depends heavily on social pressure, meaning that a widespread consensus 
on the appropriateness of the outcome is needed. Many of the interventions 
described above fail to grasp these issues. In addition, donors are willing to 
provide support for law reform initiatives that domesticate international human 
rights law, but they fail to make available the necessary funding for implementing 
this legislation. Considering the legal and socio-cultural landscapes of Sub-
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Saharan Africa, this should be considered as important as the adoption of the 
right laws by the legal orders of the state.
Interventions that aim at training local justice providers on human rights also 
tend to overlook the difficulties of implementing these standards within forums 
that rely on mediation. The purpose of these interventions is that the decisions 
made by local justice providers respect and protect human rights. However, 
local justice providers who rely on mediation need to arrive at decisions that are 
considered appropriate by those involved in the dispute, not the least because 
otherwise it will be difficult to enforce them and the effectiveness of the forum 
may decline. The same line of reasoning applies to those interventions that provide 
mediation services by ‘human rights minded’ actors at grassroots level, such as 
paralegals. For the services of mediators to be effective, compliance with decisions 
is necessary. This is difficult to achieve when mediators deviate too much from 
what is locally enforceable by consensus and the state is not available to enforce 
decisions by coercive means or cast ‘the shadow of the law’. As a result, these 
interventions can only produce gradual changes that need to be accompanied by 
sustained efforts at other levels, such as grassroots dialogue on human rights and 
the implementation of national policies in education, health, land, etc. that are 
conducive to broader social changes in line with human rights. A hypothesis that 
needs further exploration is that these constraints may be mitigated by improving 
the collaboration between local and state justice providers. As illustrated by 
Chapters 11, 12 and 14, these strategies have not always been consistently pursued.
4.3. MINIMAL ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE
In addition, most of the studied interventions seem to ignore local knowledge. 
This is mainly the case of state sponsored interventions seeking to disseminate 
national legislation embodying human rights by means of one-off, unidirectional 
legal education campaigns at grassroots level. But even certain awareness 
raising campaigns that target problems identified by means of participatory 
methodologies and that rely on an accessible language to bring the message, such 
as community theatre, seem to fail to appreciate local knowledge when they refer 
to state laws as the only solution. It seems that research on how local normative 
orders relate to the problems at hand and may contribute to providing local 
answers constitutes a strategy that only a few organisations follow.
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4.4. APPROACHING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CRITICAL 
WAY
Viewed from another perspective, this may reflect a tendency to take issue with the 
problem of lack of knowledge about human rights at local level, without looking 
at human rights in a critical way and acknowledging the challenge of cross-
cultural and cross-contextual implementation. For example, more research is 
needed on the extent to which human rights, in their current form or mainstream 
interpretation, are equipped to contain non-state forms of power involved in the 
administration of justice within local forums, such as traditional authorities and 
spirit mediums. Moreover, development actors tend to support interventions that 
take the form of capacity building for local justice providers and local justice 
users by means of training and awareness raising on human rights but only a 
few NGO-led initiatives seem to embark on truly dialogical processes that make 
room for bottom-up inputs that explore how local narratives of human dignity 
may contribute to enriching human rights.
Finally, interventions rarely focus on building the capacity of state justice 
providers to apply human rights cross-culturally and in relation to local legal 
orders, or on how national policies and legislation may need to be adapted in 
order to respect human rights embodied in local norms.
4.5. EMBR ACING A LEGALLY PLUR AL PERSPECTIVE
Finally, most interventions show little awareness of the semi-autonomous nature 
of normative orders, including state law. For example, interventions aiming at 
improving access to justice by building state courts at lower administrative levels 
often neglect how these courts’ operation interplays with that of local justice 
forums. Similarly, legal education campaigns tend to overlook how state laws relate 
to local social institutions and normative repertoires, as well as how the latter may 
enable or constrain the implementation of state laws. In the case studies examined 
in this book, this was mainly a shortcoming within those interventions designed 
by governmental bodies, whereas a number of non-governmental and civil society 
organisations did explore this issue (e.g. Save the Children in Mozambique with 
respect to orphan children and their inheritance rights). In other words, justice 
sector aid should not only address local legal orders, but should also do so from a 
legally plural perspective.
5. THE WAY FORWARD
These general findings and the insights presented throughout Part III of this book 
clearly show that socio-legal theory may feed into the practices of development 
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actors and improve them. A question that follows is how development actors at 
different levels may capitalise on these insights and how they may take account of 
these five findings within the different types of intervention they support.
Considering that international development actors generally participate in 
these processes as donors, technical advisors and stakeholders in policy dialogue, 
and that their main goal is ‘state building’, these actors are likely to intervene 
mainly at the level of strengthening the capacity of governmental actors, as 
duty bearers, to deal with local legal orders, legal pluralism and human rights. 
At the same time, donors also provide funding and technical advice for non-
governmental actors, such as international and national NGOs and civil society 
organisations so they also play an important role in supporting right holders 
indirectly. In this context, donors may lobby, provide funds and technical advice 
for legal and institutional reform, where they can facilitate empirical studies to 
inform the discussions and policy options on how legal pluralism and human 
rights work on the ground. As well as providing funding for studies that uncover 
the extent to which local legal orders contravene and/or reinforce human rights, 
donors may provide support to domestic governmental and non-governmental 
actors for the organisation of inclusive discussions that are informed by these 
studies and make room for bottom-up contributions. In addition, it is equally 
important that they provide funding to the ministries that are supposed to 
implement reforms and that they make available technical advice regarding how 
to deal with the interplay between state and local normative orders. At the level of 
building the capacity of justice providers, donors may support trainings for state 
magistrates on legal pluralism, local normative orders and the cross-contextual 
implementation of national laws embodying international standards, as well as 
dialogic encounters between state and local justice providers. They may also offer 
technical assistance to governmental actors for devising trainings for local justice 
providers so that the determination of which actors get involved and the issues 
that are discussed are grounded on local experiences. Finally, donors may support 
local civil society organisations by means of funding and technical advice so that 
they are in a position to engage in political dialogue with governmental actors 
and formulate internal demands on these issues.
In turn, governmental actors need to acknowledge that their policies and 
interventions need to go beyond support for officially recognised local legal 
orders. Ensuring that officially recognised local justice providers operate in a fair 
manner is a huge task in and of itself and requires important efforts, but it can 
only yield sustainable results when unofficial justice providers are also involved. 
Furthermore, governmental actors need to consider how attempts to improve 
access to justice by expanding the reach of state courts may become more effective 
by establishing better forms of cooperation with local justice providers. This 
requires an open but critical mind set where local normative orders are neither 
a priori condemned as inferior nor simply embraced. Local and international 
experts can collaborate with policymakers and state authorities in order to 
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improve their knowledge base in this domain. At the level of support for right 
holders to know their rights, governmental actors may want to invest more efforts 
in adapting their message to local realities, concerns and demands while looking 
at how interventions can capitalise on local norms and practices that reinforce 
human rights. In addition, these interventions need to generate dialogic spaces 
in order to discuss how national legislation relates to local practices and norms 
and vice versa.
International non-governmental organisations are prone to work with 
national non-governmental actors, who in turn support justice users. Depending 
on the capacity of these local organisations, international non-governmental 
partners may support them in generating a domestic demand for addressing 
the challenges posed by legal pluralism. Both international and national non-
governmental actors may also provide technical advice within national policies 
and state-sponsored interventions. National civil society organisations also 
collaborate with domestic governments in the implementation of certain 
strategies, such as the dissemination of state laws. In this regard, these 
organisations may generate valuable knowledge on local realities and adapt their 
strategies accordingly, as well as promote that local contributions feed back into 
national processes of policymaking and law reform.
These recommendations reflect the view that justice sector aid in legally 
plural Africa requires that interventions at different levels reinforce each other 
and address both sides of the coin, i.e. provision and demand. Moreover, 
making state justice more responsive to local realities by taking account of the 
legally plural medium in which state justice institutions are immersed may 
indirectly contribute to improving the operation of local justice processes in 
general. A  number of factors may nonetheless constrain development actors’ 
implementation of the above suggested recommendations. First, one of the issues 
that was raised by policymakers during the field research and at the international 
forum in Cape Town is that the resources allocated to the justice sector are limited 
as compared to other sectors such as health, education, and infrastructure. That 
said, some of these recommendations require more a change in mind sets than 
big changes in fund allocation. Second, the justice sector tends to be fragmented 
so that generating participatory policy dialogues may be a complex undertaking. 
Nevertheless, some experiences from other countries in the region suggest that 
the exercise is worth trying.3 Finally, there are a series of constraints related to 
the availability of local capacity, such as a limited choice of appropriate local 
partners, and a low knowledge base on the extent to which human rights, in their 
current form, are able to contain abuses of power by authorities other than the 
state. These issues require a constant effort to generate new knowledge and test 
its applicability.
3 See Rawls, 2011.
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However, one might question whether the issue is confined to improving the 
strategies that underpin the practice of development actors? According to Stephens 
(2009), the issue that bedevils development practice in all fields of endeavour is 
how to bring about policy and institutional change in an environment that is 
hostile to reform. According to him, there are three pre-conditions for advancing 
a policy agenda: political support, resources and a coherent strategy. The main 
contribution of Part III of this book lies with the third element. In other words, 
this analysis may hopefully contribute to overcoming relatively ‘benign’ though 
not to be underestimated constraints, such as the lack of coherent theories of social 
change or epistemological bias in justice sector aid and human rights assistance. 
However, how to generate political support and a genuine commitment to the 
implementation of coherent strategies, while making enough resources available 
to achieve this end, are amongst the topics that researchers in this field may want 
to investigate further.
Complementary research may explore how the internal organisational logic 
and political interests of different development actors may enable or constrain the 
implementation of these strategies. Studies may examine the interplay between 
donors’ policies at headquarters level and their implementation at country level. 
They may also elucidate what international actors are able to influence within 
justice sector national policies in this domain. At another level, additional research 
may deepen the findings presented here by documenting the impact of specific 
interventions that incorporate any of the above suggested recommendations. In 
particular, researchers may want to focus on the extent to which development 
practice in this area contributes to more inclusive interpretations and definitions 
of human rights as well as the factors that influence this. More generally, further 
research is needed on how the paradigms of justice that underpin the operation of 
local legal orders relate to specific human rights standards in their current form. 
On the one hand, this may yield valuable insights into whether human rights 
standards need to be revisited in order to contain abuses of power by authorities 
administering justice outside the realm of the state. On the other, it may uncover 
alternative ways of protecting human dignity, which may enrich our global 
possibilities to claim and enjoy human rights.
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CHAPTER 16
EMBRACING LEGAL PLURALISM: 
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Giselle Corradi, Lia Nijzink and Martien Schotsmans
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to a number of important differences between transitional justice and justice 
sector aid, this book explored how international actors address ‘traditional justice’ 
in these fields in two distinct parts, which has led to separate analyses. Justice 
sector aid is often part of broader development cooperation programmes, which 
may or may not take place in a post-conflict country. Transitional justice processes 
are part of conflict-related international interventions, such as peacebuilding 
programmes, which are often implemented before the wheels of more long-
term development cooperation programmes are set in motion. Chronologically 
speaking, both kinds of programmes – support for transitional justice and justice 
sector aid – often do not run parallel, although there can be overlaps. It also 
turns out that the international actors are not necessarily the same. Although in 
principle the same donor countries are involved, justice sector aid is often provided 
by bilateral or multilateral development organisations, while transitional justice 
interventions are more often – but certainly not exclusively – initiatives of specific 
agencies aimed at post-conflict reconstruction, which are established by several 
donor countries. Although respect for human rights is heavily emphasised in both 
domains, policy and interventions regarding transitional justice also need to take 
international norms regarding the criminal prosecution of international crimes 
into account. In spite of these differences, this concluding chapter formulates a 
number of mutual findings and recommendations. First, it discusses common 
elements at the level of policies, then it identifies a number of trends regarding 
interventions, and finally it examines the way in which international actors 
handle the tension between traditional justice and human rights.
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2. POLICIES IN THE FIELD OF TRADITIONAL 
JUSTICE
Both parts of this book show that international actors rely on a discourse of respect 
for the guidelines of the Paris Declaration regarding ownership in order to justify 
that their support is aligned with the policy of the recipient government. In other 
words, if the government proposes a certain approach towards traditional justice, 
international actors are inclined to follow this approach without being too critical 
about it.
In the field of justice sector aid, support for traditional justice is justified by 
rhetoric of improved access to justice for the poor, but at the same time this seems 
to be optional. The cases considered in Part III of this book demonstrate that 
when recipient governments pay marginal attention to this topic, international 
actors do not question this. Despite the guidelines that were produced by several 
international actors regarding the relevance of traditional justice and legal 
pluralism in the context of justice sector aid, country representatives of these 
organisations tend to look at these issues as a matter of choice. In the field of 
transitional justice an evolution occurred from internationally imposed standard 
models towards more attention for strategies adapted to the local context and 
based more on local ownership. If tradition-based mechanisms are part of the 
official transitional justice policy, international actors will support it. If they are 
not, the funding of any possible unofficial initiatives is mostly left to international 
NGOs or foundations. If traditional mechanisms are part of the official policy 
but are not yet operational, actors take an attitude of wait and see, and they will 
mainly support preparatory actions.
This implies that the perspectives and experiences of justice seekers in 
both fields are not always considered. Moreover, justice seekers’ perspectives 
seem to have little influence if they run against state policy or the preferences of 
international actors. Especially in cases of transitional justice, this leaves gaps on 
the level of accountability mechanisms at the local level. As mentioned earlier, 
ownership is one of the principles of the Paris Declaration that international 
policies rely on. While ownership was initially understood exclusively as state 
ownership, attention has more recently shifted towards the importance of 
participation of the civil society. But which civil society organisations are in a 
position to represent the multiple experiences and stakes of justice seekers? This 
book shows that international actors are too quickly satisfied with participation 
from actors of civil society, without answering these questions in depth. And even 
when civil society participates, the question remains to what extent this opinion 
is taken into account when policy is made. Recently, the field of transitional 
justice started to attach great importance to consulting the population, but the 
instruments used to do so do not always take the evolving nature of public opinion 
into account, nor the complexity of the world views on justice and reconciliation 
that people have. Often, consultative instruments only ask about the opinion of 
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justice seekers concerning a certain conflict resolution mechanism or a certain 
legal order, without inquiring after their view on broader issues. Within justice 
sector aid, international actors are increasingly financing studies on justice 
seekers’ experiences in legally plural contexts, but these studies are seldom 
considered the cornerstone of policy development.
3. TRENDS IN INTERVENTIONS ADDRESSING 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE
Another common finding is that international actors supporting transitional 
justice and justice sector aid do not adopt a legally plural perspective. In the case 
of justice sector aid, international actors may support interventions addressing 
local legal orders, but as explained in Chapter 15, this is not the same as engaging 
with the dynamics and challenges that exist due to the co-existence of multiple 
normative sources in a same social field. Moreover, in most cases this involves 
support for officially recognised traditional justice, which is only one amongst 
the many layers of local justice provision. Although to date legal pluralism is 
hardly referred to in transitional justice, the trend is the same. Since traditional 
mechanisms as such are rarely suited for dealing with international crimes, they 
are usually adjusted and mixed with international norms, creating tradition-
based, hybrid mechanisms. International actors often base their decision to 
support such mechanisms on the extent to which they are part of the official policy 
(‘official legal pluralism’), and – due to concerns with criminal accountability 
for international crimes – on the extent to which they differ from international 
norms. There is little room for supporting tradition-based views on accountability 
for crimes that heavily deviate from international norms as an alternative for 
retributive prosecutions.
In addition, both parts of this book indicate that most interventions related 
to traditional justice opt for a top-down approach, which is characterised by a 
lack of dialogue. Only in a few cases was a more bottom-up approach advanced 
and supported. Even if the outcome of bottom-up approaches is unpredictable, 
mutual openness and the creation of dialogic spaces are essential in order to 
attain an integrated approach to justice that takes peoples’ ‘hybrid’ experiences 
into account. The investigated interventions show that international actors would 
be wise to increase their awareness of ‘interlegality’, i.e. the fact that people rely 
and combine several legal orders (Santos, 2002). Traditional justice, its values and 
its mechanisms for dispute processing, occupy an important position in the legal 
landscapes of all the countries considered in this book. It is therefore important 
that interventions take into account how these interplay with state legal orders. 
In other words, more important than considering legal pluralism as a matter of 
policy choice, development actors need to understand it as an empirical reality 
that impacts interventions one way or the other. Hence, the need to engage with it.
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4. STRATEGIES REGARDING THE TENSION 
BETWEEN TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Concerning the tension between traditional justice and human rights, Parts II 
and III of this book show that international actors deploy a range of strategies 
to advance human rights within tradition-based legal orders and mechanisms 
of dispute processing. These strategies are mainly ‘legal’. However, the extent to 
which human rights are respected and protected is linked to broader societal 
preconditions leading to their institutionalisation (Rask Madsen et al., 2013). 
These issues are often overlooked and left unaddressed by interventions. In 
addition, most interventions tend to look at legal orders in isolation, i.e. they 
examine whether a certain legal order respects human rights or not. By contrast, 
a legally plural perspective points to the need to assess which actors rely on which 
normative orders and for which purposes. Such perspective demonstrates that 
justice seekers combine legal orders and contest them, sometimes by relying on 
human rights. By understanding how different actors relate to multiple normative 
orders in their quest for justice and the role of human rights therein, interventions 
can build on ongoing dynamics of social change. In the field of transitional justice 
in particular, the international community is one of these actors, either through 
its interest to end conflicts and bring about sustainable peace, or because the 
nature of international crimes forces the community to take action following 
internationally agreed upon norms. This is why its values and objectives – next 
to those of the locally involved individuals and those of the national authorities 
of the country concerned – are also important. Mutual acknowledgement and 
acceptance of each other’s values, stakes and interpretations of human rights 
can lead to hybrid strategies to deal with past crimes that are legitimate and 
acceptable to the different stakeholders involved. This requires, every time and in 
each country, a dialogical process. This can consume a lot of time and go against 
the already time-bound nature of the interventions of international actors. This 
might be uncomfortable for international actors, but it is essential nonetheless.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the main objectives of this book is to orientate future strategies of 
international actors regarding traditional justice in the fields of transitional 
justice and justice sector aid. To this end, this section formulates a number of 
concrete recommendations based on the analyses presented in Parts II and III.
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5.1. R ECOMMENDATIONS R EGAR DING TR ANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE
5.1.1. Refine the Concept of Local Ownership
– First of all, policymakers, who in application of the Paris Declaration 
rightfully align their policy with the policy of the partner country, are 
encouraged to understand local ownership not as merely state ownership but 
as national ownership.
– This means that the views of non-state stakeholders should be taken into 
account in developing and implementing the official transitional justice 
policy, through dialogue with civil society and popular consultations.
– The needs for transitional justice existing at the local level should be assessed, 
especially if victims and offenders need to coexist after the conflict. Since 
it turns out that there is not just a need for reintegration or reconciliation 
at this level, but also a need for mechanisms to establish (non-criminal) 
accountability for crimes, and that the lack thereof can lead to tensions and 
stigmatisation with the potential to threaten sustainable peace, it is important 
to examine the potential of local, tradition-based mechanisms.
– Even if certain activities or initiatives do not feature in the official transitional 
justice policy but are still identified as being important by civil society and/
or the population, donors should consider to support these, and should not 
leave this to non-state donors or international NGOs, so that systematic and 
coherent support, including the necessary guarantees and oversight, can be 
developed.
– When searching for local views, one should make sure to consult a broad 
range of representative stakeholders and not automatically assume that 
representatives of civil society effectively reflect the population’s opinions.
– There should also be consideration of the evolution of opinions and needs 
over time, depending on the country’s security situation and other aspects 
of the post-conflict situation, meaning that local views should regularly be 
inquired after and that the developed policy should be sufficiently flexible to 
take this evolution into account.
– It is important to realise that local views on justice and reconciliation are part 
of a cosmovision, which may be unfamiliar to the West, as certain questions 
in surveys show. If international actors wish to encourage local ownership 
they should keep an open mind for the complex, sometimes divergent or 
conflicting views that may come to the fore, and which may also deserve 
support.
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5.1.2. Understand Transitional Justice Holistically
– Human rights tensions identified in transitional justice are often not limited to 
traditional justice, since this is part of a wider social, political context and the 
power relations in that context, which may be conservative, discriminatory 
or even conflict-generating, meaning that an isolated approach to traditional 
mechanisms and practices is useless.
– This is best illustrated by the ways both offenders and victims of sexual 
violence are treated, since the importance of restoring social harmony is taken 
into account more than the interests and views of the individuals involved. 
If the use of tradition-based mechanisms is considered for addressing sexual 
violence, the context needs to be carefully considered.
– It is furthermore important not to understand tradition as something from 
which certain fragmentary elements can be isolated to increase legitimacy or 
ownership of activities in the eyes of the population. ‘Localising’ an already 
existing mechanism by selectively adding a few traditional elements, such 
as ritual cleansing, can – depending on the context – lead to unexpected 
and even harmful results, which conflict with the ‘do no harm’ principle. 
International actors have a responsibility for the choices they make, also with 
respect to the local population that bears the consequences.
– Donors also need to be aware of the impact that the choices they make in 
the context of peacebuilding (such as empowering traditional leaders to 
take part in peace negotiations or supporting traditional ceremonies during 
demobilisation) can eventually have on choices to be made in transitional 
justice, since their support can reinforce or decrease the legitimacy of certain 
mechanisms.
– Both exchanges with civil society and consultations with the population 
should therefore be supplemented with more in-depth research, on the one 
hand of a legal-anthropological nature (a combination of already conducted 
studies from the pre-conflict period and new research in light of the conflict), 
on the other hand of a political nature. Only a careful analysis of the specific 
context, combined with legal anthropological and political studies, can bring 
the complex combination of divergent views, values and power relations to 
light.
– There should also be sufficient attention for the interdependence between the 
local, national and international levels. A one-sided emphasis on tradition-
based solutions entails a risk of limiting responsibility for the conflict and 
the response to it, exclusively to the local level. This could imply that both the 
responsibility and legitimate interest of the national and international level 
can be underappreciated, and the impact of the (in)action at one level on the 
results at the other level could be underestimated.
– Every donor intervention regarding transitional justice should therefore 
involve a preliminary analysis and research phase lasting several months. 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   234 21-4-2015   12:29:23
Intersentia 235
Chapter 16.  Embracing Legal Pluralism: General Conclusion
2n
d  p
ro
of
This would allow for a more holistic approach to transitional justice, which 
acknowledges the interconnectedness and equal importance of the local, 
national and international levels, which would allow for the formulation and 
implementation of a coherent strategy, allowing interventions to be planned 
and checks and balances to be included accordingly.
5.1.3. Support Transitional Justice as a Hybridisation Process
– Checks and balances, however, cannot be imposed from a hierarchal top-
down position. Clauses in peace agreements or funding contracts that subject 
the use of tradition-based mechanisms to the integration of international 
standards and human rights are not effective in themselves, since they only 
strive to transplant norms from one normative order to another.
– Donors should be aware that clashes between various, overlapping normative 
orders can occur in all societies and at any moment, and are therefore a 
reality that is not limited to post-conflict countries, though they can be more 
pronounced in post-conflict countries because of the fundamental choices 
that are necessary in the framework of transitional justice.
– Hence, donors should, besides automatically integrating a preliminary 
research phase, be prepared to invest in preliminary, dialectical, time-
consuming processes to create legitimate, hybrid transitional justice 
mechanisms, orders and standards, by combining a particular society’s 
underlying, traditional values with international human rights and criminal 
law norms (such as the processes donors have been supporting in Uganda and 
Burundi).
– If donors engage in the above, they should be aware that this will require 
long-term, enduring efforts, together with diplomatic interventions to 
maintain the transitional justice momentum. They should also be aware that 
stakeholders who are involved in the process do not only expect (financial 
and diplomatic) support to the process itself, but also to its outcome (i.e. the 
transitional justice mechanisms).
– The new, hybrid mechanisms created by such processes will be unique to the 
country involved and cannot be transplanted to other post-conflict countries, 
nor can one hope that this will lead to a new standard model for tradition-
based justice and reconciliation mechanisms. Nevertheless, the experience 
with several of these processes could lead to a new transitional justice 
paradigm, based on ‘strong’ legal pluralism.
– Donors should therefore be aware of their crucial position in this process, 
even if it is uncomfortable.
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5.2 . R ECOMMENDATIONS R EGAR DING JUSTICE SECTOR 
AID
5.2.1. Adopt a Dynamic Perspective on Local Legal Orders and Human Rights
– All legal orders are contested and change, including so-called ‘traditional’ 
ones. The same applies to human rights. Diverse views may be embedded 
in conflicting interests and power differentials. This often determines whose 
version prevails. Development actors can take account of these issues by 
providing support for inclusive processes of dialogue and decision-making. 
This could take the form of capacity building for marginalised stakeholders at 
local level to participate in grassroots debates about human rights and access 
to justice or lobbying so that local views and experiences are considered 
within national policies.
– Local legal orders should not be seen as isolated normative frameworks, 
nor as alternatives to state justice. Justice seekers rely on and combine both. 
Moreover, the extent to which local normative orders uphold human rights 
is often influenced by the availability of state justice and the knowledge of 
state law. Therefore, support for local legal orders should not be seen as a 
replacement for support to state justice.
– Regarding the promotion of human rights within local justice processes, 
international actors should provide training to governmental and civil 
society actors on dialogical and intercultural methodologies (see Chapter 10). 
This means that education on state law and human rights at grassroots level 
should include a discussion of how these relate to locally existing normative 
orders.
5.2.2. Adopt a Legally Plural Perspective
– International actors should understand the difference between normative 
and empirical legal pluralism, since these two aspects of the phenomenon 
may lead to different types of intervention (see Chapter 10).
– Engaging local legal orders is not the same as addressing legal pluralism. 
A  legally plural perspective entails understanding which normative 
repertoires and justice forums are available in a certain locality, how they 
interact with each other and how this affects access to justice and human 
rights. Development actors can finance research on these issues and lobby so 
that these insights are taken into account within justice sector policies.
– Development actors should also support initiatives that contribute to a better 
collaboration between state and local justice providers, such as encounters 
where both share their views and experiences, observation of each others’ 
work, etc. This should be accompanied by training on legal pluralism and 
International Actors and Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.indd   236 21-4-2015   12:29:23
Intersentia 237
Chapter 16.  Embracing Legal Pluralism: General Conclusion
2n
d  p
ro
of
cross-cultural approaches to human rights in order to avoid state justice 
providers adopting a superior position.
5.2.3. Adopt a Power-Informed Perspective
– Development actors should be aware of the fact that norms and justice forums 
constitute ‘resources’ that justice seekers mobilise in order to advance their 
interests. Legal education about human rights and state laws, especially when 
these activities include discussions on how these relate to local normative 
orders, can therefore empower marginalised populations. The same applies 
to initiatives that improve marginalised groups’ access to forums that uphold 
these laws.
– However, state law and state justice are not always the best or only resource. 
In some cases, justice seekers may find better protection in local norms and 
forums. Development actors can provide support for legal anthropological 
studies producing knowledge on which normative orders deserve which kind 
of protection and to whom, particularly in the area of gender and natural 
resource management. This knowledge should form the basis of further 
interventions.
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